Daily Report
Latin America

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Cuba

Aldana Report to ANPP on Counterrevolution

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[Speech by Politburo member Carlos Aldana during the 10th Regular Session of the National Assembly of the People's Government, ANPP, at the Havana Palace of Conventions on 27 December—recorded]

[Text] Comrade Fidel, Comrade Escalona, comrades, deputies, and guests:

I have the duty, which I fulfill with pleasure and which I consider an honor, to present to you some basic considerations regarding the second part of the subject that we began discussing last night. I also plan to share some information and facts that we believe you should know in order to fully understand some events and problems. I am also interested in presenting some thoughts for the purpose of initiating the study of this subject.

Perhaps the formulation of the statement that has been used—counterrevolutionary behavior—might suggest an approach in terms of political sociology or social psychology, yet we understand that this problem, this reality, should be approached primarily from the ideological or political point of view, without excluding alternate or other approaches—let us say scientific approaches—to the phenomena, nor diminishing the importance of such efforts. But this is a question of the very essence of the problem and how we revolutionary militants, representatives of the people's will, cadres of the revolution, should understand it and confront it under the present circumstances.

It is possible that for some, the very use of the term counterrevolution might seem something that belongs to the past. It might seem a historical category, something for museums, something that belongs to the heroic times and legend of the revolution. This notion has some real foundation, if looked at from the perspective that the counterrevolution was defeated and annihilated in our country. This historical defeat, which took place under remarkably difficult conditions of struggle, sacrifice, tenacity, firmness, and heroism by the masses, and was carried out mainly by our working class—the workers, and all the people—represents one of the most glorious chapters of these already more than three decades of revolution.

In this, we must necessarily find the precedents and teachings that are vital to understanding the present and to guiding our struggle against the enemies of the revolution at the present time. We are here today in this assembly—and this assembly exists—because the counterrevolution was defeated. Had our enemies reached their goals, none of us would be here, because those of us who did not die would be fighting. Of course, no one would now be asking us to implement a multiparty system. No one would be asking us to go back in time toward capitalism. No one would try to alienate the social conscience of our people with the siren songs of the so-called market economy.

The fact that the counterrevolution was defeated, that the people themselves defeated all those attempts, gives the present counterrevolutionary efforts particular characteristics. Let it not be forgotten that in the first years after 1 January 1959, we faced, at times, approximately 300 counterrevolutionary organizations in the country. It could be said that this was the period when the multiparty trend flourished in Cuba. We confronted the problem of banditry in every region of the country. Even here, very close to where we are gathered, there were counterrevolutionary uprisings.

U.S. might has not been unleashed against any other Latin American country in a more systematic and cruel manner. All the forms of sabotage, all the actions aimed at destroying our economy, our country's resources, at murdering the leader of the revolution, were put into practice at that time. It is appropriate to remember that at a given time the United States considered the counterrevolutionary organizations which it had fostered in one way or another in the country as too incompetent, and decided to directly and immediately take the reigns of the counterrevolutionary movement in Cuba. For this purpose, the United States established the largest, most numerous, and best funded CIA station that has ever existed since World War II. It occupied a complex of buildings in Florida, and through several front enterprises and institutions it conducted its efforts to overthrow the revolution during the years following the October missile crisis.

The defeat of these plans created a lull of several years in organized counterrevolutionary activity in our country. There was a time when even radio broadcasts were suspended. All of us remember the last broadcast of the program "Date With Cuba" [Cita con Cuba] on the Voice of America network, where tearfully and even invoking Our Lady of Charity of El Cobre, the counterrevolutionary individuals of that time said farewell to their listeners and virtually accepted their defeat.

It was not until the eighties that there was a certain rebirth of counterrevolutionary groups. Of course, during that lull, the United States maintained an intense espionage effort, promoted subversion, and conducted intelligence missions with counterrevolutionary aims. Their intelligence activities during those years are well known. But in the eighties, in accordance with the new U.S. imperialist policies promoted by President Carter, which granted priority to so-called human rights issues, with all the hypocrisy and cynicism that characterizes this type of accusations, a new kind of group appeared in our country.

These groups, which do not define themselves as counterrevolutionary and even claim they are not political, try to defend their apolitical nature and proclaim themselves human rights defenders. These groups, which have

some antecedents prior to the eighties, and which now get public attention through international news agencies accredited in Cuba and the international press, and are in some ways supported by some countries' diplomatic missions in Cuba, are associated with that policy of eroding socialism from within, and first appeared during the Carter administration.

It is not surprising that beginning with the first Reagan administration these actions acquired some impetus, and imperialism gave importance, encouragement, and support to this alternative of underhanded counterrevolutionary activity, which tried to find cracks in our country's legal system. This is how various groups began to develop with different compositions, almost all of them marked by a majority presence of former counterrevolutionary prisoners, individuals who had been imprisoned for serious crimes, some of them for trying to leave the country illegally. All kinds of frustrated, resentful, and mediocre people found in these types of groups the possibility of getting involvemd with similar people with the sole purpose, for the great majority of them, of finding, through these activities, an opportunity to leave the country.

In other words, they were people who had no expectations that the revolution, or the political power of the revolution, was in doubt. They were people who knew that they were totally incapable of reaching the masses, who did not have a program, who did not even have a philosophy, and who held onto the litany of human rights, which was promoted hypocritically by the United States, and they tried to maintain among us pressure on the country's leadership. At the same time, they were connected with the U.S. position in international organizations, especially the Human Rights Commission in Geneva. In other words, these people, since their beginning, took a vile, antipatriotic, contemptible position to serve as an argument and a pretext for the U.S. campaigns aimed at showing that human rights were being violated in our country.

From the historical point of view, when the restoration of capitalism began to take place in East Europe, or when the signs of what our Comrade Fidel has called collapse [desmerengamiento] began to appear, and when this crisis became obvious, all these groups, or these insignificant counterrevolutionary groups in our country, began to gain momentum, as is understandable, and a noticeable change began to take place in them. From the beginning they were directed from abroad. From the beginning they maintained ties, and in some cases close relationships, with counterrevolutionary organizations abroad. From the beginning they received instructions from abroad on how to behave on this or that occasion.

But at the time these processes began to take place, this kind of activity began to evolve in our country and reached its most complete structure precisely over the course of this year. It is not strange that this should be the case, because it is a reflection of the setbacks the revolutionary movement has suffered as a consequence of the historical reverses in East Europe and the chaos and the defeat that the socialist and communist ideology and awareness has suffered in the USSR.

In the second half of this year, these groups were divided into two major blocs. One is directly associated with what is considered the most reactionary or extreme rightist organization in the political spectrum among the counterrevolutionaries in the United States. The other is associated with a new faction that tries to appear moderate and its main aim is to capitalize on the defeat that has occurred in East Europe. Its main goal is to open a breach in the confusion and uncertainty that this defeat has caused in certain sectors.

We must say that we have enough information and evidence to assert that both lines, both ideas, and the groups that correspond to each one, are directed by the CIA of the United States. In other words, they are two alternatives that the United States is using simultaneously. This does not rule out the possibility that in carrying out their activities one or the other could do things on their own, inside the general guidelines, but we have enough details to believe, without the slightest doubt that they obey instructions and are part of an overall plan in the fundamental issues.

When one talks about this before an audience such as you, it is important to give you some details to avoid talking about factions and rule out the idea that there is a certain force arising among us. I can tell you, for example, that at this time there are approximately 50 counterrevolutionary groups in our country. Some of them that have a very long title or name are made up of one person. In other words, when one tries to find out what this is really all about, one often finds that they are family groups; that is, they are made up of one man, his wife, a brother-in-law, and a nephew. With this composition, this group can get headlines in the U.S. press as the such-and-such party, the such-and-such movement, the who-knows-what coalition, and there are some gullible people in the world capable of believing that there is such a party, organization, or movement in Cuba. There are some that have one member; there are others that have 20 members. All of them exist, above all, for the sake of international public opinion so that the foreign press, the Western press agencies, and the self-seeking work directed toward this objective by some accredited diplomats in our country, can magnify the situation.

That is why, for example, if I told you that one of the blocs that has formed calls itself the Cuban Democratic Convergence [Concertacion Democratica Cubana] and is composed of 11 groups, I might be suggesting the idea of a force, as I said. But in fact, all they are is one of these types of squalid, counterrevolutionary garbage, whose current characteristic—and this is something I should stress here—is that not a few of them are completely alienated from reality. They are convinced—especially since under the pressure they receive from abroad they make a reactionary, counterrevolutionary reading of the situation in our country and analyze the situation

through their mediocracy, cowardice, and betrayal—they are convinced that the revolution is on the verge of collapse, that we cannot overcome this test.

Some have even seen this as happening in a matter of months. Others have set a date, on such-and-such a date. I must say this because it is more than fraud, more than derangement. This has already begun to exert influence over the activities of some of these people, especially those who do not feel that they have gained enough counterrevolutionary points in the eyes of imperialists, in comparison to others who have been imprisoned and who could present, when the United States assumes the direction of this country, a more rich and interesting record with their ambition—which is typical of all these people—of becoming the masters of Cuba.

So some of these people who do not have enough points from the counterrevolutionary point of view, who do not have a record from the counterrevolutionary point of view, are in a bit of a hurry. They are a little impatient. They are trying to gain time, and as a result they have begun to move from the activities that they have traditionally been carrying out in human rights matters—and even though they have insisted that this was all they were about—to direct, clandestine counterrevolutionary activities. In some cases they have begun to lean towards sabotage and violence.

In all this there are some grotesque and almost folk elements of the counterrevolution. For example, I must say that this alliance of groups received precise instructions from abroad in July 1991 to become opposition parties. These instructions were sent in a letter from Madrid, where the CIA has one of its centers that promotes this activity in Cuba. In a bizarre manner, the person carrying the letter brought it into the country in a very mysterious way. It is said, I believe, that he brought it in the heel of his shoe. But before that citizen arrived in Cuba, we already had a copy of that letter. [applause] That is, friends in Spain made sure we got a copy of that letter. I am not going to read it, of course. I must try to use time as well as possible and not run on too long. But I can tell you that this is a letter in which the CIA ringleader in Madrid who works on this full time—he is a professional CIA cadre—instructs the heads of the two factions, which have now formed two blocs as I told you, to turn immediately into political parties. The way he does it is quite curious and grotesque.

It tells them that so-and-so should become a liberal, so-and-so should become a social democrat, and so-and-so should become a Christian democrat, and after these groups have formed into parties, they should get together and organize the coalition of those parties in Cuba. The letter itself says: We would announce this with great fanfare. It tells them that three foreign politicians would be sent from the three international organizations that group these tendencies—liberal, social democrat, and Christian democrat—and they would travel to Havana under any pretext or cover. They would pick up the documents in which these parties' constitutions are written, and they would travel immediately to Caracas; Madrid; and Bonn, Germany. There they would announce that a moderate opposition had finally been formed in Cuba.

The person who sent the letter seems to realize at times that he might have overdone it, and says: I know that for you it must be a bit complicated to turn into liberals, social democrats, and Christian democrats overnight. He uses the phrase: This is going to require some carpentry because its mechanical aspects are a bit difficult to swallow. He explains how and why they should suddenly become liberals, social democrats, and Christian democrats. So he has a few scruples when he realizes that what he proposes, this metamorphosis, could be somewhat difficult for those who receive the letter.

To illustrate a little bit how our country carries out this struggle, we called all international press representatiaves and gave them this letter. We explained to them what it was all about, with all the details. This letter is self-explanatory anyway. The person that brought it, a Spanish reporter, quickly admitted in Madrid that he had brought it. A diplomatic official, of an accredited diplomatic mission in our country, who has played the role of trying to unite these groups and resolve the differences and disagreements among them, when a representative of our Foreign Ministry spoke to him and asked him if he was playing that role and spoke to him about the letter, he did not even want to touch it, and said: Yes, yes, I know about it. Nevertheless, the international press hushed it up entirely. They were not interested. It was too obvious and too spectacular evidence, and of course it has not been published anywhere.

Given this situation, it was even more difficult for the heads of these groups to swallow this pill and take those steps. So without changing their names, maintaining the same names they had, they formed into two blocs, which are very similar to the original instructions they had received without taking the more sensational step of turning into new parties overnight. This is the origin of the Democratic Convergence, on the one hand, and the so-called Democratic Coalition [Coalicion Democratica], on the other.

The former group is composed of, like all of them, a variety of individuals and former counterrevolutionary prisoners have some weight. It is the group that includes people with some intellectual reputation. It is the only one that includes some people with this type of reputation. As a result of this, it is the one that has drawn up a program, a quite detailed program, of what will happen in Cuba when they take over the country. In short, we could say that this program includes an accelerated transition to capitalism by privatizing absolutely everything. That is, absolutely nothing would be left as social property except some cases that correspond more or less to what in developed capitalist countries is also state property.

The program is a mix of stupidity, intellectual mediocrity, and an example of the curious groveling nature of this kind of people. I will give you just one example. When they face the problem of how they are going to privatize all this, they get a very original idea: Auction off the industries. In other words, set up an auction so that anyone who wants to can come and buy the factories in this country. Then they establish who will have priority. First, those born and residing in Cuba who have capital. One wonders if they are talking about the misers, and if they will accept the money, the Cuban pesos, that the misers may have. This is something we would have to ask them. But immediately after, the ones to have priority in these auctions would be those born in Cuba residing abroad, or those born abroad who have Cuban parents. So it is very clear that the idea is to sell the country to the counterrevolutionaries and those who have made money in the United States.

There are other ridiculous aspects of this supposed program. For example, to solve the housing problem in Cuba, they plan to reestablish the national lottery. They talk about... [rephrases] Concerning culture, one of their most advanced ideas is to privatize movie theaters. Of course, they talk about privatizing education, medicine, putting an end to all state operation in this field. They talk about abolishing the 1976 Constitution, and in passing say that the 1940 Constitution be restored, with some amendments that are suggested in the program.

All this may be counterrevolutionary [word indistinct], but it is also said in this text that if the historic leaders of the revolution are not removed from power, our country will be overcome by barbarism and slaughter. So, these people are promoting and encouraging the idea that there is no room for a so-called peaceful change, and that therefore we will be overcome by violence and death. I note this because this program and this group are what is called the moderate opposition in the United States. The moderate opposition, according to the United States, the international press, some people in Europe, and some diplomats in our country, is this one, which is promoting the idea of the destruction of the revolution through barbarism, slaughter, and the restoration of capitalism in Cuba.

It is obvious that for months and years we have lived with all these groups. We have tolerated them. All of them are illegal, because they do not abide by any of the norms established by current legislation for associations. We have tolerated them, and we have lived with them. I believe we cannot necessarily attribute this to an inconsistent or soft attitude on our part. I believe there has been some intelligence in handling the problem in general terms, taking into consideration the interests of the country as a whole, and also considering the fact that they have been charlatans, opportunists, crooks, and swindlers during all these past months and years. In some cases, they are true classic examples of mythomaniacs, who have been simmering in their own juices without any connection to or position in a society such as the one that has started to show itself now.

The authors of these programs—whose main head during these past months has been a woman, a woman who obtained a prize for poetry in our country some time ago—were arrested a few weeks ago. They were indicted and tried based on the evidence on the evolution of the activities initiated and originated by these groups, and based on our awareness of the timeliness of taking this step before seeing, as we sit idly by, these types of groups pass on to other actions that could endanger the country's interests and the lives of people who could be victims of actions encouraged in this way.

All this has been associated with a process that today, right now, is having a great impact abroad, and that is why I am stressing this case. This case has been presented abroad as a fragile woman, a poet, who has been a victim of mobs in our country and has also been a victim of an unfair trial. This fragile woman and poet... [changes thought] and the title of poet is used to try to create the image of an intellectual, a person with artistic sensibility. That is, they try to use that description, which inspires a certain amount of respect in the world, to associate her with an attitude that opposes the revolution.

She has been at the head of these activities and is the author of this counterrevolutionary program. For many months, she has been carrying out intense activities. Of all these ringleaders, she has been the one who has maintained the most stable, close ties with the CIA center in Miami in an intensive exchange of mail containing instructions. She is a person—and this is an argument that we have never used in public nor abroad because it is an argument that has been very discredited in other processes—but she is a person who has a personality disturbance.

I am not going to say that she is crazy because she is not. She is a person who is completely responsible for her actions, and therefore she has penal responsibility for them. But she is a person who before becoming a counterrevolutionary had been admitted three times in the Havana Psychiatric Hospital with a diagnosis—which perhaps some specialist present here could define—of hysterical neurosis. This is also associated with personal problems, such as the suicide of one of her husbands.

So I am pointing this out because it is an important component of her personality which gives her a somewhat lunatic character. By virtue of this, she became convinced or persuaded some time ago that she is the Violeta Chamorro of Cuba, with all due respect for Mrs. Violeta, whom of course we do not want to offend with this comparison. She believed she was within a few steps of becoming president of this country. In her frenetic activity of organizing clandestine groups and giving instructions to these groups, she held meetings in her apartment in Alamar with up to 30 people with close, systematic ties with diplomatic missions in our country.

I would like to point out in passing that most of the accredited diplomatic missions in our country observe an irreproachable attitude consistent with the established international laws and completely respectful of our system, country, people, and institutions. It is only a very small minority who participate in these activities. These missions and some diplomats are the ones who give these people typewriters, paper, tape recorders, tapes, the use of diplomatic pouches for contacts with other countries, political advice and guidance, and something that is very important: food.

Because these people do not work. They are not satisfied with our opportunities, and they have acquired habits of consumption which are met through these diplomatic missions and our Diplotiendas [stores for diplomats]. Often, every so often, they receive their supplies for a period of weeks. So these are people who are dependent on the foreign individuals who guide their activities here. In this latest frenetic effort the following practices began to appear. They are open provocations of us, our state, our institutions, and each of us from a personal point of view as party members. They are writing offensive, slanderous pamphlets, ranging from calling for demonstrations against the special period, for example, to questioning this assembly, presenting you, the assembly members, in the most insulting way, and slandering each of us. Pamphlets of this kind, which were signed, on occasions even with the address of the person who had written them, have been put underneath the doors of the houses of many comrades, including party officials.

I have discussed this sometimes in some sectors, some circles, and some comrades whose opinion we must of course respect think that if they receive a piece of paper like that they should go to the police station, hand it in, and report that they have received that piece of paper. I could add that perhaps a very devote, believing person who receives one of these insulting, counterrevolutionary, and offensive pieces of paper could also pray to God that He pardon those who have done it. But a party member, a Communist who receives one of these pieces of paper with the name and address of the one who sent it has to go find that person and call him to account for it. [applause]

This is the true origin of the act of repudiation that in fact took place in Alamar where this counterrevolutionary ringleader resides. This gave rise to a revolt by the masses, by the populace, and in fact was associated at a given time with what we could call a brawl, in the noblest sense of the word. The enemy, through its media, has imposed on the world the view that this woman was dragged along the ground, beaten, and dragged down the stairs of her apartment building. That is an infamy. All that is an infamy. Those of us who because of our duties have had to have some connection with this problem, and who have even personally seen this person, know that this is absolutely false.

What did occur is that one of the people who had this piece of paper put under her door was a comrade who is a party official. This comrade decided to knock on the counterrevolutionary ringleader's door and ask her for an explanation, as a woman, a Cuban, and a Communist. At that time there were 19 people meeting together in that apartment, conspiring. Because of that situation, in which our comrade exercised her right and fulfilled her duty, in my opinion, and the presence at just that time of 19 people conspiring in that apartment, the actions occurred which gave rise in fact to a legitimate act of repudiation. There were no excesses or abuses, but some of the 19 who behaved rudely and offended people, well, they received the appropriate response from the populace. [applause]

That is the truth. From its start, our revolution has been marked by being faithful and loyal to the truth. Comrade Fidel has educated all of us, he has educated several revolutionary generations, in the truth. We do not need to lie, and a lie could never be justified. But the version imposed today in the world, in big headlines and full-page paid advertisements, shows a mob venting its anger on a defenseless, fragile, woman poet. We can make a lot of efforts, even economic efforts, invest resources, to try to refute or respond to that view. Friends of ours in the world who believe in us and know how false these accusations are can also and often do raise their voices, but we must accept the reality that with a monopoly on information and the media in today's world, especially since imperialism has been ruling hegemonically under conditions of unipolar domination, it is almost impossible for the truth to come out at this time. These absolutely slanderous views have become established.

We proceeded to act against this group. Several of its members were punished, and for others the work corresponding to our authorities and institutions that are responsible for these tasks of prophylaxis was done. There are different kinds of people with different kinds of ties to this group. A few days ago, another ringleader of another group was arrested. This group has evolved much more in the direction of sabotage and violence to which I have referred. I cannot go into detail now because this is now under investigation, and because of operational considerations we should not give details, but these are people who have been approaching and trying to recruit members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces [FAR] and the Ministry of the Interior [Minint] or comrades who had served in the FAR or Minint and had retired. They were already plotting to sabotage certain facilities and carry out violent operations in certain places.

These people were members of this second group which has been the subject of a trial in accordance with our laws. Abroad, it seems that this group is a party with a social democratic orientation. The legend of a social democratic party has already begun to arise about this group which has most recently been tried.

These are the circumstances under which this struggle is taking place. It is not the face-to-face struggle against bandits. It is not even the struggle against infiltrations of

pirate attacks. It is not the activity against classic counterrevolutionary structures. Rather, it involves this whole peculiar transfiguration of this supposed situation of simple, inoffensive, moderate opposition structures. This is really a matter of—as they are little by little becoming—counterrevolutionary organizations that are impatient and in a hurry to promote what they think is imminent, the collapse of the revolution. For many of their members their goal is to gain points in this process.

Some who are a little cleverer keep on the fringes of these two groups. They try not to commit themselves to them. They show them sympathy, encourage them, but do not mix with them. They do not participate in these activities. The most famous of these, who is presented internationally as a champion of human rights, and there has even been talk about giving him a Nobel prize, is a person whom all of us who knew before the revolution—because he was someone who participated at one time in the revolutionary struggle and then betrayed the revolution—those of us who knew him well remember the discussions we had, and know that he holds profoundly racist ideas. He feels contempt and hate for black people. A racist who feels contempt and hate for black people is a champion of human rights for the United States and international public opinion.

In an interview for a Spanish publication, I made this charge, and I said in that interview that he should admit it, because I knew that of course it would be put into his hands. He did not even try to lie, because he cannot confront the evidence we have, the testimony we have, that he is a racist. The unusual thing in this case is how it is possible for a racist, one of the most contemptible and abominable ways of behaving, can be a champion of human rights in the world.

I want to mention another group that has been formed relatively recently, because it claims to have a Christian basis. More specifically, it claims to have a Catholic basis. It has also remained outside these groups, and is trying to carry out independent, autonomous activities. This faction, which is formally and really made up of somewhat more than a dozen people. Usually, they are very active people, because they are people who do not work or have any useful social activity and they spend every day and all their time on this. This faction has the sympathy of the main representatives of the upper hierarchy of the Catholic Church in our country.

A relatively short time ago, one of the main representatives of the upper hierarchy spoke about the country's situation, about what should be done, and stated that the kingdom of the church and the kingdom they are part of is not of this world. Therefore, they could not take a position of opposition to the revolution. They would see it with satisfaction, it was necessary, very necessary, but since the kingdom they are part of is not of this world, they could not meddle.

They listened to the activists, the promoters, and among them the members of this other faction who have wanted more open, clear support from the church, and they discussed this, and then when the great figure presented their conclusions in typically sybilline language in which one can see the experience of millennia, he set forth this strategy: We cannot, our hands are clean, our kingdom is not of this world, but if our brothers think they are called on to do this, please do so. So they are encouraging the counterrevolutionary opposition, and they are even giving it a certain foundation from the point of view of Catholic ethics.

That is the other faction whose behavior we are observing in this picture of little groups, which all joined together would not total 1,000 people in this country. Of those 1,000, there are not even 100 people who work on this full time. But they are showing this evolution, and given this, the appropriate authorities of our society, the institutions charged with the country's security, public peace, and social stability, will not hesitate no matter what campaigns there may be, no matter what the insults and slanders against us. They will not hesitate to act as they have been acting in the face of these counterrevolutionary activities.

I would like to add, if I may, that in my opinion we would be making a mistake if we thought that these kinds of groups and activities cover all of the counterrevolution in our country. I think we have the duty to reflect on this in light of the situation we find ourselves in, the realities we are facing, and the various new phenomena we should consider. Any one of us can understand that because of the conditions in Cuba after 30 years of revolution and the specific circumstances in which our political process has occurred, today there is no social base in classical terms for the counterrevolution in our country. That is, the exploiting classes to which we could attribute a reason, which is to restore their domination, to recover their property, were eliminated from the social scene. As people, as individuals, most of them left the country.

So the social base for the counterrevolution is not there in a bourgeoisie which does not exist, or landowners who disappeared, or even on the periphery of the dominating class of a neocolonial, underdeveloped society as ours was; that is, the overseers, the hired press, the professionals at the service of the Yankee enterprises, and the Cuban oligarchy. The vast majority of those people left the country and many of them, of course, are exponents of the counterrevolution. Others, who may or may not have had class motivations individually, became tools of the counterrevolution in the sixties and today are also in the United States. There are hardly any of them in Cuba, except for those who have not been able to leave the country because the United States, after using them as enemies of Cuba, enemies of their people, has now closed the doors to them and will not allow them to leave as they would like to. It would be a good thing, of course, (?if they went to that country).

But our revolutionary society, our society of solidarity, in this society forged by the revolution's work, heir to a

tradition and a history, educated in principles, an ideology, a vision, a purpose, the most humane and legitimate of all purposes, a genuinely liberated, democratic society, with true social justice and equality, which as a historical program has without doubt the support of the great mass of the population, the working class, the workers, the most genuine exponents of our intellectuals, our young people, the working farmers—in our society we also have soft parts who have become even more resentful under the conditions in which we are living and in the face of the challenges we are confronting and the dangers we are experiencing. They are potential participants in counterrevolutionary activities.

Yesterday some comrades mentioned here, in a correct way in my opinion, the political connotation that some criminal activities, some behavior, some actions against social property and the people's goods, acquire in the sense of counterrevolution. Under the conditions created by a socialist revolution, under the conditions in which social property prevails, this political connotation of criminal activities, apart from legalistic or legal consideration, has always existed. It has not been created by the special period, because actions against the people's goods and property have always had this connotation. It is not a capitalist, owner, or master who is being robbed. It is not an owner, master, or capitalist from whom resources and goods are being stolen. It is the people, the very people, who are being robbed, being deprived of goods or resources.

It was said very well here yesterday that in our current situation, this political connotation of criminal activities in the sense of counterrevolution has become several times more powerful. But I should say here that this is not only because of the evaluation we make of the act but the intention with which it is done in many cases and because the enemy is instructing them to do this. Right now, more than 19 radio stations are broadcasting against Cuba, more than 200 hours a day of broadcasts against Cuba. In the report the U.S. President gave in August, in which they in fact express regret that the television station is not seen and that we subject the counterrevolutionary radio broadcasts to rigorous jamming, it is also made clear that in spite of this, the United States will continue to have an arsenal of this kind of resources, made up of 19 radio stations which are on the air for more than 200 hours a day.

I do not know if any of you know this, but one of the counterrevolutionary slogans of those stations is that people should not pay the bus fares. This is one of the slogans that are repeated and reiterated. So the enemy is piggybacking on a practice which arises from a lack of public awareness, and which cannot be considered at its origins as a counterrevolutionary action, but they understand its meaning, more than economic, of course, its sense of demoralization and lack of social discipline. One of the most frequent slogans today is: Do not pay the bus fare. Of course, they also urge people not to contribute to underwriting the expenses of the Territorial Troops Militia. They also urge people not to work, not to contribute, and to destroy the goods they have at hand.

So these exhortations, which also violate the letter and the spirit of all international conventions on radio broadcasting, which literally and precisely proscribe all these destabilizing practices by one country against another, today saturate all this programming. This is one line in the counterrevolutionary propaganda from the United States: the promotion of crime, the promotion of criminal activities, the promotion of attitudes of social indiscipline. It is in this context that I think this association occurs. It also arises because of the current situation and the adversity of the current situation and the difficulties and complexities our country is facing.

Criminal activities acquire a dimension that cannot be ignored. They demand a consistently revolutionary attitude, within the framework of the law. Because we must say, and the specialists know this perfectly well, that the law offers.... [rephrases] I am entirely in agreement that our current laws could be made even more strict, and that some types of crime corresponding to this situation, and especially the situation of a maximum special period, virtually of war, are lacking. But our current legislation, if it is enforced consistently during all the steps of a trial, gives a broad margin for acting with maximum severity against these actions. Given the connotation they acquire, it is at the least an inconsistent attitude, frankly, when in the face of these realities, when we in fact observe these practices, instead of acting with social prophylaxis against crime, we live with it, and nourish and promote impunity.

The enemy is not foreign to our soft spots, and it seeks out these soft spots in our society, those cracks that were talked about yesterday in the introductory words by Comrade [Interior Minister Abelardo] Colome [Ibarra], which in my opinion summarized this situation as a whole very correctly. The enemy works on those soft spots which it knows are susceptible to certain influences and pressures, seeking to open those cracks and that breach among us.

What we could consider the efforts to confuse, to encourage consumer appetites and desires for well-being which are incompatible with the reality of underdevelopment, poverty, and our effort to develop economically starting from a neocolonial situation, the imperialist embargo, and now this new situation which has been properly described as a second embargo, have given rise to an attitude of social indiscipline and alienation with respect to the true opportunities and alternatives our society can offer as far as goods and well-being. Above all, with this message the enemy works on sectors that we could call—by forcing the description a bit in order to understand each other—the lumpen proletariat, or perhaps [words indistinct] the anti-proletariat lumpen.

Sometimes those of us who have to do with and have duties and responsibilities in ideological work, in discussions about this, when we talk about this category, the image of the slums tends to arise quickly, the outskirts we have here and in other large cities in our country. Sometimes not so much the outskirts; sometimes we have one of these districts in the center of a highly urbanized area. I assert that this is a mistaken point of view, the assumption that the lumpen arise out of poverty. Because in those same slums, there are thousands or millions of revolutionaries, party members, patriots, exemplary workers, and internationalists. That view that assumes that that is where the social premises that produce the lumpen necessarily, inevitably, exist sometimes has a racist tinge.

We must say that here there are a lot of lumpen who live in nice apartments. [laughter] Here there are some people with a lumpen attitude who do not live in slums, exactly; who do not contribute to society; who do not work or study; and who even have well-being. Although it is true that some social conditions of crowding favor some kinds of behavior and problems which later develop into antisocial behavior or even are associated with the infamous Cuban cockiness [guaperia], it would be erroneous for us to reach that conclusion, and ignore the fact that many times in the same family there are revolutionary activists of proven records, internationalists, and there is someone who has deviated and shows antisocial behavior.

But that is without doubt a soft part of our society, this behavior that is outside constructive, positive actions of contributing, working, and studying and is an attempt to enjoy things and live without contributing, and the consumer desires that come from the view of the world often offered by movies, which are often generously shown by our media and which create a total mirage which has no validity in our country's conditions and could only be attained by leaving the country or trying to return our country to a situation in which, of course, those kinds of desires would not be met anyway.

I think some sectors which we could define as our middle classes are also a soft part of our society. Some sectors, and I say sectors because our revolution has had and has an army of professionals, cadres, men and women trained by the revolution or who joined the revolution with some degree of education and knowledge, who have served and serve the revolution loyally, and who are an important part of our reserve of cadres. But there is a sector of our middle classes which has been gradually forming as an exponent of the perception of the country's situation and its possible solutions based on the level they have attained.

That is, they are people who have everything. They have all the possessions anyone could have. Sometimes they have more than one car to a family. They are the main faultfinders. They are the main strategists. They are the ones who have all the solutions, and they question our policies, and they question our line, because they measure the situation according to their own well-being, based on what they already have, from a petit bourgeois point of view.

They do not see where the revolution has to direct its efforts, who the revolution has to benefit in a priority way, what debts we have because of the legacy we received from capitalism and the neglect and mistakes that made the rectification process necessary in its time. How many people do not have houses? How many people live in difficult conditions, in dignity and austere poverty, and especially deserve the revolution's efforts to raise their standard of living?

This is the real priority. Those who measure our situation and future based on a certain level of well-being that they have attained—I am not going to question whether they have attained it illegally, not at all—and do not understand the revolution's real priority, are beginning to form a kind of thinking. We have already seen some signs of this in the discussion of the basic document for the Fourth Communist Party of Cuba Congress, and we have confronted it in some discussions. This reflects the consequences of the collapse. This reflects the pessimism and fatalism of a mediocre reading of history and a lack of faith in our people and their potential and the veracity of our positions and policies.

Thus, we already know about certain ideological notions according to which the inequalities of capitalism are inevitable. This is an argument that implies the premise that if one has a certain professional level, a certain intellectual development, a certain status, one can expect to live even better under the conditions of capitalist inequality. This is an extremely selfish view, and it is also totally deluded, because those who think that in the event of such a regression in our society they would have better expectations for personal well-being than the revolution has provided them are also ignorant and deluded.

But this is today a setting for our ideological struggle. This also shows, and I think we should all be aware of this as well, the need for all cadres, leaders, officials, comrades with responsibilities, and party members to show truly exemplary behavior as never before. We must do everything we can so that this exemplary behavior will spread to all those who are under our influence, in our families and at our workplaces. Because if this behavior has always been proper, if this behavior has always been necessary, so politically necessary, if this exemplary behavior is one of our party's instruments for education and mobilization, the population's perception of any kind of inequality, any kind of privilege, any kind of perquisite, any kind of ostentation, will naturally and understandably become that much sharper under the conditions we are experiencing and will presumably experience in the future, given the difficulties we are confronting.

I think that fortunately, we have escaped the deviations and aberrations other socialist processes suffered. We are not even remotely facing a phenomenon such as that one, but that does not mean we should become careless. We must now have a sensitivity appropriate to the special period. We must now also have a special sensitivity. Even in our behavior when we have absolutely legitimate resources and means necessary for our work, we must also use them with this sensitivity [words indistinct]. So we will not break our unity, cohesion, and true fellowship with the people in our calls, instructions, policies, and guidelines in the least.

Last—and I ask your pardon for the length of my speech—I think that we cannot avoid, in discussing the issue of strengthening our ideology and positions in the time we are experiencing, I think that we cannot avoid the fact of the consequences the collapse and everything that has happened has also had for us in the ideological sphere. I am now speaking here exclusively in my own name. In 1987, 1988, 1988, [repeats] and even 1989, we confronted the influences of perestroyka on certain sectors of our society.

More than a few comrades of ours became perestroyka fans and Gorbachev fans. They repeated among us the alternatives and solutions that were supposedly being used in the Soviet Union as those that we should adopt. I think we ourselves are the main responsible for the appearance of this phenomenon in the sense that, as Comrade Fidel has explained several times, we idealized the Soviet Union. We exalted the Soviet Union. We turned it into the Holy Ghost itself, and we led people to believe that everything that came from there, no matter what it was, was good or often even better than our things.

In the face of realities that any of us could perceive and understand concerning the problems these societies faced, which were even pointed out very early on by Comrade Fidel himself after the so-called events in Czechoslovakia, and the need that any of us could understand, that socialism in fact needed to be renewed and could be renewed and had to be improved and could be improved, based on that and on the idealization of the Soviet Union, an extremely difficult ideological moment occurred among us. From my point of view, it was one of the most difficult we have faced, not on the scale of the society, not on the scale of the people, but on the scale of many of the thinking sectors of our society.

I must say, in the name of the strictest truth, that if today we can talk about saving the nation, the revolution, and socialism, it is because we escaped that confusion. The fact that we have escaped that confusion, and I think that at a moment like this an elementary duty for honesty dictates the need to say this, if we escaped that confusion, we owe it to you, Comrade Fidel. [applause; audience shouts: "Viva Fidel!"]

I am almost sure that Comrade Fidel does not remember a conversation I had the opportunity of having with him at the end of 1987, when we were under a lot of pressure, even from within the party, to explain perestroyka and give guidance about perestroyka. This was demanded, and it was considered that we were ignoring this, that we were not fulfilling our duty. We attempted it. We wrote a document that proposed various attitudes vis-a-vis perestroyka: respect, understanding, confidence, analysis, and solidarity. Respect, because everyone has the right, just as we demand for ourselves, to choose their course, their alternatives. Understanding, because we knew that the Soviet Union was far from perfect, although we admired it and it was worthy of admiration for its enormous feats and colossal works. Confidence, because in the CPSU we saw the most mature, experienced party with the most history and potential to undertake a socialist renewal. Analysis, because we thought this experience necessarily deserved to be analyzed to the benefit of our own experiences. Solidarity, because that initial speech which spoke about putting an end to the benefits that did not come from work, putting an end to corruption, establishing order and social discipline, accelerating the economy, applying the achievements in high technology in weapons to economic development—all that generated solidarity.

When Comrade Fidel mentioned that document, which I had sent to him, and defined all those attitudes we had suggested, I remember he said: Respect, yes; respect, of course. Understanding, yes; understanding, of course. Confidence—I remember he made a gesture and said: Well, to a certain extent, because we must observe everything very closely. Analysis, I think so; I think we should analyze it. But why solidarity? Then he gave some considerations which you heard later in speeches. This is why I feel very privileged because of the opportunity I had at such an early time to reach an understanding of what could really happen, what could really happen. [repeats]

Because of this, I could understand even those who have become confused, those who have lost their way. I could understand those who have not managed to see clearly, or did not manage to see at the time what was really happening. I can understand this just as much as I cannot sympathize with those who still lack the intellectual honesty and moral courage to acknowledge that they were mistaken. Our leadership, which some people consider not to be very educated in comparison with their supposed wisdom, saw much clearer, much further, and as early on as at that meeting in the FAR Universal Room, when Fidel spoke for six hours standing up and made an analysis which predicted all the developments of these processes. This found its prophetic synthesis, and this can be said without exaggerating, in the warning he gave during his 26 July 1989 speech.

This is why I think that the conditions have matured in our country and society for us, guiding the potential we have in the social sciences, as Comrade Fidel noted at the Education Congress, the congress of the teachers and scientists, to redirect again all our efforts in this field. This field is also so necessary, useful, and has such a

major role to play even under conditions when there is no priority other than to survive, because we have young people, cadres, and comrades who were even educated in the Soviet Union who have passed through this tremendous process and have been evolving along with the historic experience and with the clarity and teachings of the party and revolutionary leadership.

Today, we can even try, on our own account, modestly, humbly, but we can try and we should try with our resources in this field, to conduct a profound analysis of the causes of this debacle, an analysis of our historic revolutionary experience; an effort to structure the thought of the Cuban revolution exposed in the speeches and comments made by Comrade Fidel and tie them to our historic experience and project them toward the future. Our social scientists have this obligation, this challenge, this task, this mission. I believe that the conditions have matured in our country to begin it, even in the current circumstances, because the process of developing, polishing, and organizing the thought of the Cuban revolution and the historic experience of the Cuban revolution is the duty of our people and our revolution to all revolutionaries in the world.

Almost always, when you have a task as the one assigned to me, at some point you have to start thinking on how you are going to end it. Sometimes you listen to comrades that express very good points but do not know how to stop. I want to stop here and to stop by reading something that I believe ties in with this historic moment and is contained in the Bulletin to the Leaders by the General Field Headquarters on 26 April 1895, signed by Jose Marti, as delegate of the Revolutionary Party, and Commanding General Maximo Gomez. In this bulletin to the leaders, Marti and Gomez, at the beginning of the definite war and knowing how many doubts and how much hesitation there would be, how many setbacks in those initial moments, so open to discouragement and pessimism, and how many would speak up and say that it could not be done, that they should surrender, they said to the leaders: By this virtue—he refers to the virtue attributed to the revolution, as Marti was already calling the war—the revolution, through its elected and valid representatives until the revolution assigns new powers, in the discharge of its duty, urges you—in other words, calls you, instructs you, you refers to the leaders—that in the case that in any manner, or by any person, you are confronted with propositions to surrender, to cease the hostilities, or reach accords that differ from the total recognition of the absolute independence of Cuba, which offensive and null propositions could not be more than a war strategy to isolate or hamper the revolution, summarily punish this crime with the penalty established for traitors to the nation. [applause]

Citizen Interviewed on Actions Against 'Traitor'

FL0301144292 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Interview with Mirta Isidoro by unidentified reporter; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] Some days ago we learned of the important reaction of a comrade to a counterrevolutionary provocation. For this reason, a news team was sent out to find her.

[Begin recording] [Isidoro] I believe that it was a provocation against me as a party official of the Habana Vieja Municipality.

[Reporter] Do you mean the letter sent to you?

[Isidoro] No, it was not a letter.

[Reporter] What was it?

[Isidoro] It was a communique urging me to express my dissension with the revolution.

[Reporter] A lot has been said about what you did. What exactly did you do?

[Isidoro] What I did was what any citizen and revolutionary of this country would have done. I asked for the address of this citizen.

[Reporter] Because you do not know her?

[Isidoro] No, I do not know her.

[Reporter] You never saw her?

[Isidoro] No, I have never seen her.

[Reporter] Then what did you do?

[Isidoro] I found her address, I located the building where she lives and I went to her house. On my way to her house, I came across another comrade, who, like me, was also looking for her.

[Reporter] Why?

[Isidoro] To settle the score, because she had also dared to slip counterrevolutionary propaganda under her door. She is just another member of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. The two of us got together and knocked on her door. When she opened the door we confronted her objected to all the propaganda she had put out because we cannot allow this.

[Reporter] It was said that both of you hit and dragged her around.

[Isidoro] No, that is a lie. We never hit or dragged her or anything like that. As a matter of fact, I could not have dragged her because she is a lot bigger and a lot stronger than me. There were 19 persons in her house, if the two us alone would have done this, they would have dragged us. What happened was that the reaction of the people was massive. The people responded right away, they reacted very fast. The people realized that she was a worm because we were screaming it to her face. They came up to her apartment, and when they came up and came in, they realized that there was a big meeting in her house.

[Reporters] Did someone order you to do this?

[Isidoro] No, no one ordered me to do it. No one has to order me to do this; this is the normal reaction of any revolutionary who receives propaganda inviting them to join the ranks of the enemy.

[Reporters] Would you do it again?

[Isidoro] Of course I would, anywhere, against her or anyone else that dares.

Dissident Leader Reports Four Members Arrested

PA0301214092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2008 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Havana, 3 Jan (EFE)—Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz, president of the Human Rights and National Reconciliation Commission, reported on 3 January that another four dissidents, members of the illegal Cuban Women's Humanitarian Movement [Movimiento Femenino Humanitario Cubano], were arrested in Havana on 31 December.

They are Bienvenida Cucalo Santana, secretary general of the dissident organization; and three of her collaborators, namely, Joel Duenas, Arturo Canica, and Miguel Granda.

The source added that the Cuban Women's Humanitarian Movement, which is headed by Cucalo Santana, is mainly interested in the situation of political prisoners, their relatives, and other needy people.

This is one of 11 organizations of various persuasions that have joined the so-called Cuban Democratic Convergence (CDC) since September 1991.

Cucalo Santana is the fifth co-president of the opposition CDC jailed in the past few weeks.

Sanchez added that the authorities are planning to try Indamiro Restano, leader of the Harmony Movement, which has a Social Democratic orientation, who has been under arrest since 20 December 1991.

Carlos Aldana, member of the Communist Party of Cuba Politburo, said last week during a speech before parliament that opposition groups have moved from concern for human rights to subversive activities.

The high-ranking Cuban Communist leader said that the Cuban opposition is divided into two blocs, the moderates and the ultraright, and added that they are part of a strategic scheme controlled by the CIA.

Citizens Hijack Helicopter, Fly to Miami

PA0301231592 Madrid EFE in Spanish 2227 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Havana, 3 Jan (EFE)—The Cuban Government is maintaining total silence regarding the escape to Miami, United States, of 34 persons aboard a Soviet-made Mi-8 helicopter.

EFE was unable to contact the regular Foreign Ministry spokesmen, while the local media is also silent on the matter.

Reports from Miami stated that the 34 Cubans, including women and children, asked the U.S. Government for asylum after flying aboard a Cubana Airlines helicopter 90 nautical miles that separate the island from Florida.

This is the first time that Cuban citizens used a helicopter to flee to the United States. On previous occasions they have used supersonic combat airplanes and small airplanes.

Havana Radio Report

FL0401193392 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1909 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] An Mi-8 helicopter was hijacked yesterday. The helicopter was registered with Cubana Airlines No. 407 and was used as part of the international tourism services in Veradero. The craft was hijacked by the traitor German Pompa Gonzalez. He took advantage of his position as a reserve copilot of crews that perform this work, together with two other individuals, to gain control of the vessel. They flew the helicopter close to the airport where other persons were picked up. They then continued their flight to the United States.

Cuban authorities are negotiating with the U.S. Government for the immediate return of the helicopter and the hijackers.

Commentary Views Characteristics of Revolution

PA0301231692 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 1400 GMT 31 Dec 92

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] The special characteristics of the Cuban revolution today are projected with greater force due to the collapse of the former socialist bloc, whose epitaph was written with the dissolution of the USSR.

Without saying that the Cuban process is perfect, as Cuba has also committed some mistakes, the truth is that the creativity of the Cuban people has made substantial contributions to the Marxist-Leninist theory.

One of the first contributions was our interpretation of that legacy to the world, and the building of solid bases to support the work carried out throughout the past years.

The creation of mass organizations, the development of a Communist Party, and a Young Communists Union were rapidly added to the numerous autochthonous values of the revolution.

No one can deny that [words indistinct] appeared in the path, and that bureaucracy frustrated a few of the people's initiatives, but the general [word indistinct] of social organizations [words indistinct] strengthened the revolution. Those types of organizations, the sole party inspired by the past century's Cuban Revolutionary Party based on the ideals of Jose Marti, and consulting the people about the main decisions characterized the life in Cuba during the past 33 years.

Other distinctive characteristics have to do with the development of awareness in citizens of their responsibility toward the community, practicing absolute

equality, encouragement of an internationalist spirit, and praising the fruits of honest work.

The rich experience acquired through the implementation of these principles makes it possible to make a distinction between the firmness of the Cuban experience and the frailness of socialism in Eastern Europe, undermined by the surrounding capitalism as a result of the absence of ideas. By contrast, Cuba maintains as one of its main weapons its broad arsenal of theories. As our national hero Jose Marti said in the past century, a trench of ideas is more valuable than a trench of stone.

Commentary Notes Success of Tourist Industry

PA0401040292 Havana Radio Havana Cuba in Spanish 1400 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Roberto Morejon commentary]

[Text] For many years the Cuban Government postponed the exploitation of the country's huge tourist resources to concentrate its efforts on the social development of disadvantaged areas in major cities.

The increasing economic difficulties, caused by the disappearance of the former socialist bloc and the worsening of the U.S. blockade, pointed to the need to promote investments in the tourist field, which is capable of yielding profits quickly.

The Cuban Government concentrated huge resources in the tourist industry, both with government and foreign investments.

Currently, Cuba has seven tourist development centers. The primary objective of all of them is to improve the quality of services in the newly opened installations and to expand the capability to receive Latin American, Canadian, and European tourists.

The strategy includes the construction of buildings, built in a natural environment—an exclusive option in the Caribbean region. This new method is being received with enthusiasm by potential foreign investors.

The first anniversary of the inauguration of Sol Palmeras Hotel was only a short while ago. It was the first to be built with the participation of foreign capital in over three decades.

The satisfactory results of the experience confirmed by the owners of the Spanish chain, called Sol, led to the construction of a second hotel, also at the Varadero resort, but this time with a five-star category. The installation was recently inaugurated and it can be distinguished by its magnificent lines.

The positive balance of investments with mixed capital can be expanded with the participation of new investors, who must be included as part of the ambitious government plan aimed at the construction of 50,000 rooms by 1995.

This year some 1.5 million tourists will arrive on our coasts.

Television Ends National Newscast Transmission

PA0501040592 Mexico City NOTIMEX in Spanish 0034 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Havana, 4 Jan (NOTIMEX)—Due to a lack of fuel in Cuba, the "As of Today" television newscast of the Radio Rebelde national station ended its transmissions on 4 January and will be replaced by a radio newscast.

The newscast had a nostalgic final transmission and will be replaced by a newscast on Cuban national radio on 6 January.

The announcers voiced their "pain and sadness" over the disappearance achieved by the "hard-working and courageous" team of the "As of Today" newscast.

Cuban authorities decided to replace the "As of Today" newscast, which was being transmitted at 1300, with a national radio newscast to be broadcast by all stations in the 14 Cuban provinces, except for Radio Reloj and Radio Enciclopedia.

The restrictive measures announced by the government on 20 December 1991 prompted an adjustment of television schedules and the cancellation of morning and noontime programs.

Among the programs eliminated is one of two national television newscasts that were transmitted by Cuba Vision and Tele Rebelde.

The measures adopted by the Cuban authorities call for the reduction of television transmissions to five hours each day from Monday through Friday, nine hours on Saturday, and 14 hours on Sunday.

All radio stations on the island on 4 January advised their Cuban listeners that the "radio network" of all the country's radio stations headed by Radio Rebelde will begin on 6 January at 1300.

They added that the purpose of this network is to transmit a special 27-minute newscast containing the most important national and international news.

The communique read over the radio stations stated that the measure was adopted "as part of a reorganization of the radio and television system in view of the measures imposed" by the special period in peacetime.

Measures To Solve Transportation Problems

FL0401184692 Havana Radio Progreso Network in Spanish 1725 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Transportation workers are using trailers with vehicles and railroad cars for inter-municipal and suburban transportation as a way to reduce the difficulties created by fuel and spare parts shortages. Right now,

approximately 100 trailers are in use and it is estimated that by 28 January, 150 will be in operation thereby greatly reducing fuel consumption. In order to find immediate solutions for the transportation problem, other measures are also being applied. These include increasing the number of inspectors and the use of magnetizers and preheating equipment used in diesel equipment, among other things.

Details Announced

FL0401030792 Havana Tele Rebelde and Cuba Vision Networks in Spanish 0100 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] The new system for reorganizing urban transportation in the capital will not meet current demand, but it does improve service on the major routes and makes more rational use of the buses, fuel, and terminals. As has been reported, this reorganization plan will be implemented beginning Sunday, 12 January, at the Alamar, Bahia, Guanabo, Regla, and Guanabacoa terminals. The rest of the terminals will be gradually incorporated every following Sunday, through 9 February. The system will operate with 114 bus routes, assigned according to public demand.

The Havana City Provincial Assembly of the People's Government has reported that 75 percent of the buses will serve the routes called rapid [words indistinct], which will run more frequently. It was also reported that almost half of the scheduled trips will be made during peak hours; that is, from 0600 to 0800 and from 1400 to 1900. These schedules [los horarios del confronta] will be maintained as they are, and some routes will vary to achieve greater efficiency.

The reorganization of urban tranportation also involves a reorganization of bus stops, which will be set further apart in the case of the express routes. It has been indicated that passengers will never have to walk more than 1,500 meters to find a bus stop.

The buses will circulate with a conductor who will maintain order, prevent damage to the bus, and prevent people from riding without paying the fare, among other things. Also assisting in these objectives will be state inspectors, the Ministry of the Interior, and the specialized personnel of the urban bus enterprise. They will work together at the main bus stops in the capital.

[Words indistinct] with the current fuel situation, urban buses in the capital run 16,000 trips a day and transport almost 2.5 million passengers. This, of course, does not meet current demand, and requires an intensification of the use of bicycles. There are already more than half a million bicycles in use in the capital, and it is hoped that this figure will double over the course of this year.

Buses that use gas are another option, but with limitations. Eighty of these buses will begin operations on 6 January from the San Augustin and Guanabacoa terminals. Two Guanabacoa routes will be eliminated. The Playa and San Miguel routes have also been eliminated.

Beginning Monday, only 1,070 taxis will be in operation in Havana. They will work mainly at hospitals, (?terminals), funeral homes, and emergency transport services. The new reorganization system eliminates 31 traffic lights in Havana City, and eight will be used intermittently. It includes the use of vehicles drawn by animals on the outskirts of the city and prioritizes the use of tricycles in transporting merchandise, among other alternatives. Work is also being done to create streets for exclusive or preferential use by buses, as in the case of Neptune Street.

The city government has also decided to extend the shuttle schedule to run from 0600 to 2000 and create more capacity for the tunnel crossing if necessary. The bay ferry schedules will remain the same, and 94 of the 133 gas stations will continue operations. It was reported during a news conference that the gas quotas for private individuals will be made available beginning Monday. Distribution of gas coupons has been delayed because of printing difficulties. The Havana City Provincial Assembly of the People's Government reported that any question or clarification should be addressed to the following telephone numbers: Urban buses 79-40-95, taxi service 81-57-31, route buses 21-54-52, and gas stations 29-28-30.

Bus Route Changes

FL0201200592 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] The Urban Bus Service Enterprise of Havana city will implement a new route program in five stages, beginning on 12 January and ending on 9 February. The program has three main goals: to expedite the transport of commuters to their destinations during rush hours at sites with the highest concentration of study and work centers, to attain utmost advantage of resources; and to help extend the usefulness of the bus pool.

The reorganization maintains 114 routes, 48 routes fewer than at present. The new program will begin on 12 January at the Alamar, Bahia, Cojimar, Regla, Guanabo, and Guanabacoa terminals, where 26 routes will be adjusted. The second stage, on 19 January, will include the Miramar, Cerro, Palatino, and Ispjae [Jose Antonio Echeverria Higher Politechnical Institute] bases, where 13 routes will be modified. The third stage, on 26 January, includes the Playa, La Lisa, Arimao, San Agustin, and Santa Fe terminals, where 27 routes will be modified. The fourth stage, on 2 February, will include the Calvario, Parraga, Mantilla, Santa Amalia, and Fortuna bases, where 28 routes will be modified. The fifth and last stage, on 9 February, will include the Cotorro, [word indistinct], Niquero, Layton, Santiago de las Vegas, Lugo, and Vibora terminals, where 30 routes will be changed.

According to the note received, a selection was made of the 120 most critical bus stops, where two inspectors—one from the bus enterprise, and one police officer—will be posted to maintain order and protect the resources.

Havana Reports Assigned National Electric Levels

FL0201213992 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Interview with Jorge Carballo Abreu by correspondent Miguel Angel Peralta at the Electric Load National Bureau, date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Peralta] As was reported a few days ago, every province has been assigned a daily consumption plan which includes state as well as residential sectors. This plan in which, as you can see, the unit of measure is the megawatt-hour, or in other words, 1,000 kilowatt-hours, is set up as follows: Pinar del Rio, 1,042; La Habana, 2,363; Havana City, 6,284; Matanzas, 1,579; Villa Clara, 1,301; Cienfuegos, 903; Sancti Spiritus, 719; Ciego de Avila, 720; Camaguey, 1,244; Las Tunas, 725; Holguin, 1,867; Granma, 850; Santiago de Cuba, 1,460; Guantanamo, 519; and the special municipality of Isle of Youth, 168 megawatt-hours. Carballo, what elements were considered in the creation of this plan?

[Carballo] Well, we basically kept in mind the two sectors that consume electricity in each province. The first sector is the residential, which we expect will comply will all measures assigned to it; the second is the state sector, which is considered as the sum of consumption of all state organs in each province, in accordance with the available level of energy production.

Peralta, I wanted to add that the figures given will apply until 15 January. These figures could change in response to fuel availability in the country. These figures could be maintained or adjusted. It is good to point out that [words indistinct], let us say the average for December, which represents a 12-percent reduction, and in relation to the last week of December, is a 6-percent reduction. It is important to keep in mind that [words indistinct] represents a reduction of electric consumption, in accordance to the current availability of fuel in the country. That is the basic situation.

The measures began today. By 2000 tonight, we will know the consumption level of every province; and by early tomorrow, each province, once aware of their level of compliance with the plan, will define which measures it will have to implement in order to comply with the plan, if they have surpassed their quota. The measures could include restriction of production, or service activities or even, if necessary, could affect the residential sector. That is the situation that we have projected. We believe that each province has thoroughly studied the problem, has been preparing for some time, and has ready all the conditions necessary to begin [words indistinct].

[Peralta] Later on, we will report the provincial compliance levels and the possible effects in each region.

Cienfuegos Coffee Harvest Season Nears Goals

FL0301173792 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1506 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] The coffee harvest in Cienfuegos has reached 96 percent of its projected goals and is being considered one of the most efficient seasons in recent times. With more than a month-and-a-half to go to complete the harvest, it is estimated that it will end with 25,000 more cans of coffee than last year and have saved half the fuel normally used. Today, all of this is possible due to the application of several initiatives such as the introduction of chutes to pick coffee in large quantities, which makes it possible to save thousands of bags; and the massive use of oxen and mule teams to transport the beans.

The information, which appeared in GRANMA, adds that contrary to previous years, the coffee harvest in the Cumanayagua Municipality of Cienfuegos is being carried out by the local work force with the assistance of members of the Youth Labor Army.

PRC 'Has No Interest in Becoming Big Brother'

PA0501184092 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1619 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Mexico City, 5 Jan (EFE)—After the disintegration of the USSR, China has no interest in becoming Cuba's "big brother," nor of becoming the "leading nation of socialism," PRC Ambassador to Mexico Huang Shikang said on 5 January.

In statements to the press, the diplomat pointed out that China is not attempting to form an economic and political socialist bloc to occupy the empty seat left by the former USSR.

"China has always maintained that no big or little brothers should exist among socialist nations, because all nations, large or small, rich or poor, should be on an equal footing," the ambassador explained.

Nevertheless, he said there has always been trade with Cuba, because the Cubans "need many of the products we can export, and we also need their sugar."

Shikang pointed out that China sympathizes with the Cuban people's determination to get out of their current economic difficulties; however, "we are not in a position to become the USSR's substitute, nor does the island harbor that hope."

The ambassador added that it is the Cuban people themselves who will have to make the effort to get ahead, and "of course," they can count on the solidarity of the Latin American nations, of China, and of other nations.

CIS Market Economy Deregulation Woes Viewed

FL0201170892 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1255 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Orlando Contreras commentary: "Our Opinion"]

[Text] The deregulation of prices is taking effect today in Russia and most of the republics that constitute the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] which until last year was the Soviet Union. Deregulation is the first of the 10 commandments of a market economy. But the dose has been adjusted so as to not kill the patient.

According to a TASS report datelined in Moscow earlier this morning, 11 percent of basic staples will not be deregulated for the time being, nor between 11 to 13 percent of products of the fuel and energy industries. From now on, some types of bread, as well as some dairy products, will cost three times more than two days ago in Russia. The cost of electricity has increased and train tickets have doubled while airplane seats cost three times more than last week. TASS commentator Viktor Petrenko reports that, and I quote: All the economists agree that prices will soar at cosmic speed, unquote. These are the facts, or at least part of them.

Let us now analyze the theory. According to the market economy theory, prices are not regulated but are set by supply and demand, in other words, the market. In Latin America, the model of market economy was the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile. In a market economy, products and services are considered commodities. Education is a commodity which is acquired only by those who have the money to buy it. Health care is also a commodity and has a market regulated cost. Of course, the work force is also a commodity where salaries are set by the market. If there is unemployment, the price of the work force commodity is cheap because there is a huge supply in the market. If production diminishes, as has happened in the former Soviet Union in the last year, there is a high demand for products, and if imports of these products is reduced, such as in the case of these countries [CIS], the demand continues to grow. Therefore, in accordance with the classic theory, salaries remain low because there is an excessive supply but prices increase with astronomical speed as the Russian economists called it, precisely because the supply in the market is inferior to the demand.

Russia and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union, have imposed some controls on the market system to avert, today and in the upcoming months, the social consequences of this phenomena, but despite these measures, prices will increase well above average purchasing power. It should not be forgotten that in a market economy everything is a commodity—bread, milk, education, health care, transportation, culture—everything, absolutely everything, even death is a commodity. Is the person-commodity better, is it more altruistic, is it more humane, or is it valued as the products sold and bought in the market, beginning with the commodity it represents, the work force? The answer is up to you.

German Labor Union Delegation Visits Santiago

FL0401142592 Havana Radio Rebelde Network in Spanish 1311 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] A delegation composed of 27 German labor union leaders is visiting Santiago de Cuba. They were invited by the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples. Politburo member Pedro Ross, secretary general of the Cuban Workers Federation is accompanying them.

Basically, the visitors are from the metallurgy and education sectors. Since their arrival on 30 December, they have expressed interest in the participation of the Cuban workers movement in economic and social plans, as well as other plans which the country is currently undertaking.

Joint Enterprise Begins Producing Electric Meters

FL0301220692 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 2032 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] The Cuban-Lithuanian joint enterprise, (?TBSA) [expansion unknown], has begun production at facilities in Villa Clara, with the completion of the first electric meter assembled by workers in Villa Clara. It is forecast that 50 meters will be produced by the beginning of June, a reasonable goal considering the raw materials on hand and the equipment which will be used in the assembly, adjustment, and quality control process.

By progressively implementing this process to the entire factory over the next five years, 250,000 meters will be assembled per year and the factory will increase its staff of technicians and work force. (Vitas Kuchinskas), the Luthuanian specialist in charge of the assembly and start-up of the equipment, has emphasized the capabilities of the Cuban workers which enable them to be quickly trained in the technical process.

Comparison of Castro Speech at ANPP Session

PA0201152492

Havana Cubavision Television in Spanish at 0139 GMT on 30 December broadcasts a recording of the speech delivered by President Fidel Castro at the closing session of the National Assembly of the People's Government, ANPP, held at the Palace of Conventions in Havana on 27 December.

The Havana Cubavision Television version has been compared with the Havana Radio and Television Networks version published in the 2 January Latin America DAILY REPORT, pages 7 to 19, revealing the following variations:

Page 7, column two, paragraph one, sentence two, reads: We have had many events starting with the congress which took place very recently, in October. (clearing queried word)

Page 8, column two, paragraph four, sentence two, reads: I remember, as it were yesterday, the very day more more than 15 years ago when we discussed this issue. (correcting figu ~)

Page 10, column two, first paragraph, last sentence, reads: There were coups in many countries that were promoted. [new graf]

The CIA became the master. (supplying indistinct words)

Page 12, column one, first paragraph, third sentence, reads: We have to carefully decide which is the best mechanism. (clearing queried word)

Page 19, column two, last paragraph, the Cubavision version does not include this last paragraph.

Inter-Caribbean Affairs

OECS Officials Admit Two Initiatives Delayed

FL0401143292 Bridgetown CANA in English 1358 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Roseau, Dominica, Jan 4, CANA—Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) officials have admitted that two initiatives they thought would have taken off by now have been delayed.

Dominica's External Affairs Minister Brian Alleyne acknowledged here that a joint OECS mission to be established in Brussels to handle diplomatic and other matters was yet to get off the ground. He said the move to ensure easier travel—be reducing red tape—by OECS nationals in the seven member countries was in for a second delay. The joint mission was to have led to the closure of Dominica's Brussels mission by the end of 1991. Alleyne disclosed that Dominica had to postpone that closure by one month, because the OECS was not yet ready to move forward with the establishment of the new mission.

"Not that the decision is being questioned or anything like that, but the countries have not come up with their contibutions, for example," Alleyne told the CARIBBEAN NEWS AGENCY. "The request for accreditation of the ambassador in respect of the other countries has not yet been done," he added.

Alleyne said despite what he called these administrative hitches, progress was being made on the new mission. "The commitment is to do it certainly by the end of January," he said.

The move to facilitate easier travel within the sub-region issue has also proven to be an embarrassment for OECS governments which first hoped to implement this by December 1, 1991, later opting for January. But Alleyne has admitted that the governments appear no more ready at the moment than they were in December, in relation to obtaining parliamentary approval through appropriate legislation to implement measures to allow for freer travel in the sub-region.

In Dominica's case, that legislation is yet to be brought before Parliament, and a similar situation exists in most of the other islands. St. Lucia, however, is seen as the only OECS country fully prepared to date, for easier travel for OECS nationals.

Alleyne has advanced the argument that these moves meant to strengthen the process leading towards integration would have been easier to attain if the islands were already united politically.

"The whole idea of OECS union would help us on that—that is one of the main reasons why we have been pushing union, because then we won't have to pass legislation, for example, in four separate units in order to get a thing like that. A single unit will pass the legislation and it will apply to all," Alleyne remarked.

Antigua and Barbuda

Prime Minister Rules Out Retirement 'For Now'

FL0101151092 Bridgetown CANA in English 1410 GMT 1 Jan 92

[By Louis Daniel]

[Text] St John's, Antigua, Jan 1, CANA—Eighty-two-year-old Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Vere Bird Sr on Wednesday said he had no immediate plans for retirement, ending speculation that he was making preparations for his son, Planning Minister Lester Bird, to succeed him as prime minister.

Bird Sr, the longest serving head of government in the Caribbean Community (Caricom), told reporters shortly after delivering a New Year's address to the nation that he intended to serve out his current term of office.

He said: "My future is right here as you see me. When I went for the last election (in 1989), the people in my constituency of (St John's) rural north...wanted to know if I am going to work out the term or if I am going to give up after a time.

"I assured them that I will not be giving up, and they can rest assured that I will be there performing the duties and I still mean what I told them."

Bird Sr survived one of his toughest years in politics in 1991 when he faced calls from seven cabinet ministers, including his son Lester, for his resignation. He said on Wednesday all was now well within his cabinet.

There had been speculation here that the prime minister was strengthening the ministerial portfolios of his son Lester in preparation for an eventual hand-over of power. The prime minister's latest move was on December 24 when he gave Lester Bird responsibility for trade, a portfolio previously held by Finance Minister Molwyn Joseph.

Explaining the move, Bird Sr said it was only to allow Joseph to concentrate on improving the country's weak finances. "The only reason for taking trade from Mr Molwyn Joseph is because I felt at the time that the burden of finance and trade was very heavy for the minister of finance. And if I relieve him from trade, he will be able to better concentrate upon the collecting of the finances of the country, and let Antigua be able to go ahead without any thought of having to go to the IMF (International Monetary Fund)," the prime minister said.

Bird Sr said he and his political colleagues in the ruling Antigua Labour Party had resolved their differences, and efforts were now underway to "ensure that we are thinking along similar lines for the new year".

"I think we are working together. I watch constantly and my experience is that the bickerings are now all gone. And I am expecting that they will work in co-operation and give a united leadership to the people of this country, which is what people have been asking for for some time," Bird Sr said.

In his New Year's message, the prime minister appealed for national unity as Antigua and Barbuda confronts the challenges of adjusting the economy in the new year.

"I plead with you, please give the system a chance to work," he said.

"...If we are to meet the challenges of the new year, we must allow the system to work in an efficient manner void of undue disgruntlement." He continued: "There is always room for improvement.....We need positive thinking people and above all - a people of conviction, vision and patriotism."

Bird Sr urged nationals to support the government's austerity programme aimed at bolstering the economy which has been hard hit by the current global recession.

Barbados

Sandiford Restates Stand Against Devaluation

FL0301172092 Bridgetown CANA in English 1428 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Jan 3, CANA—Barbados Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford has restated his government's agreement not to devalue the currency despite economic hardship and International Monetary Fund-backed austerity measures in his country. "Devaluation has never been part of the programme," Sandiford told reporters shortly after he arrived at the Piarco International airport Thursday. "The programme has been devised in order to avoid devaluation and.... All sectors in Barbados have expressed in their opinions that devaluation is not the answer to the problem."

Sandiford, who was accompanied by his personal aide Chris Sinclair and the Barbados High Commissioner to the twin-island Republic, Frank da Silva, was met by Prime Minister Patrick Manning and external affairs minister, Ralph Maraj. The Barbadian leader was the first head of government to meet Manning, who was sworn into office two weeks ago, following the victory of his People's National Movement (PNM) in a December 16 election.

Sandiford said he is hopeful that his government's programme of austerity measures for Barbados will be placed this month before the executive board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by Michael Camdessus, the fund's managing director. The Barbados Government has been facing opposition from its citizens over austerity measures which include retrenchment in the public service and cuts in government-paid workers' salaries.

Sandiford is holding talks with Manning today. Among matters expected to be discussed are a bilateral fishing agreement, joint diplomatic representation, aviation, the integration movement, the Caribbean arts festival, and the Caribbean Community [Caricom]. Sandiford said the main reason for his visit was to meet with the new head of government, and "cement" relationship between Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. The two countries, he said, have always had a special relationship and he hoped that the twin-island Republic would continue playing a leading role in Caricom affairs.

Grenada

Brathwaite Address Rules Out IMF Recourse

FL0101152692 Bridgetown CANA in English 1323 GMT 1 Jan 92

[By Richard Simon]

[Text] St George's, Grenada, Jan 1, CANA—Grenada is putting together a three-year structural adjustment programme to correct imbalances in the economy without recourse to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Prime Minister Nicholas Brathwaite said.

In a New Year's broadcast, Brathwaite told Grenadians 1992 would be a difficult year. He emphasized the government's determination to solve Grenada's problems through its own initiatives and appealed to Grenadians for their support. "Let me emphasize that we do not intend to seek a programme with the IMF," Brathwaite said.

He announced government was establishing a tripartite committee on the economy to make recommendations in relation to wages, prices, employment, and productivity. The committee was part of the government's strategy for restoring the economy, in particular the public finances, to "good health and long-term viability," Brathwaite said.

Brathwaite said Grenada's fiscal situation had reached "crisis proportions" and government had decided the problem "must be decisively addressed now". He signalled the assault on the economic problems facing the

nation would begin with the presentation of the 1992 budget, postponed from last month until early this month.

"We have deliberately held back the presentation of the budget so that resolute action, properly conceived, clearly articulated and vigorously and decisively carried out can take place in 1992," Brathwaite said. "In this hour of crisis and decision, Grenada expects every man, woman and child to join hands so that together, we can build a better land," Brathwaite said.

In his first public comment on deadlocked pay talks between the government and public sector unions, Brathwaite cited a need for curbs on pay increases to reflect the government's need to keep down expenditure. "The important consideration is not whether public officers deserve more, it is whether or not the government can pay more," he said.

The unions have referred the impasse to the Ministry of Labour for conciliation. The unions have attributed the deadlock in the talks on a three- year contract to the government's reluctance to budge from its offer of no increase for 1990, 2.5 per cent for 1991 and 2.5 per cent for 1992.

Director of Finance Nolan Murray said a better offer meant increasing the fiscal deficit. The government said 60 cents out of every dollar earned in revenue go towards paying salaries.

Haiti

Aristide Foresees Negotiation Results This Week

FL0301204292 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Without providing further explanation, Father Aristide said he interprets the delegation's visit as one more step in the negotiations intended to enable him to return to power in Haiti. The deposed president, in addressing a group of journalists, said the continuing dialogue promises to end in concrete results during the first week of January. The journalists pressed for a more complete explanation of his statement, but Father Aristide refused to elaborate.

Father Aristide had been scheduled to meet with the delegation from Port-au-Prince on 31 December to discuss the embargo. The ousted president said that he also planned to go to Mexico to meet with the president of that country, but explained that the date of that trip would depend upon the results of the negotiations being held over Haiti's political situation.

President Nerette Urges Union, Reconciliation

FL0301183392 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1200 GMT 3 Jan 92

["Report" on a speech by Provisional President Joseph Nerette at the National Palace in Port-au-Prince on 2 January—recorded]

[Excerpts] The president of the Haitian Provisional Government, Joseph Nerette, delivered a speech to the nation on 2 January on the occasion of Ancestors' Day. The provisional president, who was presented by Information Minister Henri Piquion as the one and only president of all Haitians in and out of the country, focussed his 2 January message mainly on union and reconciliation. According to the provisional president, 2 January is an occasion for us to think about the cause of all the hardships that have been beating down on the country for the past five years. Nerette asked everyone to change behavior so as to prevent further hardships from striking the country. [passage omitted]

The provisional president, who protested against the embargo that has been effecting Haiti for three months, thought 2 January to be an occasion for the authorities to wonder why the Organization of American States is forcing them to violate the country's Constitution and why that organization has done nothing to help the poor who are obliged to travel to Miami aboard makeshift boats. While expecting the authorities to assess the damages that the embargo has caused to the country's economy, the Haitian provisional president said in the name of democracy and human rights that he protests the way the surviving boat people are treated. He took the opportunity to praise many sectors including the Army and numerous foreigners that are helping the country to get out of the crisis. [passage omitted]

At the conclusion of his speech, the provisional president offered congratulations to all people who have shown patience in putting up with the embargo. Nerette reminded the nation that now is the time for reconciliation. He thinks we must have courage enough to become reconciled the same way we have withstood the embargo. He guaranteed that 1992 will not resemble 1991.

Delegation Visits Venezuela, Urges End of Embargo

FL3112202191 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Interview with Senator Thomas Eddy Dupiton, by Radio Nationale correspondent Jean-Marie Ferari; in Port-au-Prince, date not given—recorded]

[Text] Senator Thomas Eddy Dupiton made a trip to Venezuela over the past few days in order to meet with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez and the Venezuelan parliament so as to see how they could contribute to the lifting of the embargo against Haiti and to inform the Venezuelan people about what is going on in

Haiti now. Let us listen to Senator Thomas Eddy Dupiton with our colleague Jean-Marie Ferari.

[Begin recording] [Dupiton] The purpose of our trip was to give information on what has occurred in the country since 29 October [date as heard] until the date [words indistinct]. We met with several political parties, many high-level church officials, and with the president of the Republic of Venezuela, Mr. Perez. That was the purpose of the trip, that is, to inform the Venezuelan public of the Haitian political reality due to the Haitian specific political sociology.

[Ferari] Did you meet with the Venezuelan parliament as well?

[Dupiton] Yes, I did. You know it was the Christmas season. So, it was very difficult to meet with the entire parliament. We met with several deputies and senators and with the president of the Venezuelan Senate. We had a meeting in which we had a good exchange of views. They told us about their position on the Haitian crisis and we told them the entire truth of what has happened in Haiti. I believe it was something very positive. We closed the trip with a meeting with Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez.

[Ferari] You have now come back to Haiti after meeting with the Venezuelan president. What did he promise you for Haiti?

[Dupiton] Well, [words indistinct] What was more important for us is to give information about the damages that the embargo has caused to the Haitian people and we asked all of them, including the Senate president, the various heads of political parties, and the archbishops, to talk to Perez—at Christmas, which is a time of peace, reconciliation, love, and forgiveness in Haiti—to approach Perez in order to get a suspension of the embargo. That was our firm position. They told us they would intervene, that they would also ask Perez.... [changes thought] They also suggested that we ask Perez for that during our conversation with him. We did talk to Perez about that. He said he has no power over the decision. The question to raise then is the following: If he does not have power over the decision, who does? He said it is the 34 countries that should come to such a decision. Anyway, we let him know that we believed he was very influential and that the 34 countries could perhaps have a favorable opinion if the request came from him. [end recording]

Students End Canadian Consulate Occupation

FL3112200491 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in French 1830 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Excerpt] The 17 youths from the United Militants Front who had occupied the premises of the Canadian Consulate in Port-au-Prince have finally left the building.

They were taken by the Haitian Armed Forces. These youths were rushed to the hospital where they are receiving the care their cases require. Let us recall that all these youths are in a state of complete dehydration. [passage omitted]

Rene Theodore Advocates Coalition Government

FL3112195991 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] According to Rene Theodore, the solution to the current political crisis cannot be any thing other than unity and consensus.

In a statement to an AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE correspondent in Haiti, the president of the National Reconstruction Movement said this solution should end in a national coalition government that can use all available means to rescue the nation.

'Unofficial' Report on Partial Embargo Lifting

FL3112194991 Port-au-Prince Radio Nationale in Creole 1400 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Excerpt] According to an unofficial report from a Haitian senator, the embargo has allegedly been lifted as far as small firms are concerned.

Senator Serge Joseph said this decision has allegedly been taken (?because) some of the countries that signed the embargo declaration against Haiti have managed to strip Haiti of its factories and to have them settled in their own territories. [passage omitted]

Tanker Arrives, Unloads Oil, Gas Despite Embargo

PA0201044792 Paris AFP in Spanish 0134 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] Port-au-Prince, 1 Jan (AFP)—An oil tanker, of unspecified origin, arrived on the afternoon of 1 January at the oil terminal in Port-au-Prince, located southeast of the capital, AFP confirmed.

The fuel—gas oil, according to maritime sources—arrived in a tanker with the inscriptions "Karicou" and "Nassau."

The lack of fuel, rationed throughout Haiti—a country subject to a severe inter-American embargo—has become critical in recent days.

Automobile owners joined long lines to obtain limited amounts of gasoline and certain neighborhoods in the capital only get, in turn, a daily ration of between three and four hours of electricity, which is supplied by diesel facilities.

The last gasoline and gas oil shipment arrived aboard a Liberian flag ship on 28 November. According to reliable sources, the shipment was purchased on the "spot" market in Rotterdam (the Netherlands), but this was never officially confirmed.

The Liberian ship's cargo was inspected by the U.S. Navy outside the territorial water limit in compliance with a U.S. law concerning the embargo, which was approved 8 October by the OAS. The decision was made in an effort to attain the return of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who was ousted by a military coup d'etat on 30 September.

Within the framework of the embargo, Venezuela and Mexico have excluded Haiti from the San Jose Agreement for preferential oil sales.

Likewise, the United States has prevented the departure of at least one tanker whose cargo was destined for Port-au-Prince. According to Juan Jacques Honorat, prime minister of the "provisional" government, the tanker was anchored at the port of Corpus Christi, Texas.

Jamaica

Opposition Leader Seaga on Economy, Recession

FL0201130292 Bridgetown CANA in English 2004 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Report by Paget de Freitas]

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Jan 1, CANA—Jamaica's opposition leader, Edward Seaga, warned Wednesday of serious social turmoil here if the Michael Manley administration continues its policy of stringent demand management to stabilise the economy. This warning, and a promise that his Jamaica's Labour Party (JLP) "will re-establish" its ideological position in 1992, came as Prime Minister Manley prepared to unveil his new cabinet Wednesday night and against the backdrop of a growing movement among intellectuals here for reformed political processes and new leadership.

Seaga, in his New Year's message, said that the policies pushed through by the Manley government since 1989 were plunging the economy into deep recessions as money supply tightened, investment fell, and the cost of goods and services soared. The ultimate goal of the government, which has also been liberalising the market, is to stabilise prices and the demand for foreign exchange. But Seaga, who started the process of deregulation in the mid-1980's, argued that the government was taking only a theoretical approach to the issue, ignoring cultural variations and creating a class of "newly poor."

Said Seaga: "If the strategy being employed, which calls for an even stronger dose of belt-tightening in 1992, is put into effect unabated as proposed, it will not be long before unbrearable limits will be reached.

"At that point, the human spirit will break and the will to resist more pressure will give way in desperation to explosition of frustration which could take ugly forms."

Manley's plans to restructure the government was a direct fall-out from a controversy over the granting of a tariff waiver to Shell Oil Company on the importation of unleaded gasolene. The controversy cost the the energy minister, Horace Clarke, his job and there have also been demands for the resignation of the finance minister, P.J. Patterson. However, the government also affected by other scandals, lost popularity as its liberalisation programme translated into the removal of subsidies and a plunging exchange rate for the free-floating Jamaican dollar. Upshot has been inflation 1991 in the range of 60 per cent.

To use deflationary measures to push the economy to "rock-bottom," said Seaga, was to play "a desperate, dangerous game with human lives." Seaga seemed concerned that the current economic situation and opinion surveys suggesting falling confidence in traditional political leadership will impact negatively not only on the governing ruling Peoples National Party (PNP), but also on JLP, which is not without its own problems.

The party has papered over a nasty public row with a group of "dissidents" who had questioned Seaga's leadership but the rift has not been fully healed.

"As the crisis deepens in 1992, more attention will be focussed on where we go from here," Seaga said. "Alarms will be sounded for new thinking and new men of vision in the hope that someone can produce a magic solution."

But claiming that the Jamaican economy enjoyed its best years in the country's modern history between 1986 and 1988, when he was prime minister, Seaga called for efforts to be directed toward re-creating those years rather than "adventuring in a world which is already experiencing political and economic turmoil not witnessed since the great depression 60 years ago."

He added: "It is in these circumstances that new adventurers, untested, inexperienced but overflowing with the spirit of salvation will attempt to emerge as new leaders.

"This is a direction worth watching in 1992 as visionaries and malcontents gather together in the hope of forming a third political grouping." In this scenario, he said, "we will begin the year by re-establishing our ideological position, spelling out what we stand for, and our direction for the future."

Trinidad

Barbados' Sandiford Visits To Cement Ties

FL0201233992 Bridgetown CANA in English 2226 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Jan 2, CANA—Barbados Prime Minister Erskine Sandiford arrived here this afternoon for talks with his newly elected Trinidadian counterpart, Patrick Manning.

Sandiford, who was met at the Piarco Airport by Manning and External Affairs Minister Ralph Maraj, said the main reason for his visit was to cement relations with

Trinidad and Tobago. He said Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago have had good relations over the years and he wished the tradition to continue. "I am of the firm belief that if Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados work together, we will develop a climate for cooperation," Sandiford remarked.

The Barbados prime minister said the People's National Movement (PNM) and Trinidad and Tobago's first prime minister, the late Sir Eric Williams, as well as outgoing Prime Minister Arthur Robinson, were among the prime players and actors in the regional integration movement.

Sandiford, who leaves for Bridgetown Friday afternoon, said his talks with Manning will be exploratory, and they will look at various issues. The two are expected to discuss a fishing agreement between the two states when they meet here Friday morning, a government spokesman reported.

The two leaders are also down to discuss Caribbean Community matters and civil aviation, External Affairs Minister Ralph Maraj told the Caribbean News Agency (CANA).

"We welcome the visit of Prime Minister Sandiford to our country and he will be holding discussions with (our) prime minister." He added, "some of the items on the agenda for the meeting have to deal with the Caribbean Community, also the collaboration of the integration movement, aviation, the fishing agreement, Carifesta (the Caribbean Arts Festival) V."

El Salvador

Cristiani Explains Three Phases of Peace Accord

PA0501015892 San Salvador EL DIARIO DE HOY in Spanish 4 Jan 92 pp 4, 22

[Text] The United Nations will supervise the peace process that will start in February, which will include the surrender of weapons by the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front], President Alfredo Cristiani has announced.

Three FMLN "commanders" at Guazapa Hill expressed their "satisfaction" over the New York agreements, but they emphasized that the demobilization of the subversive group will not take place unless "they have their power quota secured." The terrorists did not explain what they meant by power quota.

Referring to the agreements reached this week at UN Headquarters by the delegations of the government and the FMLN, Cristiani explained that the peace process will be divided into three phases, which will take place between 1 February and 31 October.

Initially, FMLN members will gradually be concentrated in preestablished areas of the country and the Armed Forces will also retreat to predetermined areas, under the supervision of the United Nations.

Unofficial sources have said that the rebels will settle temporarily in 50 areas in the Departments of Chalatenango, Morazan, San Miguel, Usulutan, Cuscatlan, San Vicente, Santa Ana, and part of San Salvador.

The Army will implement a peace mechanism and the FMLN will follow with the surrender of weapons and demobilization. The third phase will be the return to civilian life by the subversive elements.

The Armed Forces will be reduced by 50 percent in a two-year period beginning 1 February, as established by the peace document signed at 2400 on 31 December 1991 at the UN Headquarters in New York.

An FMLN "commander," who identified himself as Damian Alegria, said on 3 January that the FMLN will "never surrender its weapons to the government or the Army, but only to an international organization once it has effectively and virtually secured its quota of structural power in the country."

Alegria, Chano Guevara, and Joel Sanchez, who are also chiefs of the so-called "Modesto Ramirez Central Front," stated that they will surrender their weapons "only when we have all guarantees."

Meanwhile, Cristiani stated that in the agreements "there is no quota, or previous distribution of positions for anyone" and in the case of the National Civilian Police [PNC], its director will make the appointments. The president said that any former member of the FMLN who wishes to join the PNC will be able to do so by "exercising his rights as a citizen," provided he complies with the requisites of the Public Security Academy.

The president claimed that the guarantees of the peace process "rest on the verification of compliance with the agreements by the United Nations, the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (Copaz), and the international community."

News reports from UN Headquarters indicate that approximately 500 soldiers and support personnel under the command of the UN Observers for El Salvador (Onusal) will be tasked with supervising the cease-fire.

Cristiani explained that during the period of transition and reconciliation, former FMLN members who consider it necessary will receive personal protection.

Regarding the intention of the rebels to maintain simultaneity between their disarmament and the reduction of the Armed Forces, the president said that "symmetry cannot exist; if the FMLN's future is to participate in politics, the rebels would be acting incorrectly by not ending the armed conflict soon and getting ready for the 1994 elections, if they wish to participate in them."

FMLN Presents Implementation Timetable

PA0601032592 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 2244 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] New York, 5 Jan (DPA)—Guerrilla spokesman Roberto Canas stated that on 5 January the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, presented to UN mediator Alvaro de Soto its proposal for a timetable covering everything that must be implemented in the peace accords. He added that the Salvadoran Government was absent from the meeting. Indicating that the FMLN was on time for the meeting, Canas complained that government representatives did not appear in New York on 5 January as was determined in the agreements to begin negotiations.

It has been announced that the government delegation will arrive in New York on the night of 5 January so the meetings will in fact begin on 6 January. "We want to state that the government must explain to the nation and the international community why it was not here at the scheduled time to begin this meeting on 5 January," Canas stated.

The FMLN now wants Alvaro de Soto to meet with the government delegation on 6 January to learn what it has brought to New York, Canas added.

The timetable for the implementation of the agreements is the nation's political agenda, Canas said. It will mark the country's development in the next few months. Among the issues that must be decided are the beginning of the work of the truth commission, the date for the creation of the Police Academy, and many other topics for which a timetable must be established, the FMLN spokesman said.

"We were present at the established place, at the scheduled date, and with our homework done," Canas said.

Santamaria Interviewed About New York Agreement

PA0501201792 San Salvador TVCE Television Network in Spanish 0210 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Interview with Salvadoran Government Minister Dr. Oscar Santamaria, head of the government delegation at the peace talks, by reporter identified only as "Antonio" on 3 January; place not specified—recorded]

[Text] [Reporter] As we announced on 4 January, our guest is Dr. Oscar Santamaria, member of the official dialogue commission. We will talk to him this morning to learn a little more about what was signed in New York on 31 December. Dr. Santamaria, we would like to know some details of the documents, and whether it marks the end of the conflict and the beginning of an (?armed) peace, or is it simply the best agreement reached so far?

[Santamaria] Yes, Antonio, first of all, good morning. Thanks to Canal Doce Television and the "Good Morning" program for inviting me and letting me reach all Salvadoran homes. I wish all of you a happy and prosperous new year, and all the Salvadoran people who have been closely monitoring every step of our efforts in New York. Perhaps 1992 will be different from all the past years, although we could call 1991 the year of peace because of the latter part of the year.

We believe all of the work that was done in New York, as the final document states, because... [rephrases] I wish to clarify here the following: Undoubtedly, a set of agreements that [words indistinct] New York, which is the legality of the agreements and which appears in the condensed agency, would have to be culminated in order to sign all of them within that legal framework we talked about. All of them are final agreements. There are no partial or isolated agreements, as we told you before, but final agreements.

We concluded all significant negotiations, as the document states. What does that mean? All parts of the political agreements that were needed in order to allow us to claim that all issues on the agenda were covered. However, a timetable for implementing the agreements is still pending—what we call the calendar. And as the calendar is also part of the agenda, the calendar must be finalized to ensure the legality of all the agreements.

That is why the UN secretary general—of course, with the consent of the two parties—said that the way to record all of our work and its results was just to record it in a final document, which is what we did in New York, and of course to establish a number of scheduled dates—as a commitment, because nc one may back down now—to finalize the pending portion in a relatively short period of 10 days, and finally to sign all the agreements.

We could discuss agreements on the issues of the armed forces, conditions to end the armed confrontation, and the political participation of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] and the National Civilian Police. We completed all the extensive work we had to do on those issues in New York, and we will travel, perhaps on 4 January, Tony—on 5 or 6 January at the latest—to start the final part by establishing a timetable for the implementation, as the agenda itself states, the timetable and implementation of the agreements.

The document contains all our work and achievements. The UN secretary general can attest to that. By the way, he was concluding his tenure on that last day. We established that we are culminating this process of negotiations, and I would say, in a successful manner. We only left pending the last part, which we will cover during those 10 days, in order to reach the final signing of a large number of documents in Mexico City, Republic of Mexico, on 16 January.

That is the process in which we were involved all that time—long days, by the way—in addition to the work we did in San Miguel de Allende, that finally led us to reach the final agreements. That is reflected in the document we all know and to which you referred, Tony.

[Reporter] Dr. Santamaria, does that mean that during this period—from now until the meeting in Mexico City—everything has been established by the New York Agreement, and only aspects of the timetable to end the armed conflict in the country will be discussed—that is, a formal commitment to reach a cease-fire. There was talk that it would be in effect on 1 February.

[Santamaria] I can read you a footnote from the document that states: The Government of El Salvador and the FMLN declare that they have reached definitive agreement that along with another one previously signed in San Jose, so on and so forth, culminate in the negotiation on all important issues.

[Reporter] Does this mean the end of the armed conflict?

[Santamaria] The end of it, the end. The document also mentions other important things such as dates. It states that the parties also agreed that the end of the armed confrontation will formally begin on 1 Febuary 1992 and end on 31 October 1992. A new meeting has been set for 5 January 1992 to negotiate the implementation schedule for the agreements.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] about the agreements?

[Santamaria] [words indistinct] there are some matters that will continue to be discussed with some difficulty.

[Reporter] What are they?

[Santamaria] The FMLN's final structure and the reincorporation of [words indistinct] well, look, for example, how long will it take to reduce the Armed Forces? How long will it take for the FMLN to begin to participate politically? Also, how can we get several short-term agreements to be implemented sooner than the others? That is where each side, from the perspective of their

interests, will say: That should be done in so many months. Somebody else will say: No, it will take a year or a year and a half. Here is where we start to negotiate, and it will depend on the point being discussed. It is important that I say this because the time to be allotted will depend on the nature of the point being discussed. There are some matters that can be implemented in a short time, but others will be implemented on a medium and long-term basis. Thus, we believe the time span that will be given to different matters will vary. However, I hope the difficulties will be solved readily, because we managed to overcome the difficulties on the agenda that were really complicated. The New York Agreement is very specific: If we do not reach an agreement by the 10th, we will use the formula presented by the UN secretary general, with the support of the group of friendly countries, which, by the way, have been working very closing in all this.

[Reporter] It would be good for both groups to reach an agreement before the 10th.

[Santamaria] Of course. I believe we should not have problems implementing and scheduling agreements if we have a clear idea of what we are doing and how far we can go on the issues. I believe everything has been anticipated and, fortunately, the work done in New York was intense and strong, as you have seen. I need not mention to you that we worked on 24 and 25 December and 31 December and 1 January. That is not our regular working schedule, and the work was especially tough and complicated. We all believe that the great effort we made was certainly well worth it. We can now truly say that we are within a definite peace framework.

[Reporter] However, according to the New York Agreement it is understood that the FMLN will not be disarming by 1 February. How then can the FMLN military structure continue from 1 February to 31 October? [words indistinct] a schedule that is divided into three stages, according to what President Cristiani has explained about the disarmament and demobilization of the FMLN. We understand that is the schedule that was agreed on in New York.

[Santamaria] Within the issue, called conditions, to halt the armed conflict—there are various points within the issue, most of which are of a technical-military nature. From there on will be established, by stages, how the halt of the armed conflict or the definite cease-fire will be implemented. In the specific case of the FMLN, as the New York Agreement itself provides, the end of the FMLN's military structure will be initiated on 1 February and will be concluded by 31 October 1992. That is the whole timeframe in which all of the steps that have to be taken for the disarmament and the demobilization of the FMLN will be accomplished. All of this must be within the agreed-upon timeframes. For example, we are talking about the [words indistinct] of the marked areas. In other cases, if we recall past experiences in this type of cease-fire, they have been called settling or security areas. Here they are called marked areas. The FMLN will be concentrated in those marked areas, within a timeframe that we call an informal cease-fire and the formal cease-fire.

The informal cease-fire is when the agreement is signed; from that time on, there is a cease-fire stage that must be complied with. Although we call it an informal cease-fire, the timeframe is relatively short [words indistinct], in effect, from 16 to 31 January. That is the two-week informal cease-fire. The implementation of the formal cease-fire document starts on 1 February. We are then in the stage of the formal cease-fire. From there on, there is the participation of all the elements required, such as surveillance forces and what we have called the security forces. In this case, the security forces will be supplied by the United Nations, as has been done in other nations when a cease-fire has been established. The presence of the UN forces, which are neutral forces, is precisely to give all-out support and assistance during that period of respecting the rules and the cease-fire agreements .

[Reporter] [words indistinct] the armed peace mentioned so often by the FMLN?

[Santamaria] There was much talk, you may remember, of the concept of armed peace, but within the previous framework. In the previous framework, and we may recall that it was the framework of the Caracas Accord, we talked of two, rather, three phases. We said that one phase involved political negotiations. We had an intermediate phase involving the cease-fire or the end of the armed conflict. The third phase would follow the political negotiations. To be sure, verification of compliance with the agreements was included.

We always said, however, that the cease-fire should not be put in the middle of the two phases of negotiations, because of the very nature of this sort of framework. We said we would have to modify the whole thing. That is exactly what happened in New York in September. We reworked the process back then. We redefined the framework and established the negotiation process into a single phase, and in a subsequent phase dealing with compliance with the agreements.

In that respect, when we defined the cease-fire in New York in September and established its main features, we established that it would have a pre-set timetable. So now the agreements read: From 1 February to 31 October, so it would be a short period of time. And it is relatively short, since we basically have eight months. We also established that it should be dynamic. What does dynamic mean? That everything that must take place within the framework and the time in which it will be observed are continuous. There are a number of sequential steps and measures. There are no isolated aspects or aspects left for some other time or day. No. Everything follows an integrated sequence.

There cannot be armed peace now because the entire cease-fire process is framed by phases and components. That includes the surrender of weapons, inventory of weapons, and a phase that includes demobilization and

the dissolution of groups that were called guerrilla groups. The possibility of what you mentioned no longer exists. We are talking here about a dynamic and short cease-fire, and one that counters and dashes any attempts made in the past to have an armed peace. The armed peace did give one side the possibility of keeping its weapons, for who knows how long. The argument was that since the negotiations ended, the weapons served as a guarantee that the negotiations would take place.

[Reporter] [words indistinct] I remember that on several occasions he told the press he would not sign any agreements if the FMLN did not agree to disarm. Did the FMLN pledge to do it this time in New York?

[Santamaria] Yes, but we have to understand regarding many of these aspects that we are often discussing the matters in terms of their development, shaping, and implementation, but without using the same words I may use. We may use other words. You will see that the words used in the agreements on ending the armed conflict are as follows: the dismantling of the FMLN military and armed apparatus. When we talk of that, we are in fact developing the concept of disarmament and demobilization. For that reason, all of that is included in the agreements, or else we would not have an end to the conflict.

We have to understand that the conflict cannot end if that does not happen. We would be talking of other topics, but the conflict could not end if the things I mention did not take place. That is why I mentioned earlier that ending the armed confrontation, within all of its major components concerning technical and military issues, includes all of these points. They include concentration of forces within the various zones, weapons inventory and surrender, and the mobilization process. Finally, we arrive at the process of full, legal reincorporation into what we have called the civilian, institutional and political life of El Salvador.

[Reporter] Dr. Santamaria, the process will last almost nine months, from February to October. What will happen with the military structure of the Armed Forces during that period? It has been said that an agreement has been signed related to cutting the Armed Forces by 50 percent. Will that really take place? It has also been said that the FMLN will be [words indistinct]?

[Santamaria] Those are precisely the issues we will soon be talking about. An Armed Forces reduction program has already been handed in to the UN secretary general. It is a commitment the government has taken on precisely to finish the negotiations over the Armed Forces. The program was not part of the negotiation or any agreement with the FMLN, however. It is instead based on the September 1991 New York Agreement, which states that we had to present an Armed Forces reduction program to the secretary general. Concerning the program itself now, we still have to prepare a calendar. Of course, it is not the same to say that there will be symmetry between what the FMLN must now undertake and what the Armed Forces has to do.

We are talking about totally different organizations; their very structures illustrate an enormous difference. The structure and organic makeup of the Armed Forces is very different from that of the irregular group called the FMLN, both in size and in the nature of the various components. The reduction of the Army will take longer than that of the FMLN, always as part of a timetable.

We must say that it is perhaps important that the FMLN weapons, as I just mentioned, not necessarily be the guarantee for complying with the agreements. It is like saying I will not disarm myself until the other party does the same. That is not the point. There are mechanism to guarantee compliance with the agreements. There are a series of guarantees and conditions so the agreements can be executed. What are they? On the one hand, we have the instrument of Onusal [UN Observers for El Salvador], which is already supervising and overseeing compliance with the human rights agreement. But Onusal has a greater role to play, because it will also participate in overseeing compliance with other agreements, particularly the cease-fire. There will be a presence of UN forces here, representend by Onusal. It is a mechanism that will guarantee the fulfillment of the agreements.

On the other hand, if you recall in September we created another mechanism called the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace, Copaz, which will be formed by civilians, particularly politicians from all political parties represented at the Legislative Assembly. That is part of what we signed in September in New York. It will support the verification process of compliance with the agreements. Thus, the position of holding onto one's weapons to ensure compliance with the agreements can neither be defended nor justified. Now, the aforementioned mechanisms that will support the continuing process will come into play. That is why we say the process has entered an irreversible stage. There is no turning back from full implementation and compliance with the agreements.

[Reporter] As part of that same program and the New York Agreement, there has been speculation on when the security corps will be dissolved. We are talking about the Treasury Police and the National Guard, for example. Has it been established when...

[Santamaria, interrupting] The dissolution of the security corps has already been established. That is part of what we mentioned earlier on establishing a timetable for complying with the agreement. For example, as you said, the security corps will be dissolved at a specific date. Other components that appeared as a result of the conflict, which we have called the Rapid Deployment Infantry Battalion or BIRI, will also change over time. Those battalions will be merged with what we call the regular army forces.

[Reporter] What date has been established for (?dissolving) the security forces?

[Santamaria] I still do not have an exact date to give you and the public. That is precisely what we are going to review now. We are going to see the various calendar dates that will be set for each of the items or goals [hitos] during the time allotted for reducing the Armed Forces. You will recall that the topic of the Armed Forces had 14 goals. The dates for attaining those goals are to be set, and then we can deal with each one separately. That will undoubtedly all lead to compliance with what we have called the Armed Forces reduction and restructuring process.

[Reporter] [words indistinct]

[Santamaria] That is also part of it.

[Reporter] Has it been scheduled yet?

[Santamaria] As I mentioned before, the security corps, infantry battalions, civil defense groups, paramilitary entities, as they have been called during the talks, and the reduction of the Army itself will have to be scheduled in the agenda process. It was, in a way, already discussed in New York, but it still needs to be defined. That is what we are now going to define.

[Reporter] What mechanisms will be used to purge the Armed Forces? Has that already been established?

[Santamaria] A San Salvador daily recently published a report that the announcement of an ad hoc commission, or evaluating commission as we have called it, had been publicly disclosed. It will be formed by three respected individuals who are known for their high ethical and moral standards, honesty and efficiency. Dr. Reynaldo Galindo Pohl, Dr. Abraham Rodriguez, and Milton Eduardo Molina Olivares are the three members of the commission that will evaluate the Armed Forces.

The task of the commission will be based on previously established guidelines. The assignment requires a very serious and responsible attitude. That is necessary because they will be evaluating an institution and its members, according to specific guidelines. They will also have to specify how the members will finally be incorporated into the institution. The issue was agreed upon in New York, but we had previously been structuring the details. The only thing pending was for the UN secretary general officially to appoint the commission.

[Reporter] Dr. Santamaria, does the commission have a stipulated period in which to evaluate the Armed Forces?

[Santamaria] Yes, the commission has six months in which to carry out its evaluation. All of the tasks they have to perform are already specified. As I have already mentioned, the guidelines to follow had been selected before the commission was appointed.

[Reporter] Does the truth commission have the same time in which to present its report?

[Santamaria] No, I apologize. I made a mistake in my previous answer. The ad hoc or evaluating commission has four months, and the truth commmision has six months. That is more or less how everything now stands.

[Reporter] Dr. Santamaria, is it possible that the FMLN concentration mechanism will have to begin sometime before 1 February? As I understand it, the formal cease-fire signed by both delegations comes into effect on 1 February, and the FMLN concentration period also begins then. How many zones were chosen in which to concentrate the FMLN forces?

[Santamaria] As I understand it, eight zones have been chosen for that purpose. What really is happening is that during the informal cease-fire, which has been in effect since the date the agreements were signed, the various FMLN fronts are to remain in the areas in which they are currently located. Movement toward the security zones or other appointed places begins only on 1 February, when formal implementation takes place. During the informal cease- fire period, the presence of neutral security forces will be essential to guarantee that conditions will be maintained. If that is not the case, there could be violations of the official rules or the accepted agreements that could, at any given moment, endanger the entire process.

That is why we will probably notice the presence of Onusal members in a few days. I mentioned in New York that, given the urgency with which we must deal with all these matters and because movement of UN security forces requires a more or less prudent time, it would be advisable to have the initial stages supervised by the current members of the UN Observers Group in Central America [Onuca]. We have been informed that there is currently a contingent in Central America dealing with all security issues concerning regional peace agreements. That group is a neutral component of the UN security forces. As it reportedly has virtually concluded its duties, it could be incorporated as an advance contingent of the various forces that will be present in El Salvador. In such a case, Onuca would be responsible for the informal cease-fire period.

[Reporter] Doctor, on 3 January guerrilla commander Damian said during a news conference that the FMLN will neither be disarmed nor demobilized as long as there are no suitable conditions for doing so. He also spoke of power quotas for the guerrillas. He said no one can imagine guerrilla fighters surrendering their weapons without having secured that. According to that commander, it has been a negotiation for power between two armies that were unable to defeat each other. What is your opinion of this sort of statement, which could create confusion [words indistinct] the staff?

[Santamaria] Yes, Tony, sometimes some people still use political rivalry and use expressions that perhaps serve their particular interests. Those statements have no

significance in the general context of what we are trying to build. What the gentleman was saying has no meaning, because it has been made evident that an irregular group or a guerrilla force, as you may call it, has the political will, has given its word, and has made the commitment to comply fully and legally with the agreement. There is no room for loose ends. There is no loose end. Everything has a sequence that must be followed, which is what we are going to do. We are going to prepare a program establishing deadlines so that all this is complied with.

When some people talk of legal power, of a military tie and all that, they are using a discourse that was appropriate during the negotiations period, but is not appropriate any more. When there was talk about all this, it was said that the FMLN had to demand as many concessions as possible at the negotiating table in order to fulfill its aspirations. The agreements show that there is no such power quota and no participation in institutions. In the beginning, you may recall, they were demanding participation in the Armed Forces and in the National Civil Police; none of that is established in the New York Agreement. The New York Agreement establishes that if members of the FMLN, as former fighters, apply in the future for employment in the National Civil Police, they will be doing so as any other citizen, in some cases under certain procedures and condition to be established by Copaz. And here is another point: The applicants must graduate from the Public Security Academy. There is no automatic employment and there are no acquired rights. No one may say: I just go there, present myself, and am immediately enrolled in the National Civil Police. None of that. Applicants must receive training at the academy. If they graduate, they then become policemen and serve the Police Department, which serves Salvadoran society and not the FMLN.

[Reporter] Let me get this straight, doctor. The FMLN has no power quota as a result of the New York Agreement.

[Santamaria] No, Tony, what we have had are solutions to problems they presented. One problem they posed concerning land was that many followers, relatives, and members of the FMLN are settled in land that the owners, speaking in relative terms, abandoned and stopped administering as a result of the war. Let's recall that in the September 1991 New York agreements, we established that a satisfactory legal solution to the situation had to be sought; we were speaking about respecting the principle of legal security in the country. What is that legal security principle? The right to own property. The moment the right to own property in the country ceases to exist, we will stop knowing if our house is really ours. We cannot fall into such a crisis because it would produce a holocaust. In the end, we would not know what to do, and there would be upheavals, disorder, and decomposition.,

What the agreements establish is this: Let's say there is a person in possession of some land somewhere. We would have to establish how much time that person has been in possession of that land, and whether or not that person has worked the land. All that would form part of an inventory that would have to be prepared. The agreement establishes that the inventory would have to be made and verified. Once the inventory is verified, it will be determined if the person has been in possession of that land. Two things may then happen. One owner may say: It is my land; here are my land titles. I have never ceased being the owner of that land. If I stopped exerting my rights over that land, it was because of conditions created by the conflict itself. Nevertheless, I once again want to exert my rights of possession over that land. No authority or law can ignore that person's right. That person is entitled to recover his land. In that case, the person can be asked if he wants his land back after so much time. If that person says he does not want it, at a just price, then a transaction could take place with the government—that is, the state—to acquire the land. Once the land is acquired, within the same agrarian reform mechanisms established in the process, the land can be transferred to the current owners, within established agrarian reform projects, so the person can work the land.

[Reporter] What is the position of the Land Bank that currently [words indistinct]...

[Santamaria, interrupting] [words indistinct] are also beneficiaries of the agrarian reform, as you have seen. In those cases, the benefits can also be applied to that person. From there on, there is a process of voluntary transfer—voluntary, I said—because here we cannot be talking about expropriations or sequesters; that is not what the state wants to promote. If the owner does not want to sell, he will not sell; and those families will have to be relocated. There is another solution. If the owner decides to work his own land, then we go into what we call the relocation phase, where the current landowner moves to another place in the same area to state-owned lands. The state does own property—those lands measuring over 245 hectares that were expropriated during the first period of the agrarian reform. The persons can be transferred and settled there, in those cases. There is also land that has been voluntarily offered for sale to the government, through the Land Bank, which you just mentioned, and through [words indistinct]. The lands can also be voluntarily transferred to those persons and be acquired, I repeat once again, in agreement with the mechanisms and regulations established within the agrarian reform.

What we have here is an overall solution, and that is what is important here: that we have answered and provided solutions to those problems and situations presented by the FMLN. The contrary would have been to say we do not care, we will not present solutions. That would have triggered a crisis, or it would have escalated an already existing crisis. No, we did not do that. We provided solutions to the crisis within a satisfactory legal framework—not illegally. We are not attempting to do anything here that is not within a legal framework.

[Reporter] Some 48 hours have passed since the signing of the New York Agreement. We still have not heard any official reaction from the Arena party or from the Armed Forces. All of the sectors have expressed, enthusiastically and with great joy, their opinion regarding the New York Agreement. Do you consider the fact that Arena and the Armed Forces have not yet voiced their opinion to be a bad sign?

[Santamaria] No it is not a bad sign. I believe that if they have not expressed their opinion, it is because we are in recess. At UN headquarters, the defense minister and Armando Caleron Sol—as Arena party president—gave total support to the agreements to be signed, in an evident show of support for the whole process of agreements. I would like to mention that the recess the government institutions now enter might have influenced the fact that a public statement, which is generally made in these cases, has not been made. There have been official statements by the persons I just mentioned, who broadly represent the position of the official institutions. In addition, the president of the republic, the nation's main leader, also spoke out. He made favorable statements on the agreements and on how the government also endorsed them. In addition to being the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, he is also highest ranking representative of the government party, which we can say took him to power.

[Reporter] When will the FMLN commander be able to return to the country without fearing the previously issued arrest threats?

[Santamaria] We have to remember that the Geneva Agreements talk about their reincorporation into civilian life within a total legal framework. When one talks about total legality, it must be clearly defined, that is to place a person who has been in an illegal situation into a legal situation. That had to be accomplished within the mechanisms that are applied in such cases. That is why we, and the secretary general, have already advised the president that a general amnesty will have to be decreed here. A general amnesty is what will return rights to a person so he can fully exercise them, according to the law. We will also have to work specifically on implementing the agreements. We must make decisions and take steps within that scope.

I can say therefore that this is precisely what we are now going to review: To earmark certain steps and measures that need to be taken to ensure that everything concerning the execution of the agreements, especially issues dealing with the FMLN's participation in politics, can take place. That is where we say there are certain short-term steps and others that [words indistinct].

[Reporter] [words indistinct]

[Santamaria] That would have to be short-term. When the cease-fire framework becomes effective, we will have to discuss a general amnesty bill. That aspect is basically headed in the direction of something we have always referred to as reconciliation. It creates the foundation needed to grant what we call a pardon. That has not been granted only in El Salvador, but in all other countries that experienced similar situations and solved a conflict involving internal groups. We believe that it would provide the foundation and guarantee the framework for full legality, which would have to be established to make any political activity by FMLN members possible.

[Reporter] Would the FMLN be eligible to act as a political party?

[Santamaria] Tony, we have definitely already said so at the negotiating table. We have said that it has to be complied with and is part of what the Legislative Assembly will be required to deal with in due course.

[Reporter] Can we have an armed political party?

[Santamaria] Definitely not, Tony. The UN will inventory the arms and collect them. A demobilization will also take place, so that at that moment they stop being a guerrilla movement and reincorporate themselves into Salvadoran society within the framework of full reality. Such full reality must be backed by a law, and that law must be backed with what we call amnesty. That is what we call the starting point for all those who from now on will be reincorporated into Salvadoran society, within a framework of what we call nonvulnerability for what may have been illegal actions at one time or another. That will allow them instead to reincorporate into society with the full rights of citizens, thanks to that important step we call general amnesty.

From that viewpoint, we believe that following FMLN actions since the execution of a definite cease-fire agreement, several steps and measures have to be taken, but with logical correspondence. For example, I take a step provided another step is also taken. That is why the political accords must have proper agreement.

[Reporter] Starting on 9 February, the country will perhaps begin a new stage, which ends on 31 October when the third phase of FMLN disarmament is completed and the FMLN joins political life. What will happen in this country after 31 October?

[Santamaria] Well Tony, remember we have been talking of what needs to be done in the country during the postwar period. We will undoubtedly end the chapter of armed confrontation. A new chapter will begin, however: the reconciliation of Salvadoran society and what could be our country's reconstruction. When we speak of reconstruction, let us not only talk about everything to do with rebuilding structures—a completely destroyed infrastructure—but the reconstruction of all ethical, moral, and natural values. Probably everything the Salvadoran people have has been affected by the conflict. All of us know that the conflict struck every fiber of Salvadoran society. Reconciliation is needed, and it is needed right now. That is why we mention that an important stage took place in executing the peace agreements—the national reconciliation stage. We will need to work toward that goal with all walks of life. That is

why it is important to say that it is true we have private interests—people, group and sector interests. Those interests must yield to the national interest of Salvadoran society. That is why we believe that all leaders—be they union, religious, political, or any type of leader—will have to work from now on within what we call a framework. That framework was used in all postwar periods. All post-conflict periods had a concept that gave a solid foundation of what was the reconstruction of those countries.

That concept is solidarity. From now on, we have to work together to secure national goals, general goals. Personal ambition, group ambitions, the ambition of sectors have to yield for the sake of the general interest. If we do not do that, it will be difficult to consider the reconstruction of the country. We think we have a big task ahead of us. We will need resources. People will be saying: You have created a checking account called peace, but you continue to draw on that account. Everybody is going to think that peace is going to resolve everything. That is not possible. Peace is an abstract on the basis of which we may start building what we have been talking about, but everybody must work in that direction.

Some of us have lived through this process with more intensity than others. Some of us drafted and edited a chapter of our history when we signed the agreements. Now we need the participation of all Salvadorans. There is no exclusion here. It is true that the government now bears the greatest responsibility, but it is not an exclusive responsibility of the government. All that is happening affects all sectors of the country; all of us have to make the effort, utilize resources, and have the will to say together: We are beginning this new phase of reconstruction of ethical and moral values, of physical structures, and of the country's productive infrastructures. We are doing this so we will be able to generate whatever we need from now on, and so all Salvadorans may see that this reconstruction, which also involves the institutional framework, will allow us to reconstruct, renovate, and promote the institutions in order to instill in them a different vision of the country. The agreements provide for that.

All of this encourages us to trust that we are creating new foundations not only for the current generation, our generation, but also for future generations.

It looks like the time has come for Salvadoran society to go through the self-examination all societies must experience in order to know where they stand and what has to be done in the future. That is why we are saying that the Salvadoran people are the big winners in all this.

We don't have to think in terms of the FMLN, or the government, or the governing party. No! We don't have to think that way! If we do, we would be deepening the abyss that has split the country and the scars that the 11 years of war have left. No! We have to look at it from a different point of view. The Salvadoran people are the big winners here. We have provided a new starting point from which the Salvadoran people will move forward to do what the Salvadoran people have to do: Create new foundations; establish new possibilities for the country's institutions; and promote, on that basis, the reconciliation that eventually will lead us to the highest possible level of social coexistence and harmony.

[Reporter] That will affect the life of the country.

[Santamaria] That is precisely the goal, Tony,: to have stability and development for the sake of a society that demands and wants a higher standard of living, let's say.

[Reporter] [words indistinct]

[Santamaria] [words indistinct] Thank you, Tony, very nice of you. Our greetings go to all of you, to all Salvadoran people. I want to tell you that we are going to have a new meeting, as I have said. We will be leaving either 5 or 6 January to sit again at the negotiations table in order to agree, within the next five days, on what is needed. On 16 January, we will have a ceremony that will be momentous, not only for El Salvador, but also for Central America, the Latin American continent, and the world, because that ceremony will be to sign the final peace agreements.

We will try to be with you on another occasion. Thank you.

[Reporter] I thank you, Doctor.

Announces General Amnesty Law

PA0401041992 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Oscar Santamaria, minister of the presidency and head of the government's delegation for talks with the rebels, announced on 3 January the issuance of a general amnesty decree that will benefit the guerrillas and ensure their incorporation into civilian life. Here is a report:

[Begin recording] [Unidentified reporter] To reincorporate the rebels into the Salvadoran political process, the government's official spokesman announced the implementation of the law as an essential requirement to guarantee that process.

After insisting that the inclusion of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] in the political arena must take place within fully legal bounds, Santamaria pointed out that an amnesty must be implemented in the near future; at the very moment when the armed confrontation ends.

[Santamaria] That is why we argued before the UN secretary general for a general amnesty law, because that instrument restores one's rights and allows one to fully exercise them, as the law states.

[Reporter] Santamaria said that the initiative is part of the reconciliation process the government is promoting.

The government initiative specifies that FMLN commanders would be favored by an amnesty before it becomes a political party.

[Santamaria] It creates the foundation needed to grant what we call a pardon. That has not been granted only in El Salvador, but in all other countries that experienced similar situations and solved a conflict involving internal groups. We believe that this would provide the foundation and guarantee the framework for full legality, which would have to be established to make any political activity by FMLN members possible.

[Reporter] Santamaria categorically said that the FMLN will have no power quotas, as stated in the New York agreements. He also denied that the point is under discussion, because it was completely exhausted [depurado]. [end recording]

Vargas Urges People To Build Peace After War

PA0501010692 San Salvador LA PRENSA GRAFICA in Spanish 4 Jan 92 p 5

[Text] The agreements signal the end of the war, but not peace, Colonel Mauricio Ernesto Vargas, deputy chairman of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff and member of the government's dialogue commission, said on 3 January.

"Peace," he added, "is not obtained by decree. Peace must be built. What we have achieved is the political will to end the war, to eliminate the conflict. Now we must build peace and the entire society must participate," the colonel stressed.

Vargas issued a call to Salvadoran society to truly participate in building peace. "Peace is not a single act. There is a basic peace and there is a higher peace. The latter entails the development of economic and social structures that will bring well-being to all Salvadoran citizens. In that way, democracy will be consolidated and peace will become strong, stable, and lasting," he added.

According to Vargas, the main challenges that society faces to achieve a higher form of peace are: First, a change in the mentality of each and every Salvadoran so that individual or group interests will be set aside in favor of the nation's stability.

Second, there must be a reorganization of the national forces; only that will guarantee that all sectors will fulfill their commitments. If someone has doubts about the communists' compliance with the agreements, the reorganization of forces will guarantee that the great majority of the people in the country will eliminate that danger. "We are not disabled or incapable of developing a process. We are the majority and we are capable of carrying out a peace process," he added.

The third challenge is to achieve a new political and social pact in the country, because there is a new form of politics. "More opportunities emerge each day; at this time, pluralism is at its highest level throughout the country," he added. He stated that the Armed Forces are restructuring, modernizing, and professionalizing themselves to have a place in a new society, with a judicial system based on human rights.

He said that to carry out the transition phase, which he termed "very difficult," one must maintain an attitude that is in line with the nation's interests, without taking advantage of problems to make mutual accusations. In that way, he added, the transition phase will have the least possible social costs.

Ruben Zamora Sees Country Entering New Phase

PA0401044092 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Democratic Convergence leader Ruben Zamora said that the country's economic, social, and economic structures are entering a new phase due to the New York agreements.

[Begin Zamora recording] We feel that the fundamental significance of the New York agreements is that they politically end the war. [end recording]

Twelve years of war are over, and, therefore, the New York agreements open a new phase in the country's political, social, and economic structure, according to Zamora. We are beginning a new cycle that entails two major tasks, he stressed.

[Begin Zamora recording] The first major task is to democratize Salvadoran society through the total demilitarization of our society. [end recording]

The second task deals with reconstructing El Salvador, based on the consensus of all the sectors of society. The process is long, the political leader added, but there are immediate tasks to undertake.

[Begin Zamora recording] The first immediate task consists of strictly abiding by all the deadlines agreed on in New York. We want the final peace document to be signed on the 16th of this month. Then, we have the immediate task of approving the constitutional amendments on the Armed Forces, something that is still pending. [end recording]

The third task would be approving the law on the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace; and the fourth, the creation of the economic consensus forum, Zamora indicated. He added that this way peace will have a solid foundation, instead of being based on war, which caused social and economic imbalances. We must stop regarding each other as foes; we should not be warriors, but political adversaries, Zamora indicated.

FMLN Commander Villalobos on New York Accord

PA0301190792 (Clandestine) Radio Farabundo Marti in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[Text] We are bringing you excerpts of statements made by Commander Joaquin Villalobos on 1 January, before he left New York City. Commander Villalobos gives a detailed explanation of the agreements, especially the most thorny aspects, such as the National Civilian Police, the Armed Forces' reduction, and socioeconomic issues.

[Villalobos] "At the meeting in New York, we basically tried to resolve the crucial points in the negotiations. They are what I call the central issues: the Armed Forces, police reform, guaranty of the FMLN's [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] [words indistinct], socioeconomic issues, and the characteristics of the [word indistinct]. In that regard, the negotiations were very positive. The details have been established for the FMLN fighters and former fighters to join the National Civilian Police. In addition, mechanisms and procedures were agreed upon for the zones of conflict; the police will guarantee stability and order in those zones. The mechanisms deal with the commands and the [words indistinct] of the National Civilian Police in those areas. To resolve the point on the Armed Forces [words indistinct], everyone knows that it included a number of things that must now be implemented. The (?distribution) of land in the conflict zones was settled satisfactorily. [Words indistinct] mechanisms were established in the economic area. Regarding the economic and social aspects, we must say the government's stand was wrong, because it will result in political problems. The government had the opportunity to create an economic package that would ensure stability. Nevertheless, the government was reluctant at all times to let the economic and social forces help give greater stability to the country. Some points were settled and a mechanism for a concerted effort, or a forum, was established. It will have to be used by the social forces under the new conditions that will emerge in the country."

The commander also discussed the cease-fire, which will be effective on 1 February, and will last nine months.

[Villalobos] "A cease-fire has been established for a duration of nine months. The Armed Forces will stay in their barracks and all changes in the forces will be made during that time. The cease-fire will give our people a clear vision. It will be a time of true peace. The Armed Forces will be reduced to their position before the war. They will remain in their barracks and will be subject to the military control of the Onusal [UN Observers for El Salvador] forces. The FMLN will retain the positions it has held throughout. A temporary system will be established for the operation of the provisional police; it will operate until the new National Police guidelines are established. That is what was discussed. There were still two packages of proposals waiting to be discussed; however, they could not be debated because the negotiations have not yet concluded."

Commander Villalobos responded to questions about the FMLN's participation in the civilian national police and the reduction of the Armed Forces.

[Villalobos] "The FMLN's participation in the civilian national police will occur at all levels. That was clarified completely. It was set forth in the document that the number of officers will be reduced and that some facilities will be turned over to civilians. Perhaps the most important point is the fact that a cease-fire agreement implies, for the rest of the civilian population and the international [words indistinct], that the Armed Forces, which have applied a warmongering and militaristic policy, will operate under different conditions. As a result, military aid will end. The financial support, through which the Armed Forces justified their existence, will end. (?The agreement) stipulates the obligatory nature of the terms under which the Armed Forces will operate. [words indistinct]"

Villalobos also commented on the socioeconomic issue, apparently one of the points on which the government hardened its stand late in the New York negotiations.

[Villalobos] "[Words indistinct] because of the meeting to reach an agreement. In reality, the social and economic agreement initially settled more relevant aspects, such as land, credit, and some details [words indistinct]. The people's movement must now keep struggling for the things it has been demanding."

Villalobos commented on the schedule of the agreements and the dates stipulated in the New York document.

[Villalobos] "This is a very important issue. It constitutes one of the negotiation's main achievements. The time has arrived for reaping the fruits of 24 meetings, such as constitutional reforms, improvement of human rights, legalization of the ownership of lands for FMLN combatants and their relatives in conflict areas, police reform, FMLN participation in the national police. It was urgent to begin applying all that. The agreement is perhaps the best guarantee that we are going to begin reaping the fruits of the negotiations, when we will ensure the compliance with the accords. The cease-fire is a very important item in the agreement and gives the political forces leeway to assume the responsibilities of the new stage. It is a sort of forum to make sure that everything is complied with, that the necessary transformations will be carried out, and that the country will be transformed. During the nine months, the FMLN will continue to guarantee the fulfillment of all of these things."

Villalobos also talked about the FMLN's political participation in the new stage of the country's history.

[Villalobos] "It has been established that the FMLN will become a legal political force through a special decree. As a legal force, the FMLN will have its guarantees and rights [words indistinct]. All these aspects are contemplated in the political participation agreement. All the political prisoners will be released. Guarantees will be given for the return of exiles and people who have had to live outside the country because of the conflict. There is an extraordinary and exceptional situation in the country. As I said before, it is time to begin reaping the

fruits of 24 rounds of negotiations. This is the most important stage, and we must prepare for it."

On the night of 31 December, a document was signed which, according to Villalobos, does not reflect all that was agreed upon. The document, however, filled a definite need for a number of reasons.

[Villalobos] "We must admit that a portion of the document represents something that had to be done in the last 10 minutes of the negotiations. The FMLN had obtained all that had been demanded, (?although) there had been no time to negotiate the schedule. The document truthfully registers the currency in which the FMLN is repaying the time and effort spent in the 24 rounds of talks. It was the FMLN's pledge to put an end to its military structures. The shortage of time, the approaching holidays, the exhaustion of the delegates, and the fact that the document does not reflect all that was achieved will probably create some confusion. The important thing, however, is that the people can learn from the document. Even more important, however, is that the people know the FMLN. [words indistinct] In addition, there is something else to do. It was necessary to give Cristiani a ticket out; he needed the support of the agreements that had been reached. He needed to reassure his people. A very important negotiating package had been put together already. Consequently, the document becomes a sort of promissory note signed by the FMLN, pledging to do all that the document says. The document is a step toward ensuring stability, despite the problems. Today I learned that there have been explosions in El Salvador. It is an indication of who is grieved over the agreements and who is benefited by democracy and peace."

Commander Joaquin Villalobos pointed out the important role that the UN Group of Friends' member countries, the U.S. Government, and the UN mediation team played in the negotiations.

Villalobos also said that the ad hoc commission that will be in charge of purging the Armed Forces has already been agreed upon and appointed. Finally, Villallobos explained the impact that the New York Agreement will have on the 1994 elections, in which the FMLN can participate as a legal political party.

[Villalobos] "First of all, the political agreements will generate all sorts of [3-second break in transmission] will get rid of repression in the country. The Civil Defense groups and all the other tools of the National Guard will be dissolved. That will contribute to freedom. In my opinion, though, the government made a serious error at the negotiations. We were offering the possibility of reaching an economic and social agreement that would bring great stability to the country, as well as a pact that would have given the Nationalist Republican Alliance [Arena] an edge in the 1994 elections. But the government defended its economic platform in such a dogmatic and ideological way that what was achieved was the transfer of some points for discussion by government commissions. That will represent a big disadvantage for Arena in the 1994 elections. Arena will pay then for its refusal to secure a more unifying economic agreement that will bring greater stability to the country."

Further Comments

PA0501180392 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1551 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Managua, 5 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—"Commander" Joaquin Villalobos, a member of the top leadership of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) of El Salvador, on 5 January described the "achievements" made by the guerrillas as a result of the peace agreements signed in New York on 31 December as "enormous.

Villalobos arrived in Managua on 4 January to meet with former Nicaraguan president Daniel Ortega, through whom he expressed his thanks to the Nicaraguan people "who accompanied us in these difficult, bloody years of so much sacrifice."

"We are now about to reap the harvest of all those years of struggle. We hope that peace and stability in El Salvador will also bring peace, stability, and progress to Nicaragua," the FMLN leader added.

The Sandinist opposition press, which reported the meeting between Ortega and Villalobos, did not specify whether the Salvadoran guerrilla leader met with officials of President Violeta Chamorro's government. Other sources have not been able to ascertain that either.

According to Villalobos, with the signing of the New York Agreement, "if we look back on the original causes of the Salvadoran armed conflict, the FMLN has gained more than 100 percent."

"If we consider it from the viewpoint of our original doctrinaire and ideological discussions, then that is another matter," the Salvadoran leader said.

Villalobos, who went on to New York after his visit to Managua, said that peace in his country "is at hand," because all that remains to be negotiated is the timetable for implementing the agreements. He gave assurances that the Salvadoran Government and the FMLN will sign a permanent cease-fire agreement in Mexico on 16 January. [passage omitted]

Villalobos said he does not believe the negotiations will fail, "because it is an irreversible process," although he emphasized that "it will not be easy." He insisted, however, that there will be "spectacular changes" in El Salvador.

Modesto Ramirez Commander Alegria on Disarming

PA0301201792 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] The joint staff of the Modesto Ramirez Central Front stated there will be no disarmament or demobilization of rebel forces as long as there are no guarantees for their reestablishment in civilian, political, and institutional life in the country.

Commander Damian Alegria said when such guarantees exist, the weapons will be turned over only to the UN Observers for El Salvador or another international organization, but never to government authorities.

[Begin Alegria recording] We will not have the combatants parading to turn their weapons over to the Army. They should forget about that, because it will not happen in our country. Rather, it will happen when the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] has a guaranteed quota of structural power in a real and concrete way in our country. That is so that, in this political, economic, and military transformation process in our country, there are no disadvantages for any party at any time. [end recording]

Alegria was accompanied by other rebel chiefs from Guazapa Hill. He went even further than what has been made known so far about the New York Agreement. He spoke of the structural power quotas for the FMLN.

[Begin Alegria recording] Cristiani says there are no power quotas for anyone in [words indistinct] but it is obvious that he is negotiating with us, and what he is negotiating is power. Starting from that, it is an undeniable fact that we are negotiating how to share power in our country. Second, we understand there will still be an effort to pacify some sectors in the Army, his party, or the government who might be against the negotiations.[end recording]

The agreement, which has been called the New York Agreement, represents for the FMLN the final effort to achieve the end of the armed conflict. There will be sectors blocking the advance of negotiated solutions, said Commander Damian Alegria, but he warned that the FMLN will give a military response to the groups that are against the negotiations.

[Begin Alegria recording] We will always be alert to the possibility of that groups may want to go back to the past and block the process of modernization, democratization, demilitarization, and dismantling of the dictatorship in our country. We must point out that, in this sense, the FMLN has a lot military experience. The FMLN will be ready to use that experience if and when the conditions force us to do so.[end recording]

Even if it is true that the government and the FMLN command have sorted out the most difficult topics, there are still topics to be solved that are considered easier by some sectors of the church. One of the pending topics is deciding how to end the military structure of the FMLN. The rebel commanders say there will be a conversion to civilian and political life, and that disarmament will come with the establishment of a real democracy in the nation.

Modesto Ramirez Leadership Calls Accords Historic

PA0501003392 San Salvador DIARIO LATINO in Spanish 3 Jan 92 p 8

[Text] During a phone conversation with this newspaper, the leadership of the Modesto Ramirez Central Front and its urban commando units have described as historic the agreements signed on 31 December by the government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN]. They added that the agreements signed at the negotiating table are due to the efforts of the FMLN and groups that united to bring peace with social justice to the country.

The urban commando units said that they were pleased with the agreements signed by the government and the FMLN because they have struggled for the past 12 years to bring about a just and lasting peace for the Salvadoran people. They also recognized the government of Alfredo Cristiani for its courage to reach agreements that meet the aspirations of all Salvadorans, despite the pressure applied by antidemocratic groups that do not want peace. They urged the Salvadoran Government to combat groups that tried to prevent the signing of the agreements through reactionary actions to frustrate the peace aspirations of the country.

Finally, they voiced their joy and satisfaction and urged the Salvadoran people to ensure the implementation of the agreements so that the much-wanted peace will prevail.

FMLN Commander Doubts Post-Accord Coup

PA0401184392 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 1200 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Mexico City—Salvadoran guerrilla representatives said in Mexico City that it would be very difficult for the Salvadoran Army to stage a coup d'etat after the signing of the peace agreements between the rebels and the right-wing government of Alfredo Cristiani.

At a news conference in the Mexican capital, Miguel Saenz, representing the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] and a member of its Political Commission, said he could not rule out a possible coup d'etat, although the FMLN believes it would be highly difficult, because in El Salvador there are factors that would make it so. But we will not put our hands in the fire, he added.

Saenz pointed out that after El Salvador's peace agreements are signed on 16 January in Mexico City, it will be most difficult for the Army to attempt a coup d'etat because Salvadorans are highly politicized. He added that the FMLN believes it is very improbable [dificil]

that the United States, which in his opinion influenced the achievement of peace, would lend a hand to the coupists.

According to Saenz, the agreements reached in New York between the FMLN and the Cristiani government will exert a positive influence on the Guatemalan peace process. Guatemala has been waging a 30-year undeclared war that has resulted in more than 100,000 deaths.

Mr. Saenz added that he did not know at what level the Colombian, Spanish, Mexican, and Venezuelan governments would be represented at the peace agreement signing ceremony scheduled for 16 January in Mexico City. According to Mr. Saenz, it would be very significant if the ceremony was attended by Colombian President Cesar Gaviria, Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Venezuelan President Carlos Andres Perez.

Saenz commented that after 31 December 1991, when the peace agreement was signed, there have been cases of provocations by the Salvadoran Armed Forces in the Departments of Chalatenango and La Libertad. He added that it is quite difficult to avoid provocations by rightist groups because there will always be groups who are against the political agreement. The FMLN leader restated that the guerrillas have made a clear commitment to defend the positions they currently control.

He commented that Germany, France, and Sweden, among other countries, have shown interest in rebuilding El Salvador. The civil war taking place in El Salvador for the past 12 years has resulted in more than 80,000 deaths.

Saenz believes that the Cristiani government and the FMLN both have the political will to consolidate the peace process to ensure a lasting peace. The signing of the peace agreement, Saenz continued, is the culmination of a whole series of sacrifices the Salvadoran people has made. There are no winners or losers in this war.

There are currently approximately 300,000 Salvadoran nationals residing in Mexico, of which only a small percentage are under the protection of the UNHCR [UN High Commissioner for Refugees]. Mexican immigration authorities consider the rest illegal aliens. Meanwhile, Saenz pointed out, there are nearly one million Salvadorans in the United States, 80 percent of which are considered illegal aliens.

FMLN Commander Facundo Guardado said the present Salvadoran generation should feel proud to have participated in the changes that were agreed on 31 December 1991 at UN Headquarters in New York.

FMLN Commander Marcos Jimenez and Rebeca Palacios also participated in the news conference. In 1991, Mexico was host to the FMLN and Salvadoran Government representatives, who participated in the peace talks aimed at bringing peace to El Salvador.

FMLN Summarizes 1991 Military Activities

PA0301191592 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 31 Dec 91

[Text] [Announcer] The year 1991 became one of important victories in the Salvadoran people's revolutionary struggle. They were victories in the political, military, and diplomatic fields. To tell us about this extraordinary collection of victories by our revolutionary army, here we have Santiago [not further identified] at the console. He will give us a military summary for 1991.

[Santiago] In 1991 we upheld our political-military initiative. Our military forces defended our strategic rearguard zones and moved forward with the organization of the people in new areas of the country, primarily in the cities. We continued our operations to draw fire and capture weapons from the antidemocratic armed forces. We maintained our rejection of the government's economic plan by carrying out our sabotage operations against the electrical system, and collapsing all power transmission lines. Those actions played a basic role in forcing the power groups to begin serious negotiations with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN], thus presenting real opportunities for peace in 1991.

This is how we end 1991. We now present a summary of military actions carried out by the National Army for Democracy [END] during that period, in one of the most astounding military campaigns in the history of worldwide social struggles. We hope this is the last year we will present such a military summary. We hope so, because we believe we have showed the ultra rightwing facts that demonstrate that it was defeated in its attempts to continue with the military solution to the Salvadoran conflict.

Attention local and international press. A summary of the 1991 military operations follows:

This year we inflicted a total of 6,800 casualties on the antidemocratic armed forces; we repeat: 6,800 casualties, including 67 officers and 157 troops [numbers as heard]. In fighting during the year, we took 147 prisoners of war. Among the officers included in the casualties were four pilots who were shot down during our operations to counter air raids. In 1991, the FMLN took 355 rifles from the antidemocratic armed forces; I repeat: 355 rifles. Other weapons captured during the year were 23 M-60 machine guns; 12 M-79 grenade launchers, 20 M-72 LAW rocket launchers; 35 TRC 77 transceivers; five 90-mm cannons, two 60-mm mortars; a large amount of ammunition, and other war materiel.

During our air war operations, END fire damaged 22 aircraft, including the following: five military helicopters were shot down; three A-37 fighters, and one push-and-pull airplane were destroyed on the ground during the attack against Comalapa Airport; one AC-47 gunship was damaged; two A-37 fighters were damaged; 10

helicopters were damaged; and 28 military trucks and seven armored personnel carriers were destroyed or damaged.

During 1991, Radio Venceremos and Radio Farabundo Marti received battle reports that tell of a total of 88 fellow END fighters falling in battle. They were 88 companeros who in 1991, with their own blood, wrote part of the immortal campaign the Salvadoran people have been carrying out for these 11 years. Companeros who fell in battle: You have found a place in the hearts of the people. As we say good-bye to 1991, you will remain here as a frontline column to continue flying the flags of the democratic revolution, and to move toward the future and toward victory.

Chamber of Commerce: Peace Agreement Reassuring

PA0401211192 San Salvador Canal Doce Television in Spanish 0300 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Ricardo Montenegro, president of the Salvadoran Chamber of Commerce and Industries described the social and economic agreement made between the Salvadoran Government and FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] guerrillas in New York as comforting and reassuring.

As the majority of Salvadoran sectors have done, the Chamber of Commerce and Industries expressed its satisfaction and pleasure over the completion of a final agreement between the government and the guerrillas. According to Mr. Montenegro, the creation of a socio-economic forum between the government and the FMLN is comforting.

[Begin recording] We see this as a great opportunity for future issues to be based on consensus. It implies that we should all agree on what has to be done. We believe that the consensus issue is quite important because it will allow different sectors of our society to become involved and take an active role in the peace process. [end recording]

The achievement of a peace agreement is the result of the sacrifices of thousands of Salvadorans. In addition, he rejected the position taken by certain sectors who, with the arrival of peace, have demonstrated antidemocratic attitudes.

[Begin recording] I believe those sectors will slowly disappear. They must disappear because we cannot tolerate or provide opportunities for them to express themselves. With every passing day, those groups will receive less and less support. Now we must all set our sights on the future and start working for the benefit of the country. [end recording]

Montenegro pointed out that during the reconstruction process, there is urgent need for his organization to support small businesses, which will contribute to an increase in economic levels.

Government sources estimate that approximately 1 billion colones will be required to rebuild El Salvador. Chamber of Commerce estimates predict that at least 2 billion colones will be required to rebuild the country and to ensure sustained economic growth.

Guerrillas Abandon Some Guazapa Hill Positions

PA0501205592 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1610 GMT 5 Jan 92

[By German Reyes]

[Excerpts] San Salvador, 5 Jan (ACAN-EFE)—The Salvadoran guerrillas are beginning to abandon some of their positions in Guazapa Hill, one of its main bastions for attacks on San Salvador and the object of constant attacks by the Salvadoran Army and Air Force.

Guazapa is a high-risk area because of the mines the rebels have placed there. One of the mines exploded on 4 January, when a correspondent and a messenger for ACAN-EFE, an editor for INTERPRESS SERVICE, and a reporter for EL MUNDO, a San Salvador newspaper, were crossing a creek. The newsmen were slightly wounded. They climbed almost 1,000 meters up Guazapa Hill.

ACAN-EFE established that rebels who were in an area of the hill, 30 km north of Managua, have moved to other areas leaving behind evidence of recent clashes during which they used heavy artillery such as 66-mm antitank rockets, RPG rockets, and other artillery. In the northern area of the 1,420-meter hill, there is also evidence of incursions by Army elements who were able to penetrate 500 meters when searching for guerrilla hideouts. There are thousands of spent machine gun and automatic rifle casings spread on the slope of the hill. On the higher areas, hundreds of trees are down, felled by bombs dropped by the Air Force. [passage omitted]

The guerrillas have left their camps intact, including trenches, hearths, huge kettles for preparing food, sleeping quarters sheltered by clay bricks, and the protected underground hiding places that are linked by narrow tunnels. [passage omitted]

The environment is one of total calm in some of the guerrilla camps in the southern part of Guazapa Hill. The rebels receive newsmen, play football, chess, cards, tell jokes and say that peace will be a reality if the government complies with the New York agreements.

FMLN Commander Jorge Shafik Handal Interviewed

PA0301204992 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU in Spanish 1420 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Interview with Commander Jorge Shafik Handal of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, FMLN, by Ricardo Gomez; place and date not given; live or recorded—monitored in progress]

[Text] [Handal] ...without it, the problems of its own security and its own internal peace. That is the new thing about this solution. That is the creative thing about this solution. We have agreed to a nine-month cease-fire under UN surveillance. We have agreed that it will start on 1 February and end on 31 October. Before that, we will have 30 days of an informal cease-fire. Both sides are committed to that and it already began on 1 January. As of 1 February, there will be UN surveillance and control of the cease-fire. More UN personnel will arrive to handle the situation.

Over nine months...[pauses] Many will ask: Why nine months? The government wanted it to be 30 days at the most. Why nine months? Because that is the period for the agreements to be kept. Of course, there are some agreements that will take more than nine months to fulfill, but they will begin during the cease-fire period.

The Copaz [National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace] will have to work hard. It will not only have to supervise and verify the agreements, but will also have to carry out hard work; it has already prepared for this in its meetings. There will also be dozens of laws or draft bills that must be sent to the Legislative Assembly to be approved so that the many necessary changes can be implemented. As of last month, Copaz had found and listed 87 secondary laws it must prepare. It seems to be that the number will increase; it could go up to 100. I mention these numbers because they give the Salvadoran people a good idea of the amount and size of the change that the country will undergo and of how complicated the job is. However, the main thing is that the letter and spirit of the agreements are fulfilled. The FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] is committed to that and will put all its effort and national and international moral and political prestige into it.

A group of governments to support the agreements' implementation process will also be formed. That group will support the process in several ways and will also supervise and watch over it. The group will be formed by the countries of the group of friends of the UN Secretary General: Mexico, Spain, Venezuela, and Colombia. The UN group, which has proposed several initiatives, will join together with the United States and some European countries. They will work to get even more countries to join the group, such as Canada and Japan. Another aspect of the group's work will be to help obtain financial support for reconstruction. Therefore, the group will have two main tasks. First, it will monitor and verify fulfillment of the agreements while trying to get both sides to fulfill the letter and spirit of the agreements. Second, it will support the fulfillment of the agreements by supporting the country's reconstruction and financially supporting the effort to consolidate peace in El Salvador.

[Gomez] An attitude has formed among the Salvadoran people during the 11 years of war. Some institutions have become accustomed to a specific work style. What dangers are foreseen at this time? What warnings or remedies can be given to the Salvadoran people in view of the possible changes that will affect Salvadoran society? The institutions, relations between management and workers, in sum, relations among the various groups comprising Salvadoran society will be affected by implementation of the agreements. What are the dangers, warnings, and possibilities of avoiding those dangers?

[Handal] There is certainly concern about what you have just said, Ricardo. However, I would pay more attention to another aspect. The war, with all its cruelty, has also brought positive changes in the mentality of practically all groups in our society. There are still some small recalcitrant groups that do not want to accept the new ideas and changes. That is logical. Some of those groups may create problems. However, I would say that all groups, including us, have experienced changes. There has also been a change of mentality within the Armed Forces. We are sure that there are many soldiers who have developed a new mentality, who have supported the negotiations, and who have accepted the agreements reforming their institution. We believe they are also committed to complying with the agreements. We also believe that Arena [Nationalist Republican Alliance] itself has experienced changes. We recall that in its earlier days, it published paid ads, and groups affiliated to Arena published paid ads saying that the negotiations constituted treason. It is true that there are still some groups that hold that position, but they are becoming more isolated. On the other hand, Arena has also changed its ideas. That is true of other political parties that were always struggling in favor of the negotiating process and a political solution for the country.

Therefore, the main force to guarantee compliance with the letter and spirit of the agreements is the Salvadoran people. In addition, groups, mechanisms, and organizations were created to support the negotiations. First, the national institutions. I will mention two of them. There is Copaz, which includes all political parties, as well as the FMLN and the government. Another is the National Forum for Economic and Social Concerted Efforts [Foro Nacional de Concertacion Economico-Social]. There are also some small groups that the public will become familiar with, but there are too many to mention here. International mechanisms were also created: one is the agreement establishing verification by the United Nations, and the other one is the group I mentioned before, of governments in favor of the negotiations that will be expanded into a group of governments supporting implementation of the agreements, so that the negotiations can bear fruit. There are numerous support groups. Obviously, that will not prevent actions by groups that stubbornly opposed the negotiations. We can expect such actions. However, I am sure they will not go very far; they definitely will not succeed in their efforts to stop the process. I would say that trying to stop that process is like trying to stop the Lempa River with our hands.

[Gomez] Commander Handal, while the negotiations were going on, we saw how the Soviet Union gradually crumbled. How do you explain the fact that while that

crumbling was taking place at the international level, the FMLN was growing and gaining strength?

[Handal] That is a very good and illustrative question. It had been said all the time that we were some sort of appendix of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and the Nicaraguan Sandinists. That situation has been cleared-up, but some people still say it, as if the cold war had not ended and as if they did not read newspapers. Facts have answered all such questions. While the Soviet Union was crumbling, the FMLN not only survived, it also became stronger. It stayed alive and continued to struggle. That is what made possible the negotiations and what gave shape to the nature of the negotiations.

How can that be explained? The FMLN's roots are quite national. Weapons are not enough. It is necessary to have people willing to wield them and to fight for a cause. That cannot be imported or brought from abroad. Once we had people ready to fight, it was necessary to secure arms for them; we had to get weapons wherever we could. That was a responsibility of the leaders. We could not let our companeros—the thousands of Salvadorans who during those years joined the ranks of the FMLN and the thousands of them who fell heroically and whose names will be known by the people, who must remember them—face the risk of death empty-handed. Those people are the true builders of the transformations that will take place. They are the forerunners of the Salvadoran people in this struggle that is drawing to an end as national aspirations are being secured.

[Gomez] One last question, Commander Handal. It has to do with the role the United States has been playing in the negotiating process. Here in New York we have noticed how a high-level group of U.S. State Department officials have always been present at the negotiations in the United Nations. What is the meaning of that? What kind of change of attitude is it? How can you explain the historic change in the U.S. position regarding the Salvadoran negotiating process?

[Handal] I told you a while ago, Ricardo, that in these 12 years of war, plus other years of sporadic warfare, since the 1970's, plus all the previous years, but especially during these past 12 years, all of us have changed our views, our plans for the future, and our plans for El Salvador. All of us have realized that it is necessary to look for a new national consensus that should serve as basis for a lasting peace that should in turn be the basis for the country's development and prosperity.

Everybody has changed. One of the most notable changes has been the U.S. Government's change of position and policy.

Correspondents Issue Communique on Car Bombing

PA0401162692 San Salvador DIARIO LATINO in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 2

[Communique issued by the Association of Foreign Correspondents in El Salvador; in San Salvador on 1 January]

[Text] The Association of Foreign Correspondents in El Salvador (SPCA) rejoices over the agreement reached on 31 December in New York by the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The agreement will end an armed conflict that for 11 years has brought pain, destruction, and death to society.

Regrettably, while at UN Headquarters the aforementioned important announcement was made and in Salvadoran homes the coming of a new year filled with hope was celebrated, an explosive attack destroyed the vehicle of Martin Langfield, president of our association and correspondent of the British news agency REUTER. This criminal action, which fortunately did not cause any casualties, damaged totally or partially other vehicles belonging to journalists and other citizens. The vehicles were parked next to Langfield's in the parking lot of the Camino Real Hotel in this capital.

Some time afterward, unidentified individuals entered and raided the homes of journalists Thomas Long, CBS radio correspondent and contributor to THE NEW YORK TIMES and MIAMI HERALD, and UPI correspondent Daniel Alder. The incidents took place a few weeks after three foreign journalists received written death threats.

The SPCA voices its most vigorous condemnation of those actions and it expresses its concern that such attacks could come from sectors that may be interested in launching a campaign to sabotage the longed-for peace that is coming to El Salvador.

Once more, journalists have become targets of attacks. But that will not affect our duty to inform local and international public opinion on the events that take place from our respective points of view.

[Issued] San Salvador, 1 January 1992

FMLN Station: U.S. Backs New York Accord

PA0401235292 (Clandestine) Radio Venceremos in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Station commentary: "Everything for Peace"]

[Text] President George Bush has backed the New York agreements signed between the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] and the Alfredo Cristiani government. The U.S. Congress is already debating the withdrawal of military aid to the Salvadoran Armed Forces so that aid can be turned into funds to rebuild the country.

We appreciate the realistic attitude of the U.S. Government because it further isolates those sectors that do not accept the democratization of El Salvador. It is our view that the use of the money resulting from a cut in military aid for social reconstruction programs constitutes a fundamental step toward peace. One of the key aspects to make this a final peace is the reduction of the Armed

Forces, a reduction that the warmongering sectors are reluctant to accept. Those sectors express their views in EL DIARIO DE HOY editorials against peace, coup attempts, and terrorist attacks on the international media, such as the one that took place on 31 December in San Salvador.

We feel that the shift in U.S. policy toward El Salvador is a belated but highly important rectification, as it realizes that the Salvadoran conflict stemmed from the lack of democracy and social justice because of the imposition of a militaristic system. The United States also realizes it was not a social struggle arising from what was once called Soviet expansionism. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics disappeared, but the FMLN is militarily intact and politically victorious. That fact led to the signing of the agreements that include gains for Salvadoran society as a whole.

The pressures that the U.S. Government exerted on Cristiani to fly to New York, when he was reluctant to participate in the negotiations and made inconsistent demands, certainly played a role in the outcome. We now expect two fundamental contributions from the U.S. Administration to consolidate peace. First, we want a cut in military aid and the money used for reconstruction. The aid should exceed the $5,000 billion [as heard] the Armed Forces received in 11 years. The Armed Forces used those funds to destroy with airplanes and bombs entire towns like Tenancingo, Torola, Joateca, El Mozote, San Fernando; and to depopulate a large area of our national territory.

Second, the nation is asking the U.S. Government, once the final peace is signed, not to deport the thousands of Salvadorans who went to that country to escape repression and seek better economic conditions. That is the challenge the United States faces before history and the new times that mark the grave of militarism.

Radio Cautions Against Distorting Accords

PA0501010592 (Clandestine) Radio Farabundo Marti in Spanish to El Salvador 0000 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Station commentary: "The President's Challenge"]

[Text] With the New York Agreement, our fatherland culminates a total phase of revolutionary warfare by reaching a clear national victory and begins a new phase of political struggle to turn those agreements into a reality through their full implementation. The avalanche of peace and democracy represents the product of 21 years of armed struggle and untold number of deeds by the people, such as fighting in the streets, strikes, and political demands.

The social, human, and material cost that the people paid to win peace is immense and invaluable. For that reason, it will be impossible to disregard this achievement. Undoubtedly, the results of the negotiations and the enthusiastic response by the people and the international community have frightened sectors opposed to changes in El Salvador, sectors that go unpunished, and sectors that maintain their privileges at the expense of the people.

The handling of this development by President Alfredo Cristiani, in trying to hide the importance of the peace agreements, merely seeks to prevent chaos in his party and the Armed Forces. We understand that following the agreements reached in New York, Cristiani and his negotiating commission faced difficulties with the ultraright sectors, which may even attack them, as they have done in past internal conflicts, such as the case involving [name indistinct]. We realize that Cristiani is even afraid of his own shadow, but it would be grievously irresponsible to distort the negotiation agreements, as he is doing on matters dealing with the reduction of the Armed Forces and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front participation in the civilian national police and lawful political activities.

We admit that Cristiani was courageous in signing the peace agreements, and we hope that he will continue to implement them so that the challenge will consist of turning El Salvador into a new fatherland.

Nicaragua

Foreign Minister Reacts to Salvadoran Agreement

PA0501235592 Managua LA PRENSA in Spanish 3 Jan 92 pp 1, 12

[Report by Emilio Zambrana]

[Text] Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Enrique Dreyfus and members of local political circles on 3 January described the peace agreements signed in New York by the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN] and the Salvadoran Government as "a success" for the cause of Central American peace and stability.

Foreign Minister Dreyfus said that, according to Nicaraguan foreign policy and Nicaragua's commitments at various area forums, "President Chamorro's government has always held the view that Central America needs undivided peace."

"Either there is peace in Central America or there is no peace in any country," Foreign Minister Dreyfus said in a optimistic tone, referring to the agreements recently signed in New York, which will possibly end a decade-long bloody war.

Asked whether the Nicaraguan Government played an important role in seeking Salvadoran peace, the foreign minister said the Chamorro government was concerned over the armed conflict and even offered national territory so the Salvadoran guerrillas and government could meet to smooth over differences and head toward an end to the war in the sister country.

The foreign minister referred to the fact that President Chamorro herself instructed some of her officials to

persuade the Salvadoran guerrillas and speak to them of the success of the Nicaraguan peace process.

The foreign minister said the New York document had drawn from Nicaraguan experience and contains clear objectives such as the scheduling of the agreements, order of priorities, and a clause stipulating that if an agreement is not reached between the Salvadoran guerrillas and government, the UN secretary general is empowered to influence future decisions.

Foreign Minister Dreyfus said the New York agreements will benefit Central American integration and the regional process, two topics that were given priority in discussions among the area heads of state in the face of their countries revitalization.

A Central American diplomat described the agreements in similar terms, adding that the doors are open for regional trade to enhance area development.

Nicaraguan politicians voiced optimism yet caution, including Daniel Ortega, Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] leader and ally of the Salvadoran guerrillas, who was accused on several occasions of supplying weapons to the FMLN.

National Assembly Secretary Dr. Fernando Zelaya stated that the "tumor of war in that country, which was affecting Central America, has ceased to exist and, more importantly, so have the suspicions that Nicaragua supplied weapons to the guerrillas."

Zelaya noted that Nicaragua began Central America's genuine political and economic integration "by setting an example to the world that dialogue and democracy are the only ways to attain peace."

"The democratization of Nicaragua was a crushing blow to the Salvadoran guerrillas," Zelaya indicated, noting that the failure of communist ideology in the world "weakened their strength."

Deputy Adolfo Jarquin, foreign affairs committee chairman, said the New York Agreements pave the way for the trilogy of peace, democracy, and reconciliation, which are "concepts appropriate for stability."

Jarquin asserted that the agreements strengthen the region's democratization process, sponsored by the Esquipulas Accords, and described the guerrilla view of reaching power by force as a failed option.

He concurred that the end of the war in Nicaragua forecasts better economic conditions not just for the country but for Central America.

It seems the New York Agreements between the FMLN and President Alfredo Cristiani suggest the possibility of ending other armed conflicts in the region before the end of this century.

In the aftermath of the FSLN defeat in our country and the FMLN's commitment to end the war now, everything seems to indicate that the armed option no longer exists, as a result of the democratic opening that is taking place in the area countries.

Ambassador Comments on Debt With USSR

PA0401004392 Managua Radio Catolica in Spanish 1200 GMT 30 Dec 91

[Text] Nicaraguan Ambassador to Russia Adolfo Evertz made statements regarding the relations between the new Russian Federation and our country.

The Sandinists left a huge foreign debt, said Evertz.

The Nicaraguan Government has officially recognized the new Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] formed by the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union.

The Nicaraguan Foreign Minister issued a brief communique stating that the recognition was in accordance with the principles of international law. Nicaragua was one of the first countries to recognize the CIS.

Adolfo Evertz, Nicaraguan ambassador in Moscow, stated that Nicaragua will recognize the rest of the republics that form the new CIS in due time.

[Begin Evertz recording] The Nicaraguan Government has recognized the Russian Federation as an independent republic with Mr. Boris Yeltsin as its president. This recognition is due to the new situation in that part of the world which formerly comprised the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As soon as possible, Nicaragua, through its Foreign Ministry, will recognize the rest of the republics that have become independent and which now form the CIS. [end recording]

Nicaragua established diplomatic and commercial relations with the former USSR in September 1979, during the Sandinist regime. The relations continued when President Violeta Barrios de Chamorro took office in April 1990. Ambassador Adolfo Evertz said that Nicaragua has a debt of approximately $3.5 billion with the former USSR and the government is seeking the appropriate persons to renegotiate the debt, which was mainly incurred through weapons and oil purchases.

[Begin Evertz recording] The greatest problem in our relations with what was the USSR is the foreign aid sent to Nicaragua. The debt is approximately $3.5 billion and has a major political connotation. Part of the debt is from oil delivered to the Sandinist government, which irresponsibly failed to pay the bill. The other part of the debt is from weapons and everything else involving the confrontation between the two superpowers at the time. [end recording]

BARRICADA Interviews Daniel Ortega

PA0401203492 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 30 Dec 91 pp 1, 5

[First part of interview with Daniel Ortega Saavedra, secretary general of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN, by Mauricio Vargas in Ortega's private office in Managua; date not given]

[Text] [Vargas] At the end of 1991 there seems to be a high degree of understanding, some even say too much understanding, between the government and the FSLN [Sandinist National Liberation Front]. Adding to this is the permanence of Sandinist officers in top Army posts, which makes people speak of a cogovernment. What is your opinion on this?

[Ortega] We must make it clear that there is no cogovernment. That must be completely clear. What we have been doing since the elections is making a big effort to ease the transition period and allow the government to administer with due respect for the Constitution and for the legal and legitimate decisions of the Sandinist government. We have signed agreements to this effect. Very often they are not fulfilled and this has created tension. The problem is people believe the fact that the government fulfills an agreement with us makes us a cogovernment—and that is a big mistake. It is that simple. The situation here has been so polarized that something in another country as basic as a normal change of government here turns into an intense struggle because some groups are interested in destroying all the changes made by the Sandinists. There is no cogovernment. I think the Sandinists did not have the necessary strength to fully defend the Transition Agreements, which were not a gift from the government. They are based on respect for the Constitution. To speak of a cogovernment, first there would have to be an understanding between the government and the FSLN on economic policy. Second, there would have to be, let us say, the active and direct participation of Sandinist cadres in key government positions.

Budget: Between a Rock and a Hard Place

[Vargas] The difference is not clear to me because, as far the government's economic plan is concerned, there is Sandinist support.
[Ortega] No, that is not true.
[Vargas] However, the 1992 overall budget was approved at the National Assembly thanks to Sandinist support and the budget was drafted based on the economic adjustments plan.
[Ortega] As for the budget, you must understand the FSLN was between a rock and a hard place. I think it was not a problem between the government and the FSLN, but a Nicaraguan problem, therefore Nicaragua was between a rock and a hard place.

On one hand we had the vengeful deputies, who defended Law No. 133 (the property law) against the presidential veto. On the other hand, we had the government defending a budget proposal. Vengeful deputies, who were aware of the sensitive nature of the budget topic, began using this as an instrument of pressure against the government so that the government would step back from its position on the property issue and withdraw the presidential veto. We disagree with the government budget, we have our objections, especially in the social areas, in health and education.

But what happened? The situation was not ripe for a budget discussion with the government and, on top of it all, we did not have the necessary votes to approve our own budget proposal. Besides, if the budget was not approved, we ran the risk of breaking up the plan, the effort to win the presidential veto. There was no other choice but to vote in favor of the budget to win approval of the veto and to begin to solve one of our biggest problems, one we have been dragging along and which destabilizes the country: the property problem.
[Vargas] That is not called cogoverning?
[Ortega] Of course it is not cogoverning. It is only a convergent action between the government, the Sandinist Front, and several UNO deputies who believe that we need to overcome the political crisis to fully work toward stability.

The Armed Forces

[Vargas] Among the conditions for the existance of a cogovernment, you mentioned the participation of Sandinists in key government positions. In addition to the special case of the Nicaraguan Institute of Energy minister, Sandinists in key positions include the leaders of the Armed Forces, the army, and the police.

[Ortega] In any country of the world where change is brought about by means of an electoral process, no one argues about the Armed Forces High Command. No one undertakes a political or ideological analysis of the military rank and file or organizes a witch hunt. These are mere institutions that exist and have their own character and regulations that are to be respected, and that is final.

Some sectors consider the fact that the government has accepted the permanence of the Armed Forces rank and file as a concession. What the government is really doing is respecting the Constitution. Of course, what we have here is a new force that rose as result of the revolution. Those sectors who are opposed tend to view it as a political issue. In fact, the Armed Forces and the police are simply institutional forces, and their rank and file exist. It is a legitimate issue.

[Vargas] How would you define, then, the degree of influence and coincidence the FSLN objectively has in the government's decisions?

[Ortega] I think those who regard the FSLN as just another party and Nicaragua as if the war is forgotten and as if there are no violent outbursts have the wrong

impression. They fail to realize the strength and presence of Sandinism in all its scope.

Sandinism is more than a political party; it constitutes a struggle front that summoned the people to topple Somoza and later to defend the country.

The FSLN cannot be regarded as one more political party, nor can Nicaragua's experience be compared to any other in Latin America, not even to Venezuela's—where even though the people ousted a dictatorship, they were supported by the Venezuelan Army.

Here we had a political force that made a revolutionary change. Therefore, the FSLN's responsibility goes beyond that of any political party. Sandinists have to put Nicaragua's interests first.

I do not even consider us an opposition party, because that would entail being against, and there is no reason to be against. We should be on the side of stability, disarmament, democracy.

I even think that saying we went over to the opposition is relative, because, look, if the government does something and it benefits—quote, unquote—the government and enhances its prestige, we must understand that also enhances the country's prestige.

[Vargas] You are talking about a new kind of opposition, right?
[Ortega] We must face the challenge, I think, of breaking out of the traditional pattern of alternating power, namely the system where the one who leaves power begins to plot against the one who stays in office.

We must break out of practicing democracy that way because it only produces military coups and the like because we lack, say, national responsibility, and engage in acts to begin to wear down the government to see if we can win the next election. In fact, we are wearing down the country. What am I going to get when I win the next election? A country that is even more worn down. That way, the country's dismemberment continues.

We must break out of that mentality and begin to think in terms of the country's interest. For all of the above reasons, I find that referring to us as the chief opposition party is unacceptable.

[Vargas] Looking at things that way, would a Sandinist government be different from the current one?
[Ortega] I think so. I think so.
[Vargas] What would those differences be?
[Ortega] First, in a Sandinist government I believe we would maintain the basic principles of honesty and austerity. We would apply economic measures that are similar to those the current government applies, but in a different proportion. Current measures tend to benefit minorities. In other words, the measures are nothing new. You see? What is new is that we Sandinists support the government's international duty to seek funds—support we never received.

Regarding the application of measures, we would be fighting inflation and seeking currency stability, even at the risk of not bringing inflation down to zero. At the risk of having some inflation, I believe it would be feasible to apply a policy to protect social sectors such as health and education and to give incentives to national producers.

I mention two important aspects in which we would act differently—the proportionate application of economic measures and their principles.

[Vargas] What do you mean by honesty and austerity?
[Ortega] I believe that in Nicaragua's history, the Sandinist government characterized itself as being truly austere and composed of honest men. Proof of this is that we had to issue special laws to protect officials who after 10 years owned no home or car.

Tough economic measures, such as those being applied, need to go hand in hand with honesty and austerity so we can tell the people that these tough measures involve us all.

[Vargas] Has the FSLN already designed an alternative government plan?
[Ortega] I have to say that we have no alternative. It is difficult to design an alternative without access to all the detailed information available to the government. It is not that there is a policy of great secrecy, but operationally it is difficult if one is not part of the government. Look, I believe this is good proof that there is no so-called cogovernment.

We have pending a meeting with the government so that it may explain its complete proposal to us to give us enough elements of judgment to make counterproposals. Please notice that I am talking about your question on the possibility of us being part of the government. As far as a more momentous alternative is concerned, there is a vacuum that affects not only Nicaragua but also the left in Latin America and the world.

The crumbling of Eastern Europe created this vacuum because that region represented a reference point, not a dogma, but an important point of reference. We have a vacuum and now a new proposition has to be drafted. This is why the meeting economists will hold in Lima to discuss this subject is important. This meeting is a mandate of the Sao Paulo Forum. It involves 68 Latin American leftist parties and movements that are trying to come up with an alternative to neoliberal policies.

[Vargas] Speaking of the North, I would like you to tell me about the state of the relations between Sandinism and the United States. A short while ago U.S. Ambassador Harry Shlaudeman referred to the words in the Sandinist anthem that say "Yankee, the enemy of mankind," and he hinted that communications between Washington and the FSLN can improve little if the Sandinists continue maintaining close relations with Libya's Colonel al-Qadhdhafi.

[Ortega] I do not think the United States will change its way of seeing the world and the South as long as there are no changes in the United States. It is as simple as that. With the crumbling of the East, the United States feels the field is clear and that it can bang its big stick in any direction with impunity.

[Vargas] So there is no solution?

[Ortega] We have to struggle so that the United States changes, not us. I believe it will change and this will catch us by surprise just like the changes in East Europe and the USSR.

[Vargas] Until those changes take place, will the confrontation between the Sandinists and the United States continue?

[Ortega] In Nicaragua they maintain political and economic pressure. It was not casual that when the Sandinist Army sought nonmilitary aid in Taiwan the United States made plain its opposition. The situation was later overcome when the Nicaraguan Government filed a claim and spoke with other Latin American governments.

[Vargas] This is why I am saying things are unchanged.

[Ortega] There is contact. Points of view have been exchanged, but it is obvious that there are well-defined ideological differences. The idea, though, is to make political efforts to secure a relationship based on respect.

The United States, however, is maintaining its imperialist behavior. Its attitude is what permits this description. In the name of pragmatism, they maintain a cynical policy.

[Vargas] This means that the words to the FSLN anthem will not be modified?

[Ortega] The anthem matter is not significant to the North Americans. If they refer to it, it is just to use it as an excuse. If we take that from the anthem, they will look for another pretext. Besides, the anthem is part of the history of the FSLN and it exists just like all the other anthems in the world.

[Vargas] But this thing about the enemy of mankind?

[Ortega] Look: This is our criticism of imperialist policy. We know very well that we are not referring to all North Americans; we are referring to a particular political behavior.

[Vargas] Will relations with Libya stay as they are?

[Ortega] It would be absurd for the Sandinists to pull away from Libya when half the world has normal relations with that country.

Our relations with Al-Qadhdhafi, with Kim il-Song, with Fidel, with Mandela, with leaders in the South, are relations based on principles. The United States has nothing to do with that. That would be absurd.

[Vargas] Is it easier to expect changes in the United States?

[Ortega] Of course. The world cannot place itself at the feet of the United States. Goliath plundered the world for a long time but this did not mean David had no right to bring him down. The U.S. David will come from the U.S. population. The economic crisis will lead them to change.

The moment there is no imperialism, there will be no need to speak of imperialism.

Ortega Interview Continues

PA0401224992 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 31 Dec 91 pp 1, 9

["Last part" of interview with Daniel Ortega, secretary general of the Sandinist National Liberation Front, FSLN, by Mauricio Vargas in Ortega's private office in Managua—date not given]

[Text] [Vargas] Has the Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] declined

[Ortega] Erosion is relative. I think it took place when we were in the government and it became evident in the elections. Since the elections, I cannot not speak of erosion. The FSLN is in a transformation process. We are trying to regroup and avoid being defensive, a current weakness.

[Vargas] You have spoken about the vertical power structure of the FSLN, but some believe the FSLN has exhibited, even before the revolutionary victory, intolerance. Will tolerance become a virtue of Sandinism?

[Ortega] Tolerance is a virtue, but there is a relationship between tolerance and circumstances. Tolerance when we were fighting Somoza was one thing and tolerance now is another. I am against expressing regret after a sin has been committed. The truth is that we must acknowledge what we did without any kind of shame.

We will not commit the same errors. Besides, I would not describe what we did as wrong. We are talking about different times. Look at history. There is the French Revolution. Errors were made and terrible things were done, but mankind took a big leap forward. This is how we can look at the situation here. In the midst of horror and errors, the truth is that Nicaragua has had a formidable transformation toward the construction of true democracy.

We must view each event considering the moment. When we were struggling against aggression, there was a big polarization that the majority of the Sandinists discussed, so some companeros who are now presenting themselves as very moderate should not say they did not participate in making decisions.

The situation hardened us, it turned us into interpreters of a vertical power structure in terms of intolerance. I would say that intolerance was directed more at other sectors of Nicaraguan society, than at the people within Sandinism. This was, if you want to call it that way, our biggest sin. I insist, we have to view this sin in its historic context. Otherwise we could also infer that Eve sinned when she gave the forbidden fruit to Adam. We cannot reach this kind of conclusion.

What we have to do is consider the present and look at the future.

[Vargas] During the FSLN Congress in July, some groups stated their opinions. Do these groups really exist? Do they play any particular role? Will there be tolerance and will they be allowed to exist?

[Ortega] They have always existed. The Front experienced a division that marked the behavior of the Sandinist groups even after we gained power. This is not a new situation. It was only normal that these groups were to become visible during the Sandinist Congress. Because we did not have experience with open demonstrations of positions, many companeros saw this as a sign of division.

This made it obvious that we lack maturity to hold discussions at that level. We have to do it because such discussions bring strength; when ideas are repressed, problems grow deeper.

The leaders, the sectors that produce concepts, have to make an effort to advance from conceptual positions to become the promoters of concepts and actions, so that our voices may be multiplied. If we want to promote a national plan, we cannot make it with a weak foundation.

[Vargas] Are the reports true that there will be changes in the National Directorate of the FSLN?

[Ortega] In December, we started discussing this issue and we decided that nothing would be gained by distributing functions, if this distribution did not result from a reorganization within the Front. We realized that we needed a proposal describing the role of the National Directorate.

[Vargas] In a recent CID-Gallup [Multi-Specialty Development Counselors-Gallup] poll, Humberto Ortega and Sergio Ramirez placed a little higher than you in popularity. Has this any political meaning?

[Ortega] After the elections I stopped believing in polls, although they should not be underestimated and should be considered.

I do not think that the average rating of the Sandinist leaders has varied much. There is always some pendular motion.

What is new is that for the first time I saw Lucio Jimenez right up there, next to Tomas Borge, Sergio Ramirez, and Humberto Ortega. The polls showed that five Sandinist leaders are showing well in the polls.

What the polls actually show is the weight of Sandinism.

[Vargas] How would you define, in a few words, the Sandinist priorities for 1992.

[Ortega] The fight for the country's stability in political terms has become Sandinism's priority, but the starting point is a regrouping of Sandinism. This is what serves as a framework for the formation of a grand national front to defend the rights of Nicaraguans.

Spanish Daily Reports Ortega, ETA Ties

PA0501044792 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1047 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Madrid, 3 Jan (EFE)— Former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega "granted citizenship to several members of the terrorist group ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization]" to guarantee their immunity to possible extraditions, Spanish daily ABC reported today.

The report, which was the preview of an expanded report to be published in the newspaper's weekend supplement, is based on information gathered by Alfredo Semprun, its correspondent in Nicaragua; and Mauricio Hernandez, its correspondent in El Salvador, regarding the activities of the terrorist group that seeks the independence of Euzkadi (northern Spain).

ABC stated that "Ortega granted citizenship to 96 Spanish citizens, including several ETA members, through an emergency procedure."

The newspaper added "the reports that involved the government with those organizations (terrorist groups) were destroyed," following the Sandinist defeat at the polls.

"Daniel Ortega," the report indicated, "ordered the destruction of police records and the transfer of the secret service's data bank to the Defense Ministry, which, thanks to the transition agreements with President Violeta Chamorro, remained in the hands of the Sandinists."

In the report entitled "Proofs of a Shameful Friendship," the conservative newspaper stated that "the arrest by Costa Rican authorities of ETA member Gregorio Jimenez Morales, alias 'El Pistolas' provided the first example regarding the close ties between ETA and the Sandinist National Liberation Front that reached the Spanish public."

"El Pistolas" was captured as "one of the men who planned the attack in 1983 on Eden Pastora, a former Sandinist leader who had taken up arms against the Ortega government," the "ABC" news report stated.

Another case was that of Miguel Angel Apalategi Ayerbe, alias "Apala," who is known to have trained Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front guerrillas in Nicaragua. "Apala" is currently one of the ETA chieftains, the Spanish newspaper stated.

Ortega Denies Claims

PA0601010392 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 4 Jan 92 p 16

[Text] On the night of 3 January, Former Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega Saavedra denied that he had

given citizenship to dozens of "ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Organization] members" during the last days of his government, as reported by the Madrid ABC newspaper on 3 January.

ABC advance published an excerpt of a more detailed report, to be published this weekend, in which Ortega is directly charged with giving citizenship to "several members of the terrorist ETA band."

"It is not a new campaign" and "comes from the Spanish conservative sectors that want to separate Spain and the ruling Spanish Socialist Workers' Party from the Sandinist Front," Ortega added.

The Sandinist leader made his statement at the end of a roundtable discussion entitled The El Salvador Peace Agreements, hosted by Extravision television news. During the 20-minute program, national and international reporters discussed with Commander Ortega topics related to peace perspectives in El Salvador.

With respect to the ETA members, the former president stated that "the information is completely false" and "when the alleged granting of citizenship to those Spanish citizens took place (March-April) I was on a tour of several Latin American countries."

During that time, Ortega attended the swearing-in ceremonies of Chilean President Patricio Aylwin and Brazilian President Fernado Collor de Mello. The Sandinist leader even traveled part of his South American trip in the company of Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez.

Without Expectations

With respect to the forthcoming national dialogue, Ortega stated that "it is not convenient to create expectations" on account of "we should not entrust the future of Nicaragua to the national dialogue."

He added that on the contrary "we must entrust the future to the National Concerted Effort Agreements."

Ortega, without underestimating the national dialogue, stated that agreements already exist with the government and they must be honored.

El Salvador's Future

During the roundtable discussion, the former president defended the San Isidro de Coronado Presidential Agreements (signed in December 1989 in Costa Rica). On concluding the discussion, he was accused of "having sold out the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front] in exchange for disarming the counterrevolution."

Ortega pointed out that U.S. influence on the Salvadoran negotiating process that concluded last December was the determining factor "because the United States is convinced it cannot defeat reality."

He added that the guarantees expressed in the New York Agreements lie in the strength of the Salvadoran people, and that the main financial backer of the reconstruction process in El Salvador should be the U.S. Government.

According to Ortega, the Salvadoran peace process is rapidly progressing "despite the pressure being exerted by rightist groups in El Salvador and the United States."

Recontra Leader Reportedly Extends Truce Period

PA0401001492 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 1100 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Report by Francisco de Jesus Rodriguez from Jinotega]

[Text] During late 1991 and early 1992, the forces of El Indomable [Jose Angel Moran Flores] have remained at two points—San Gabriel and Sabana Grande—near San Rafael del Norte, according to passengers traveling in those areas.

On 1 January, these forces started a huge bonfire in the middle of the road for unknown reasons. Unofficial sources confirmed that El Indomable and his subordinates will honor the free transit of vehicles until 13 January when the government and the recontras are scheduled to start a new dialogue.

Should the recontra leader's demands not be met after that date, Jinotega will become Troy again. Although the truce expires on 13 January, some transporters will not drive their vehicles on 4 January out of distrust and to avoid having their vehicles torched.

Panama

Linares Remarks on Ties With Russian Federation

PA0601034192 Panama City LA PRENSA in Spanish 4 Jan 92 p 12A

[Report by Elio A. Rujano M.]

[Text] The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation is not a possibility but a fact, Foreign Minister Julio Linares stated 3 January. He did not specify how soon those diplomatic relations will be established.

All of the other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS] have given Russia the status of heir to what once was the Soviet Union, something that is of great importance to Panama because the two sides issued a statement establishing diplomatic relations, Linares said. The new Russian Federation has respected that statement, he added.

Since the former USSR did not have an embassy in Panama, all of the steps are being handled through the new Russian Embassy in Nicaragua, Linares said. He stated that diplomatic relations cannot be established with the whole CIS since "we are a small country, and though we may want to maintain (diplomatic relations) we do not have the resources necessary to do so."

There are two sorts of ambassadors, either resident or visiting, he explained. The resident ambassador lives in the country to which he has been accredited, whereas the visiting ambassador can serve in three or four countries but lives in only one of them.

"The best we can hope for is to establish relations at the level of visiting ambassadors," Linares said. But even that will be difficult owing to budgetary constraints because that ambassador would have to be traveling constantly to handle all of his assignments.

Panama has diplomatic relations with 60 countries but is facing budgetary and staffing difficulties. The Foreign Ministry's budget totals 16 million balboas for 1992 and has 537 officials on its payroll working in Panama and other countries.

Through Executive Decree No. 1 issued 3 January, Panama recognized the Russian Federation and the independence of the states that comprised the former USSR.

U.S. Soldiers Involved in 'Shooting Match'

PA0501224292 Paris AFP in Spanish 2203 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Panama City, 5 Jan (AFP)—Several U.S. soldiers were embroiled in a shooting match in a Panama City neighborhood early 5 January, in which Panamanian civilian Reynaldo Rodriguez, 38, was wounded. They escaped afterward, the Panama National Police reported 5 January.

An official National Police communique read that Rodriguez was wounded in the left knee while standing in a telephone booth making a call.

Eyewitnesses said that the soldiers, wearing civilian clothes and driving private cars, exchanged fire at about 0130 near La Cuchilla area, in the midtown Calidonia neighborhood, wounding the Panamanian.

The official report read that when a patrol car drove to the scene, three soldiers in a gray car fired at the patrol and fled. They were later stopped at U.S. Howard Air Force Base.

Soldiers Jeffrey Scagg, Erick Hurd, and Paul Porreca are under arrest at the Kobbe area and are being questioned by U.S. authorities.

No member of the Panamanian police was wounded. So far, the motive for the shooting, the identity of the occupants of the other vehicle involved, and the kind of weapons used are unknown.

The U.S. Army has 9,000 soldiers stationed in Panama, nine defense sites, and a complex electronic espionage system on Galeta Island, at the mouth of the Panama Canal. All must leave the country by the year 2000 in accordance with the Torrijos-Carter Treaties signed in 1977.

PTJ Becomes Part of Attorney General's Office

PA0601030992 Panama City Telemetro Television Network in Spanish 1720 GMT 3 Jan 91

[Text] It was announced 3 January, at a ceremony attended by the Supreme Court chief justices, Attorney General Rogelio Cruz, and Government and Justice Minister Juan Chevalier, that the Judicial Technical Police [PTJ] has become an agency of the Attorney General's Office. PTJ Director Jaime Abad briefed the local media on the advantages of Law 16 of 9 July 1991, approving the PTJ Charter as an agency of the Attorney General's Office.

[Begin recording] [Abad] Law 16, on the PTJ Charter Law, is now in full force and is very positive. One of the most important benefits of this law is that it provides job stability. We are now joining the judicial branch. All of our officials have job stability along with all of the responsibility that comes with it. The law also establishes different organizations and structures, and new departments and divisions. Thanks to this arrangement, the PTJ's services to society will become more technical and professional.

[Unidentified reporter] What practical impact will this law have at the start of 1992 on the increase in street violence?

[Abad] We can divide the practical impact into various aspects. First we have that the PTJ higher directorate is transferred from the Government and Justice Ministry to the judicial branch, namely, to the Supreme Court of Justice that is empowered to appoint the PTJ's three chief directors, and the Attorney General's Office, namely Attorney General Cruz.

Concerning the practical impact this may have in fighting street crime, the law gives us greater budget stability, since as judicial branch officials we will have a bigger budget in the coming years and greater stability as far as criminal investigations are concerned. This is so because Law 16 states that a PTJ official can gather information during preliminary judicial investigations.

[Reporter] Can you make a quick assessment of the PTJ's performance in 1991?

[Abad] Modesty aside, I think that, with the backing of the people, the PTJ experienced a positive change in 1991. Some reports in the printed media greatly supported the previous director and me. I think the news media reflect a general sentiment. This is a positive aspect. As far as the PTJ inspectors and detectives are concerned, we all concur that with God's help we will move forward. [end recording]

New Political Movement Issues Proclamation

PA0301233692 Panama City EL SIGLO in Spanish 2 Jan 92 pp 24, 25

["Proclamation to the Panamanian Nation" issued by the National Integration Movement in Panama City on 2 January; published as a paid advertisement]

[Text] As aware citizens, we state that we will struggle until the public administration is at the service of all Panamanians.

The current society benefits only a few and ignores many. The majority is becoming more impoverished daily while minority sectors enrich themselves. Government leaders must serve the common good. The modern world's great problem is the government leaders' corruption. We are aware of the discredit of the current and past government leaders. We are also aware of the people's distrust of the party leaders who aspire to govern the country. We understand the great difficulty that well-intentioned men and women have to organize successful political options that will obtain popular support. Despite this situation, we have organized ourselves into the National Integration Movement [Movimiento de Integracion Nacional—MINA] that wants to be a new political option.

The MINA calls on Panamanians who have faith in their ability to work and to organize to join the struggle:
—for full consolidation of our sovereignty;
—for the rescue of Panamanians' national and international dignity;
—for work as a source of income;
—for the democratic election of our leaders, without restrictions;
—for the improvement of Panama's current economic, political, and social situation;
—for the right to a decent life;
—for a better future for our children;
—for a decent retirement without economic hardships;
—for justice;
—for family unity;
—for the recovery of our own identity;
—for our real liberty;
—for the just use of national resources;
—for administrative honesty; and
—for all those principles that enable us to live and die with dignity.

The MINA struggles for an integrated society that will have a legitimate and able government that will turn the Panamanian nation's historic project into a reality. The national integration government can only be the product of the people's will.

Let us become an overwhelming force so that no barrier can prevent our victorious march toward a promising future that will be free of the great political, social, and economic ills and flaws that prevent the nation's development.

The MINA has the task of winning the people's credibility. Feasible political options will emerge only if the people have faith and trust in their leaders.

Panamanians, united, without differences of race, social condition or religion, let us raise our voice of struggle and as a single will, let us join together beginning today, 2 January 1992, to carry out the noble and true task of national recovery and reconstruction.

[Issued] Panama City, 2 January 1992.

[Signed] 1. National Coordination
Arrigo Guardia C., general coordinator
Luis Chen Gonzalez, region one coordinator, Panama Province
Miguel Canales, region two coordinator, Darien Province and Embera Indian Territory
Enrique Mora, region three coordinator, Colon Province and Kuna Yala Indian Territory
Tomas Gonzalez, region four coordinator, Herrera and Los Santos Provinces
Rita Penalba, region five coordinator, Cocle and Veraguas Provinces
Carlos Jones, region six coordinator, Chiriqui and Bocas del Toro Provinces and Ngobe Indian Territory
2. General Secretariat
Roberto Arosemena Jaen, secretary general
Isaac Rodriguez, assistant secretary general

3. Organization Secretariat
Eison Broce D., secretary
Flaviano Iglesias, assistant secretary

4. Finance Secretariat
Tomas Sanchez Quintero, secretary
Roberto Alleyne Prince, assistant secretary

5. Discipline Secretariat
Jorge Gamboa Arosemena, secretary

6. Political Training Secretariat
Alberto Quiros Guardia, secretary
Otto Wald, assistant secretary

7. Information and Public Relations Secretariat
Jaime Padilla Gonzalez, secretary
Guilermo Moreno, assistant secretary

8. Legal Affairs Secretariat
Emilio Effio Torregroza, secretary
Ruben D. Cogley, assistant secretary

9. Domestic and Foreign Studies Secretariat
Ezequiel Jethmal Garibaldi, secretary
Armando Bey Castillo R., assistant secretary

10. Administrative Secretariat
Apolonio Miller, secretary

Legislator Proposes UN Defense of Canal

PA0601024992 Panama City EL PANAMA AMERICA in Spanish 2 Jan 92 p 1

[Article by Eduardo Soto P.]

[Text] Honorable Legislator Domi Luis Montenegro is proposing in a draft bill that the United Nations protect the Panama Canal. The draft bill calls for the creation of the Panamanian Commission on the Canal [Comision Panamena del Canal—Copaca] that will be tasked with reaching the necessary agreements to attain this goal.

Montenegro, a member of the Christian Democratic Party, presented this draft bill to President Guillermo Endara, who some time ago established a high-level commission to study this issue.

The draft bill reads that, should another country commit an aggressive act or if the canal is in jeopardy, Panama would request help from any UN member to defend and protect the canal.

The Copaca Board of Directors would be made up of representatives of civic clubs, professional organizations, the Catholic church, and the legislative, judicial, and executive branches.

Representatives of the following would serve on its board of directors: labor groups; canal users; the National Banking Association; the Association of Panamanian Industrialists; the Chamber of Commerce Panamanian Construction Chamber; the University of Panama; and of the cattlemen.

This commission would elect the members of the canal's Board of Administrators.

Montenegro's draft bill reads that the posts of canal administrator and two deputy administrators would be filled by two civil engineers.

Argentina

U.S. Officials Accused of Exerting Pressure

PY0401173292 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1255 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] Buenos Aires, 4 Jan (EFE)—The U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires has lodged a protest with the Argentine Government over alleged "delays and interference" in a tender for the installation of a defense communications system in which a U.S. enterprise was selected to compete. That information was published on 4 January by the Buenos Aires newspaper PAGINA 12, which also stated that "highly confidential advisers of U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney transmitted the Pentagon's concern about the matter to the Argentine diplomatic corps."

The daily, which cites a member of the Argentine Government as its source, maintains that it is a question of a "secret" and multimillion-dollar tender for which the U.S. company GTE was selected to compete in the first place.

In December 1990 the Argentine Defense Ministry invited eight enterprises from the United States, France, Italy, Spain, and Germany to participate in the tender. Most of them submitted proposals, but to date only the folders containing the technical data have been opened, while the folders containing the economic aspects remain closed.

Applying a point system, an evaluating committee first selected GTE to compete for the tender because of its technical background, but it is not known whether its economic offer is the best for the Argentine Government. Although it is not known how much the suppliers want to charge, because the folders remain closed, the official estimate for installing the system ranges from $35 to $120 million.

The daily states that GTE has protested the delay in opening the folders with the economic proposals, adding to the protests of officials of the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, "which for the past two months has been at its best in applying pressure." The newspaper reports that James Walsh, Ambassador Terence Todman's secretary; Commercial Attache Rafael Fermoselle; and military attaches Monroe and Carpenter are among the officials.

"The participation of the embassy's political branch, through Walsh, and the military pressure applied by the two colonels demonstrates that the U.S. Government's concern in this matter goes much further than the commercial aspect," the newspaper states. It adds: "In this case, the White House's very special interest in keeping the defense communications system within the orbit of the United States so it can dominate a key element in the DEA's policy in its fight against drug trafficking must be highlighted."

The newspaper concludes by saying: "The Pentagon's traditional obsession with controlling everything that is linked to defense matters must also be included."

Air Force Report Outlines Goals for 1992

PY0401005692 Buenos Aires LA PRENSA in Spanish 3 Jan 92 Section 1 p 8

[Text] The Argentine Air Force [FAA] was able to reduce its expenditures through savings and the sale of its assets; consequently, it started 1992 with no deficit, but a $4 million surplus. In 1990 and early last year, the FAA experienced a $22 million deficit. Those figures are included in the annual report that was submitted to Defense Minister Antonio Erman Gonzalez by Air Force Chief of Staff Brigadier Jose Julia.

The report released by the Defense Ministry also notes the personnel reduction carried out in 1991, including the brigadiers.

The report has three chapters entitled "Financial and Economic Area," "Personnel Area," and "Major Objectives Designed for 1992," which includes "the privatization of international airports." The first chapter points out that the FAA began 1992 with a $4 million surplus, which will be used "to purchase spare parts" and to pay all debts, "especially those owed to the YPF [Government Oil Deposits] and Aerolineas Argentinas."

Concerning the international area, the report notes that "the (IA-63) Pampa Program with U.S. LTV has been strengthened" through the U.S. donation of "two C-130 Hercules," which "will arrive in Argentina in May 1992." The report states that "an agreement has been reached with Germany and Italy to install a radar maintenance center for the FAA and the entire South American continent."

It notes that the decree on the Condor 2 Project deactivation was fully observed, and the Intesa [expansion unknown] enterprise that supervised that project was dissolved. It also states that "the logistic cycle of U.S. and European spare parts supply, which was suspended during the former political administration, was reactivated."

As for FAA personnel, the report says the number of cadets to be admitted to the Air Force School was reduced "from 120 to 50," and the financing of the Aeronautic Lyceum in Rosario was suspended. The report says that "the number of brigadiers, who in 1989 totalled 29, was reduced to 22; the civilian personnel were reduced 30 percent, and the number of conscripts was reduced from 5,000 to approximately 1,100."

Regarding the objectives to be met this year, the report notes "the intensification of the Pampa Program with the Unites States," "the supply of materials by the United States (aircraft and spare parts)," "the definitive conclusion of the Condor 2 Program," and "the privatization of the Cordoba Materiel Area."

It finally refers to the objective designed "to privatize the international airports," "the definitive pacification and strengthening of the authority within the institution,"

"the strengthening of FAA participation in the promotion of the government's great objectives," and "the sale of useless furniture and properties."

Prosecutor General Issues Drug Instructions

PY0301210892 Buenos Aires BUENOS AIRES HERALD in English 3 Jan 92 p 11

[From the "Argentina in Brief" column]

[Text] (NA)—Prosecutor General Aldo Montesano Rebon instructed all the prosecutors in the country yesterday to "use every means that you have at your disposal" to oppose judicial verdicts that free "alleged drug traffickers." The resolution signed by Montesano Rebon apparently includes the instruction to appeal any decision of the kind to the Supreme Court.

Bolivia

Miners, Health Workers Respond to Strike Call

PY0301164292 La Paz Radio Fides Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] La Paz workers only partially respected the 24-hour strike called by the Bolivian Labor Federation [COB]. Miners and health workers respected the strike call, while other workers went to work normally. The COB's call for a 24-hour strike was accompanied by a rally and a blockade of San Francisco Park at noon yesterday.

[Begin unidentified person recording, in progress] ...to join this blockade, this blockade of the traditional park... [end recording]

COB legal adviser Juan del Granado said that the COB has submitted a petition to La Paz District Superior Court, demanding respect for individual rights as provided for by the Constitution and violated by the executive branch.

[Begin Del Granado recording] We are denouncing to La Paz District judicial authorities the suppression of and the threat to restrict those essential, fundamental constitutional rights. Article 19 of the Constitution authorizes Bolivians to resort to the judicial branch to demand respect for constitutional rights. This is what we are doing. The COB has submitted a petition to the district court urging executive branch officials to fully respect the right to hold meetings, the right to move throughout the country, the right to hold strikes, and the right to disagree, which are now being expressed by the workers on the occasion of the current conflict. [end recording]

Meanwhile, the General Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia [CSUTCB] has called on departmental and regional leaders to join the voluntary hunger strike that COB leaders began on 30 December 1991.

CSUTCB leader Tino Montenilla gave us the following report:

[Begin recording] We are part of the COB and as such, we have assumed the responsibility of being united in the struggle. We feel that the privatization law directly harms our national assets, such as the state companies. We also feel that this affects not only workers and their jobs. The government has also outlined a new agrarian law which provides for the free purchase and sale of land. [end recording]

New Strike Called for 6 Jan

PY0401013692 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 0000 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Report by (Ruben Suquilla)]

[Excerpt] We are now reporting the details of what is happening at the Bolivian Labor Confederation [COB] meeting.

The COB meeting ended a few minutes ago. At the meeting, a 48-hour strike, protesting the fuel price increase and the privatization of state-owned entities, was decided on for 6 January. [passage omitted]

Narcotics Committee President on Drug Struggle

PY0301174392 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 27 Dec 91 p 5

[Text] Senate Narcotics Commission Chairman Lorgio Rivera yesterday stated that the government is physically unable to complete the eradication of 7,000 hectares of coca plantations within the next four weeks.

"To commit ourselves to eradicate the balance in only three or four weeks would not be a wise decision," said Rivera. He added that recent official reports state that 1,800 hectares have yet to be eradicated to reach the target of 7,000 hectares as agreed with the United States in exchange for $66 million in economic aid.

Rivera thus contradicted Agriculture Minister Mauro Bertero who three days ago predicted that his ministry could achieve the goal, initially set for 31 December, if the United States grants a four-week extension.

"The record for eradicating coca plantations in Bolivia was set in March 1990 when the peasants agreed to destroy 1,100 hectares in one month. Taking that as a yardstick, we would need at least two months to fulfill the agreement with the United States," Rivera said.

Following a meeting between Bolivian and U.S. officials in Santa Cruz, and after agreeing to negotiate at the White House, Bertero predicted a special extension in which to reach the goal.

Senator Rivera is an active member of the ruling party MIR [Movement of the Revolutionary Left]. He said yesterday that if an extension is to be negotiated, other aspects must be considered. He cited the total eradication figure for 1990, when 7,750 hectares of plantations were destroyed.

"This year, one of the best years for eradication, we eradicated an average of 650 hectares per month. Now that the coca price is less advantageous for the elimination plans, we cannot think of a figure above that average," Rivera explained, noting that its international image could be jeopardized should Bolivia fail to fulfill its commitment.

However, he said, if the United States does not accept a "more flexible" term over the 1991 goal, Bolivia would risk losing $22 million, the last parcel of the U.S. aid program, "which would represent a serious loss to its economy."

According to an official report by the Alternate Development Secretariat, since Bolivia began the eradication program in 1986, 18,500 hectares of coca plantations have been destroyed voluntarily by the peasants of the Chapare region of Cochabamba, the largest coca producing zone in Bolivia.

Lorja Discusses Issues

PY0301181992 La Paz PRESENCIA in Spanish 24 Dec 91 p 5

[Text] Senate Narcotics Commission Chairman Lorgio Rivera yesterday stressed that if the 1991 antidrug struggle were to be financially evaluated, it would be seen that Bolivia "spent much more than it received" from the international community.

Commenting that the antidrug struggle was successful in spite of "working with puny funds," Rivera wistfully said: "If we added up all our contributions to the antidrug struggle on one side and everything received as cooperation on the other, the expenditures would undoubtedly be seen to exceed the receipts."

Rivera recently released a government report in which it states that Bolivia has lost more than 25,000 jobs and more than $1 billion through the eradication of coca crops over the past six years. He added: "We hope that during 1992 the international community becomes aware of the difficulties involved in combating drug trafficking without funds."

Rivera said: "The industrialized countries must evaluate, for example, Bolivia's efforts during 1991 to prevent cocaine worth $1.5 billion from entering consumer markets."

"This really has been a huge effort. If we add this to the removal of the leaders of the largest drug trafficking gangs through the repentance decree, we can certainly say that the antidrug struggle in Bolivia has been the most effective in the world, even more effective than the one in Colombia," Rivera ventured.

The senator said that "Bolivians should be proud" of having combated the traffickers, but must be "concerned" about the chronic lack of funds.

Rivera stressed: "We have done more than we pledged to do, more than the industrialized countries did, and all with very little money."

Chile

Report on El Salvador, Ambassador to Russia

PY0301193092 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Clodomiro Almeyda was confirmed today as Chilean ambassador to the Russian Federation. This information was released by the diplomat and Socialist politician himself, after meeting with Foreign Minister Enrique Silva Cimma.

Almeyda reported that he will not have the same status he had before the former Soviet Union, but will be our country's diplomatic representative to those states that Chile will recognize. Thus far, Chile has only recognized three states: Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus.

In addition, the Foreign Ministry today issued a communique on the agreement reached between the government and the guerrillas in the Republic of El Salvador.

The communique expresses the Chilean Government's willingness to contribute to the reconstruction and final establishment of democracy in El Salvador, a country with which Chile has been historically linked with very fraternal ties.

With respect to the agreement, the communique points out that beyond the good willingness of the two sides, it also represents the culmination of the efforts made by the United Nations to achieve peace in a region that is so dear to all the Latin American community.

Arms Sale to Yugoslavia Under Investigation

Special Judge Appointed

PY0301195892 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Report by Teresa Barriga at Santiago courthouse]

[Excerpt] Judge Hernan Correa de la Cerda has been appointed special judge to hear the case involving Chile's arms sale to Yugoslavia. He must establish himself in the 18th Criminal Court of Santiago.

The judge, who is a member of the Fifth Appellate Court of Santiago, was named today by the Supreme Court plenum that approved a petition filed last night by the Defense Ministry.

The Supreme Court believed the judge's appointment was in order because, as provided by rules and regulations, there is a state of public alarm in this case.

It is appropriate to remember that the Supreme Court plenum previously had rejected the government's petition to name a trial judge in this case. [passage omitted]

Government Resolve To Clarify Case

PY0401135492 Santiago Radio Chilena Network in Spanish 1000 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Excerpt] The petition filed with the Supreme Court for the appointment of a special judge was prompted by the government's decision to fully clarify the case of the illegal sale of weapons to Croatia.

This statement was made by Enrique Correa, minister secretary general of government, who also referred to the replacement of Famae [Army Ordnance] director Brigadier General Hector Letelier.

[Begin recording] This suggestion was made some time ago by the government, which deemed the change convenient. The proposal was finally made by the commander in chief of the Army [General Augusto Pinochet] to the president of the Republic, who made this change yesterday, appointing a new Famae director. [end recording]

When asked whether this change meant Gen. Letelier is responsible for the illegal sale of weapons, Correa answered that the people involved will the identified during the administrative and legal investigations that are under way. [passage omitted]

One Indicted, U.S. Citizen Released

PY0501010492 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 2330 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Excerpts] Judge Hernan Correa de la Cerda, who is investigating the illegal arms shipment case, today indicted Ramon Perez Orellana, a civilian employee of the Army. Correa de la Cerda also ordered the release of two other individuals who were being held under arrest. [passage omitted]

Captain Patricio Perez, retired, and U.S. citizen (Sidney Edwards), who had been held since yesterday, were released from the public jail at 1500. Two employees of (Main Cargo), (Sergio Colman) and Antonio Sahd also were released at 1700. [passage omitted]

After a difficult questioning, Judge Correa de la Cerda said:

[Begin recording] [Correa de la Cerda] I indicted Ramon Perez Orellana on charges of forgery.

[Unidentified reporter] What about the others, the U.S. citizen?

[Correa de la Cerda] All the others have been released. The investigation will continue. We are just beginning. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Colombia

Foreign Minister on Salvadoran Peace Agreements

PA0301155192 Santa Fe de Bogota Emisoras Caracol Network in Spanish 1200 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Santa Fe de Bogota—Colombia celebrated the peace agreement signed between the Salvadoran Government and rebel forces. The national government expressed its satisfaction with the signing of the New York Agreement on 31 December between the Salvadoran Government and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The Colombian Government believes the agreement will lead to the prompt solution of the armed conflict in that Central American country.

Foreign Minister Nohemi Sanin praised the decision made by the Salvadoran people and President Alfredo Cristiani to solve their conflicts through dialogue. She added that the agreements will surely produce invaluable benefits for El Salvador's economic and social development.

Ecopetrol Clarifies Sale of Fuel to Haiti

PA0401034092 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 0009 GMT 4 Jan 92

[Text] The ship that violated the embargo on Haiti was not Colombian. In addition, the fuel it took to Haiti had been bought previously by a European corporation. The Colombian Petroleum Enterprise [Ecopetrol] and the Colombian Foreign Ministry clarified this situation for the country and the OAS.

The ship Karibu, which had departed Cartagena, was not doing business with Haiti directly at the time. The ship, flying the Bahamian flag, is owned by Carib Petroleum Co., headquartered in Panama, with offices in Miami. It arrived in Cartagena on 29 December to load 148,000 barrels of diesel auctioned off by Ecopetrol on 10 December. The best bid was submitted by Carib Petroleum, which has held commercial relations with the Colombian corporation for the past three years.

At the time the fuel was taken aboard, the ship's captain, an Italian sailor, mentioned Freeport in the Bahamas as the ship's final destination. This fulfilled all requirements and OAS instructions were not violated. Ecopetrol did not know that the company that originally bought the diesel fuel resold it in the international market to Gambit, a firm in the Netherlands—a country that does not heed the embargo because it does not belong to the OAS. This Netherlands firm, in turn, sold the fuel to someone in Haiti.

[Begin Ecopetrol President Fernando Delgado recording] We sell our products in port. As a formality, ships tell us the final destination of our products. To prevent incidents of this type, however, we are now inserting a clause in our invoices listing places we do not want our products to go. [end recording]

Justice Minister on Drug Struggle, Cuba

PA0301194392 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1800 GMT 1 Jan 92

[Interview with Colombian Justice Minister Fernando Carrillo by Felix de Bedoit at the Inravision studios in Bogota—live]

[Text] [De Bedoit] Good afternoon. Millions of dollars confiscated from the drug traffickers in 1989, 1990 and part of 1991 have failed to yield interests; and the country has failed to collect 48 billion pesos, meaning $79 million, in interest from drug traffickers' funds confiscated in the last two years. A large amount of the money was confiscated at farms belonging to El Mexicano [Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha] and turned over to the Bank of the Republic, under the management of the Judicial Branch's Security Fund. The organization returned the funds in April 1991 without implementing the procedure that would make it possible to place the funds in a savings association to earn interests.

The National Drug Directorate says the funds are frozen in the form of titles that must be endorsed by the Justice Ministry. The 48 billion pesos would be enough to modernize Colombia's health system, and there would be funds left over to pay the debt owed to the teachers. The National Drug Directorate claims that the large amount of money and assets created anarchy in that office, and the dollars were promptly designated for other projects because of the risk they represented.

The Justice Ministry, under the administration of Eduardo Suescum, created the Judicial Branch's Security Fund during the Barco administration. The dollars have remained idle, without yielding interest, in the Bank of the Republic's vaults. The National Drug Directorate has received 99 million pesos since November 1991—all of it the result of new confiscations from drug traffickers. The money was not turned over to the Judicial Branch's Security Fund; it has already been earmarked for drug prevention plans and a large-scale campaign against drug abuse. The National Drug Directorate has already assigned assets—confiscated from drug traffickers in the last two years—as follows: 800 farms, 679 houses, 1,395 vehicles, 273 boats, 100 aircraft, 208,000 heads of cattle, and 1,398 communication equipment.

We now ask Justice Minister Fernando Carrillo to discuss this and other topics. Mr. Minister, you have heard our report. Do you believe that there is a possibility of recovering the interest that we failed to collect on these funds?

[Carrillo] Good afternoon, Felix. First of all, allow me to wish you and all Colombians a happy new year. The legal tools we used in the past were undoubtedly insufficient, but part of the reforms we managed to achieve during the second half of 1991 deal with this issue. Specifically, the new Colombian Constitution has norms concerning the expiration of ownership rights on these assets. The new legal procedures grant the office of the prosecutor general, which is scheduled to begin operating in a matter of days, the authority to act swiftly and efficiently on these issues. Consequently, the delays, the obstacles that arose in the past are being overcome through reforms to the justice system, which was the first important legislative development achieved in the new Colombian Constitution.

[De Bedoit] Mr. Minister, the world is expectantly waiting for Pablo Escobar Gaviria's trial. You recently returned from Cuba, where agreements were reached with that country for the exchange of evidence. What is the outcome of that visit?

[Carrillo] The outcome is very positive, just as it has been with all Latin American countries. Frankly speaking, the exchange of evidence can become a secondary matter compared with the creation of a new and different option in the struggle against drug trafficking. The option deals with creating joint judicial opportunities, because it involves not only the exchange of evidence but also the exchange of information, the exchange of possibilities to file charges against international criminals.

I think that the struggle against drug trafficking in the 1990's has different connotations, and it must undoubtedly overcome the problems encountered during the last decade. This involves the creation of international mechanisms to struggle against that scourge. That is why President Gaviria's administration has been talking so much about international penal jurisdiction and the creation of a joint judicial option within the framework of the Andean Group. That is specifically what we did in Cuba.

Cuba has proved that it stands firm; that it is closing ranks in the struggle against drug trafficking; and that the modern struggle against drug trafficking involves a struggle against money laundering and the trafficking of drug precursors as well as the following up and tracking of bank accounts and assets belonging to the drug traffickers. This is undeniably the latest trend, and we are working on this.

[De Bedoit] Minister, can you promise us that this year Colombian judges will receive evidence that other countries have against Pablo Escobar?

[Carrillo] Well, I think the evidence continues to come in, but that is confidential because it is part of the legal summary. I am a member of the Executive Branch; I am not an official of the Judicial Branch. The Judicial Branch officials are responsible for the resolution, for filing charges against drug traffickers. We are sure that the processes are being successfully carried out, that evidence has come in, that evidence will continue to come in, that charges will be filed, and that the processes will result in the implementation of pledges that were made when the government policy was accepted.

[De Bedoit] Thank you, Mr. Minister.

Police Discover Rebel Arsenal in Barranquilla

PA0301200592 Santa Fe de Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 2 Jan 92

[Report by Hernan Estupignan in Barranquilla]

[Text] We have a last minute report. The Atlantic coast has been saved from a new terrorist attack. The authorities have discovered a large-scale subversive plan against Barranquilla and other cities along the coast. The guerrilla forces had plans to blow up public buildings and the Barranquilla brigade's installations, but the guerrilla forces' arsenal, which even included rockets, was fortunately discovered.

The foiled attack on Malambo Air Force Base in Atlantic Department, which authorities attributed to the Army of National Liberation [ELN], was only the first blow of a terrorist plan against military installations on the Atlantic coast. The plan included the use of remote control rockets and time bombs. The information was revealed on 2 January by the National Police Intelligence Central in Bogota.

The guerrilla fighters had camouflaged a remote control rocket behind one of the security trenches at the air base. They had arrived at the base dressed as soldiers. The homemade rocket was made with polyvinyl chloride pipes, but had advanced electronic technology. It had a range of approximately one block. The rocket was loaded with plastique, a very dangerous explosive, and had glass shards and screws as shrapnel. It is calculated that it would have a destruction range of 70 meters. Its targets were the airplane fuel storage tanks. The police believe that, once the tanks were destroyed, the guerrilla forces intended to distract the attention of the public forces while simultaneously attacking the Army brigade in Barranquilla, the F-2 communications center, a national naval base, and several municipal offices. The series of attacks would in turn facilitate the possible arrival of a weapons shipment through the Atlantic Coast.

The attack failed because the remote control antenna was aimed in the opposite direction of where the device to activate the rocket had been placed. The guerrilla members fled when they realized they had been discovered. While they were fleeing in a station wagon, several dynamite bombs they were carrying exploded; four guerrilla fighters were killed by their own device.

The authorities investigated the evidence left by the car bomb explosion. On 31 December, they raided several Barranquilla residences, where they found the following materiel: A mine with three firing systems, a time bomb with a 15-minute timer, a pressure bomb that explodes when someone steps on it, a booby trap, FAL rifles, AK-47 rifles, ammunition, grenades, backpacks, and bloodied Army uniforms used to infiltrate the base. It is believed that the ELN prepared at least 15 bombs to perpetrate different attacks.

Rebels Claim Responsibility for Abduction

PA0401233492 Santa Fe de Bogota EL TIEMPO in Spanish 27 Dec 91 p 8a

[Text] Barranquilla—The Army of National Liberation (ELN) Jose Manuel Martinez Quiroz Front has claimed responsibility for the abduction of Wilton Vides Ochoa, the liberal mayor of La Jagua de Ibirico (Cesar). He will be submitted to a people's trial.

In a communique, the Camilist Union of the ELN blamed Vides Ochoa, as well as Government Secretary Alberto Ruiz, Comptroller Miguel Martinez, and Treasurer Danny Rios, "for continually stealing public funds and tax revenues, especially from the extraction of coal."

The guerrilla also charged that Vides Ochoa has supported militarization and aided groups of paid assassins. The communique stated: "This action is sponsored by Carbones del Caribe and headed by the La Popa Battalion."

The communique mentioned Aura Mier [not further identified] and indicated that the guerrillas believe her to be "a swindler who pays off municipal employees with the connivance of officials in that office."

Ecuador

Foreign Ministry Communique on CIS Relations

PA0301154892 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0045 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Quito, 2 January (EFE)—The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Ecuadoran Government issued notification on 2 January that it will maintain the same diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation that it once held with the USSR, and that it will also maintain relations with the other states in he new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated through a communique that Grigoriy Taralenko, the Russian Federation's charge d'affaires in Quito, was notified of this decision on 2 January "in view of the fact that the Federation legally replaces the USSR."

The communique adds: "The Ecuadoran Government has duly noted the decision made by the states that form the CIS to give their support to the Russian Federation" so that it may occupy the position that the USSR occupied "on the UN Security Council, and their desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security, in accordance with the goals and principles of the UN Charter."

Paraguay

Government Outlines Policy on Russia, Commonwealth

PY0401130092 Asuncion ABC COLOR in Spanish 4 Jan 92 p 11

[Text] Regarding the disappearance of the USSR, the government issued a declaration on 3 January in which it ratified its decision to continue talks with the Russian Federation seeking to establish diplomatic relations with that country.

The declaration states: "The Republic of Paraguay is observing with interest the events that have occurred in the former USSR and that have led to its breakup and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) by a majority of the states that made up the USSR."

"In the same manner, it acknowledges the decision of the CIS to support the Russian Federation in its bid to replace the USSR in the United Nations and as a member of the Security Council. And it acknowledges the desire of the CIS to help strengthen international peace and security on the basis of respect for the UN Charter and in compliance with its international obligations."

"On this occasion, the Government of the Republic of Paraguay expresses its decision to continue talks with the Russian Federation seeking to establish diplomatic relations with that republic."

Finally, the document, which was issued by Government House on 3 January, states: "Regarding the other states that make up the CIS, the national government will—at the opportune time—be willing to establish diplomatic relations within the context of the principles and objectives of its international policy."

Peru

Fujimori Criticizes Congress in National Address

PY0501234892 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1905 GMT 5 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 5 Jan (EFE)—In his address to the nation, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori commented on his decision not to promulgate the 1992 budget law, which has increased tension in the executive versus legislative conflict.

On 5 January, the Peruvian press emphasized the details of the message broadcast on 4 January through a radio-television hook-up and pointed out that Fujimori again voiced his disagreement with the amount of money that Congress assigned itself, which he deemed excessive.

On 31 December, after the budget bill was approved by Congress, Fujimori noted reservations on 41 articles of the bill, including those pertaining to the expenses of the Chamber of Deputies. As a result, he did not approve the bill and returned it to the congressmen.

According to congressional spokesmen, Fujimori's decision created a "serious legal vacuum." They said that since the budget has not been approved, government officials cannot authorize public expenses, thus "semi-paralyzing" the country.

On 2 January, Fujimori summoned Congress for an extra series of sessions, which will begin on 6 January, to discuss the 41 articles on which he noted reservations. Congress must reconsider these articles and modify or maintain them. According to the Constitution, Congress can promulgate the budget bill after that analysis.

In his message, Fujimori pointed out that his reservations were meant "to warn against the risk that this bill will pose to the anti-inflation plan, which has cost so much to implement with relative success," and said that there is no power dispute.

He added that after he warned against the high sums included in the bill, the Chamber of Deputies cut the budget by $40 million.

"Congress itself admitted that some excessively high expenses were not adequately justified," Fujimori said. He added that the budget was reduced only "because the people were aware of how many soles the Chamber of Deputies was assigning itself."

Fujimori said that despite the cut, the Chamber of Deputies budget, like the Senate's, "is still high," as he noted in the reservations he submitted to the legislative branch. He recalled: "The people have sacrificed to fight inflation and can thus defend the achievements of the anti-inflation fight by demanding austerity from the congressmen."

He added that no government branch is "above the country and its true needs." The president and Congress "must also comply with the principles of austerity."

"Together, we must make Peru a strong, healthy country. This can only be achieved through discipline, austerity, and a rational administration of public funds, never through waste and squandering," he emphasized.

The bicameral budget committee that will analyze the president's reservations on the bill and submit their conclusions to the congressional plenum during the special session has charged the executive branch with not complying with the austerity rules it is now pointing out. The Peruvian press reported today that the bicameral committee has revealed that the budget bill establishes a 300 percent increase in Fujimori's salary and authorizes the presidential office to spend 17 times more than it did last year.

Senator Mercedes Cabanillas, a member of the bicameral committee, asserted that the committee has agreed to recommend at the plenum that the budget bill be promulgated as Congress approved it, without considering Fujimori's reservations.

Cabanillas added that if Fujimori disagrees with the text of the bill, notes reservations, or requests that it be modified, he must submit his reservations to Congress through bills, which will then be debated, "as established by law."

Officials Comment on Special Congress Session

PA0301210392

[Editorial Report] Lima Panamericana Television Network in Spanish at 1200 GMT on 3 January announces that "President Alberto Fujimori has called for an extraordinary session of Congress in order to discuss the articles of the 1992 general budget law to which he attached comments. The special sessions will be held from 6 to 9 January."

The same newscast then reports that Prime Minister Alfonso de los Heros "has responded to criticism made by the opposition members, pointing out that the president's comments on the budget law as approved by Congress do not constitute a confrontation between the executive and the legislative branches," and that "the president acted within the framework of the Constitution."

De los Heros told reporters "no group has a majority in the parliament, and therefore all democratic mechanisms are being used." "The president's comments have the support of the entire cabinet." The prime minister also pointed out to the reporters that "the president of the Republic is empowered by the Constitution to attach comments to the laws, and does not need any approval by the council of ministers; nonetheless, the ministers have voiced their support for the president." The prime minister concludes his remarks by saying that the draft law "has several articles that are unconstitutional." "They cover issues that are not related to the budget."

The newscast then reports on an announcement made by Deputy Eduardo Calmell del Solar, chairman of the bicameral budget commission, that congress will insist on promulgating the general budget law in the exact amount sent to the executive branch. Calmell del Solar said "the bicameral commission has appointed a subcommittee to analyze a pronouncement that will probably be made on 6 January concerning the comments made by the president of the Republic." Calmell del Solar also said "the special congress sessions need to insist on and promulgate the budget law. In addition, it would be important for that special session to issue a legislative resolution to clarify once and for all that the president of the Republic cannot make comments on the annual budget law. That law is totally different from the other laws." Deputy Calmell del Solar concludes his remarks by emphasizing that "the congress of the Republic will have to solve this situation."

The news anchor then conducts a live studio interview with Dr. Enrique Chirinos Soto and Dr. Alberto Ruiz Eldredge, who are members of the constituent assembly that approved the current Constitution. In the 10-minute interview, Chirinos says "there is no such confrontation among the branches of the government," because the officials in each branch are carrying out their duties as provided by the Constitution. "It is up to congress to approve the budget. The president of the Republic is empowered by the Constitution of the Republic, regardless of what Deputy Calmell del Solar said, to attach comments to all draft laws, including the budget, with the sole exception of the constitutional reforms." Chirinos notes that the president "could very well issue an emergency decree and extend the 1991 budget." "But what Calmell del Solar wants to do is modify the Constitution and deprive the president of the Republic of the power to attach comments to the laws, which would be equivalent to a congressional coup d'etat."

The anchor then asks Ruiz Eldredge about the special congress session. Ruiz Eldredge replies that he feels the president did not have the authority to attach comments to the budget law, and that many services such as water, electricity, and transportation could be very much affected by the lack of national budget. Ruiz Eldredge adds that the president's comments "have not been approved by any minister, and therefore his actions are null." "They violate the Constitution."

The anchor then asks Chirinos Soto if this means that "the presidential veto would then be null," to which Chirinos Soto answers: "Of course, all actions by the president of the Republic need to be approved by the ministers of the cabinet. I have no proof that these actions—making comments—have been approved." Chirinos Soto adds that the Constitution of the Republic specifies that "the president of the Republic is authorized to make comments on all or part of every draft law approved by the Constitution, and it does not make any exceptions with regard to the budget law."

Armed Forces Command Chief Supports Fujimori

PY0401141692 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0246 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Text] Lima, 2 Jan (EFE)—On 2 January the Peruvian Armed Forces expressed their support for President Alberto Fujimori's national pacification measures, which have been harshly criticized by the opposition in Congress.

General Nicolas de Bari Hermoza, new president of the Armed Forces Joint Command, in his inaugural address today stressed the military organizations' support for the pacification strategy.

Fujimori presided over the ceremony, which was held in the Defense Ministry.

Bari Hermoza stressed: "We are convinced that with implementation of these legislative decrees within the context of full respect for human rights, we will defeat terrorist violence and drug trafficking, which are trying to destroy the country's democracy in a criminal alliance."

These government decrees, which were promulgated under special powers granted by Congress and implemented in December, were termed "authoritarian and militarist" by a majority of congressmen.

Congressional spokespersons have called for an extraordinary session of the chamber in January to revise the government's legislative decrees and decide on their approval and to reconsider the budget law, which was not promulgated by Fujimori and which, according to political observers, has created "a legal vacuum."

The government has issued a total of 126 decrees on diverse economic and social issues and Congress has questioned at least a quarter of them.

Bari Hermoza, who is also commander in chief of the Army, replacing Pedro Villanueva, stressed in his address, which was disseminated by the state news agency ANDINA, that the Armed Forces have decided to "destroy war and build peace."

The general added that the security forces want to achieve national pacification within the government's strategy and "within the shortest possible time and with the lowest possible social cost."

Bari Hermoza believes that the measures implemented by the government are "coherent and interconnected in order to achieve greater success in the national pacification crusade."

Government 'Satisfaction' at Salvadoran Agreement

PA0601041792 Lima Radio Programas del Peru Network in Spanish 0100 GMT 6 Jan 92

[Text] The Peruvian Government has voiced its satisfaction at the signing of a peace agreement that ended 11 years of armed conflict in El Salvador.

The chief executive also congratulated Javier Perez de Cuellar, who worked actively and tirelessly in his capacity as UN secretary general in search of peace for the Salvadoran people.

Uruguay

Lacalle Under Pressure To Change Economic Policy

PY0201223192 Montevideo BUSQUEDA in Spanish 27 Dec 91 pp 7, 8

[Excerpts] President Luis Alberto Lacalle will have to make some serious decisions during his vacations. During his 20-day vacation in Punta del Este, Lacalle will have to decide whether he will maintain and intensify the economic deregulation process, or listen to his National Party [Blanco] peers who are calling for the replacement of some government officials—a move that would strengthen the faction that supports more gradual and regulating policies.

His fellow party members have more or less established a deadline for his decision. The Blanco leaders who are not Herreristas [those who belong to the faction headed by President Lacalle] are anxiously awaiting his decision.

A high-ranking government source told BUSQUEDA this week that the president intends to continue to implement the existing economic policy and the schedule for the reforms. Those close to President Lacalle, however, have said that he will contact his party during his vacations to discuss the political situation of the party.

Since March 1990, the National Rocha Movement (MNR)—headed by Senator Carlos Julio Pereyra—has endured increasing internal pressure to oppose the economic policy. Vice President Gonzalo Aguirre (head of the Renewal and Victory Movement faction) wrote a letter to Lacalle calling for a softening of the economic policy and the replacement of the current economic team. [passage omitted]

In an interview to BUSQUEDA, Senator Carlos Julio Pereyra admitted that he has been discussing with Lacalle "deadlines" for modifying the economic policy. "Everything has its moment and... certain measures are indispensable for harmonious coexistence," he said.

Pereyra declined to discuss these "deadlines," but political sources have pointed out that, like Aguirre, the MNR leader has been telling Lacalle that January 1992 will be a key month. In the opinion of Aguirre and Pereyra, the main point consists of replacing Ramon Diaz as the Central Bank president. [passage omitted]

Even some members of the Herreristas oppose Lacalle's economic policy. When he first became minister of economy and finance, Enrique Braga faced a sort of "congressional interpellation" by Herrerista congressmen who disliked the idea of a fiscal adjustment that would increase the tax burden.

It is known that some leaders close to Lacalle have commented on their "discrepancies with neo-liberalism" and called for "a less dogmatic position." During 1991, the opposition increased its criticism of Ramon Diaz and some Herrerista congressmen began to suggest that he should be replaced.

The entire situation leaves Lacalle with a very thin and conditioned Blanco support which forces him to negotiate each bill. It also places him in a delicate situation with the Radical Batlleism and the Colorado and Batlleist Union—Colorado Party factions that support the government.

President Lacalle's electoral promise of governing "with the entire party" may become increasingly difficult to fulfill unless he decides to modify the basic principles of his economic policies. [passage omitted]

Joint Venture With Russians To Exploit Krill

PY0301214592 Montevideo EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Dec 91 p 14

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] At noon yesterday, Uruguayan and Soviet businessmen formally created a Uruguayan-Soviet trading company to process protein from marine life.

In a solemn ceremony that reflected the unusual characteristics of the agreement, which was signed outside governmental circles, well-known Uruguayan businessmen and USSR (until 31 December 1991 we can still use this acronym) technicians, scientists, researchers, and biologists representing Soviet companies, signed an agreement creating a company called "Sur-Norte S.A."

Uruguayan investors will hold the majority of the shares of this company which was created under Uruguayan laws. Fernando Munoz Alvarez will be the president of the company and a Soviet scientist specialized in fishing matters will be the vice president. The company will be headquartered in Montevideo and it will process extremely high quality protein from marine life. The Soviets will provide the advanced technology, boats, fishing technology, and the industrial processing equipment, all of which is extremely expensive.

The basic objective of the new company is to fish for krill and, through advanced technology, to obtain protein from it. Through other high-technology processes mastered by the Russians, this product will be used to produce an artificial skin almost identical to human skin. This will be used for skin grafts in the treatment of burn patients. [passage omitted]

Dr. Luis de Barbieri, a company board member, reported: "It must be made clear that our recently created company will be engaged in non-traditional fishing. We will fish for krill, red gilthead [besugo], squid, etc, but not corvina, or any type of hake. The Uruguayan-Russian company fleet will operate well outside the 200 mile limit; that is, it will operate in the South Atlantic." [passage omitted]

Venezuela

Government 'Satisfaction' at El Salvador Accord

PA0301151192 Caracas Venezolana de Television Network in Spanish 0000 GMT 3 Jan 92

[Report by Zaida Pereira from Miraflores Palace]

[Text] The Venezuelan Government has issued a communique voicing its satisfaction with the signing of the peace agreement to end the war in El Salvador. This agreement was made possible thanks to the active mediation of Javier Perez de Cuellar, outgoing UN Secretary General, as well as representatives of the Venezuelan Government.

Part of the communique and its conclusions were reported by Venezuelan Foreign Minister Armando Duran, who said that the New York Agreement signed in the beginning of this year will end a bloody war that has lasted more than 11 years and resulted in 75,000 deaths. Venezuela also feels a great deal of satisfaction for having participated actively—together with Colombia, Mexico, and Spain and under the auspices of the UN secretary general—in attaining peace in Central America.

[Begin Duran recording] With the cooperation of the United Nations, both parties will implement all the agreements contained in the Caracas Agenda, such as the reduction of the Armed Forces, the demobilization of the guerrillas, and other aspects that will ultimately lead to peace in El Salvador. [end recording]

Armando Duran added that the second part of this agreement—the guaranteeing of the cease-fire from 1 February until 31 October of this year—will be signed in Mexico on 16 January.

Regarding the situation in Haiti, Foreign Minister Armando Duran explained that two Foreign Ministry officials, whose visas have expired and have not been renewed by Haitian officials, will be forced to return to Venezuela, leaving the Venezuelan mission without representatives in that country.